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Attacks on an operating system have become a significant and increasingly common prob-
lem. This type of security incident is recorded in forensic artifacts, such as log files. Forensic
investigators will generally examine the logs to analyze such incidents. An anomaly is highly
correlated to an attacker’s attempts to compromise the system. This thesis proposes a novel
framework to automatically detect an anomaly in a forensic timeline constructed from log
files. Before identifying anomalies, an automatic log parser is built so that the investigators
do not need to define a rule-based parser. Parsing is modeled as named entity recognition
problem and a deep learning technique, namely the bidirectional long short-term memory,
is exploited to parse log entries.
This thesis proposes three major methods as the base of the framework. First, a method
for automatic cluster-based anomaly detection is proposed. The anomaly decision is made
based on the estimated threshold derived from the clustering results. It considers several
statistical properties, including frequency and inter-arrival rate. Second, anomalies are
identified by establishing a baseline model for normal activities from log files. Another deep
learning technique, namely the deep autoencoders, is employed to construct the baseline.
Third, this research proposes an anomaly detection using sentiment analysis of log messages.
A negative sentiment means that the investigated log entry is an anomaly. Two methods,
specifically the attention-based deep learning and the gated recurrent unit, are proposed to
perform the sentiment analysis. This work also addresses the class imbalance issue in the
log data using the Tomek link method.
Finally, a fusion technique is applied to combine the aforementioned major methods.
The weighted majority voting is used for the final anomaly decision. The detection results
are then displayed in a forensic timeline to assist the investigators. Experiments on var-
ious public datasets indicate that the proposed framework achieves superior performance
compared to other log anomaly detection methods.
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Event logs are records of important activities performed by users or systems. They are
usually stored in a log file or a database. There are several examples of event logs, such as
system logs, application logs, authentication logs, or network logs. The event log is one of
the most important sources of evidence in forensic investigation and is used to help trace
the attackers and analyze incidents on a particular device.
One of the critical procedures in the examination of digital evidence involves the creation
of a timeline from a forensic disk image [7]. Event logs are the primary source of information
when constructing a forensic timeline. An investigator can retrieve timestamps from log
files on an operating system to create the timeline. The message description in log entries
gives valuable knowledge about a particular incident.
After a security incident, the investigator needs to create a comprehensive timeline. It
is important to recognize suspicious activities and their past events in the timeline [8]. The
forensic timeline gives an insight into the events that took place before, during, and after a
specific security attack [9].
The forensic investigator searches for unusual occurrences on the forensic timeline. How-
ever, current techniques require a manual search [8] or the input of keywords with a strong
probability of occurrence [7]. The use of predetermined dictionaries does not offer flexibility,
as newly-discovered log messages can be recorded in log files. Several other approaches can
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be used to generate a forensic timeline [10, 11], but none of these can identify anomalous
activities in that timeline.
Anomalous activity inspection could take a considerable amount of time if initiated via a
manual command in the prompt or from a terminal [12]. Event management software, such
as Splunk [13], requires users to input thresholds with statistics-based methods, namely
the Z-score and the interquartile range (IQR). However, in several cases [14], the fixed
threshold cannot be adjusted to accommodate the continually changing log records. The
use of conventional machine learning techniques [15] is another approach, although this
method is not very accurate.
In this research, we propose an automatic framework that can detect anomalies in
a forensic timeline. We consider three main aspects, namely clustering-based statistical
properties, normal activity baseline, and the sentiment of log messages. The fusion of these
novel methods facilitates the anomaly detection. The proposed framework provides a more
convenient and automatic approach as well as a better anomaly detection performance.
This chapter is organized as follows. This chapter state the research aims, problem
definition, significance, and contribution of the thesis. Section 1.2 provides aims of this
research. Section 1.3 depicts the scope of the problem. Section 1.4 lists the contributions
of the thesis. Section 1.5 outlines the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Research aims
The aims of this research are listed below:
1. to build an automatic log parser that is used to split and label each field in a log entry
as this is the first step prior to undertaking a closer analysis of log files,
2. to develop cluster-based automatic anomaly detection based on statistical properties,
3. to develop anomaly detection based on normal activity baseline,
4. to develop anomaly detection with sentiment analysis of log messages, and
5. to construct a fusion method based on three main approaches and plot anomaly de-
tection results in a forensic timeline.
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1.3 Scope of the problem
We define the scope of the problem and assumptions to make this research feasible as follows:
1. The event log is obtained from a secure source such as a centralized and secure logging
server.
2. There are no tamper or edit actions for the event logs. Therefore, the integrity of the
event log is assumed to be secure.
3. We focus on the anomaly detection of operating system logs, especially in a Linux
environment.
4. The proposed framework is not associated with a specific attack on an operating
system because we focus on the anomalous events recorded in log entries.
5. The type of anomaly is point-based which means each log entry is checked for its
anomaly.
6. There is no real-time update for the machine learning models in the proposed frame-
work.
1.4 Contributions of the thesis
The current anomaly detection methods to support forensic investigation are very depen-
dent on the parameter setting, which is defined by the user. This circumstance leads to
inefficiency and inaccuracy, as the tuning of the best parameter is very time-consuming.
The aim of our proposed framework is to automate all of the anomaly detection processes,
from pre-processing to timeline visualization, to assist the forensic investigators to analyze
incidents more efficiently. In more detail, the contributions are listed as follows:
1. An automatic tool for event log parsing which does not require forensic investigators
to define any parsing rules. It provides genericity as there is only one model file to
parse various types of log files.
2. A parameter-free graph-based clustering of the event logs. The proposed procedure
then detects an anomaly in the clustering results based on statistical properties of the
cluster.
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3. A novel application of the deep autoencoders for detecting anomalies in operating
system log files as the primary source of a forensic timeline. We present various
features from log files, not only event frequency.
4. An aspect-based sentiment analysis in a forensic timeline with deep learning. The
anomalies are modelled as negative sentiments. We also propose another sentiment
analysis which considers class imbalance in operating system log data.
5. Finally, we propose a fusion method for anomaly detection in a forensic timeline based
on the methods as mentioned above. The fusion method comprises of these novel
approaches and provides more accurate identification results. It should be noted that
the focus of the fusion is to investigate whether our previously developed methods can
complement in a multi-classifier fusion pipeline.
Each module of the proposed framework is described in the next section which sets out
the structure of the thesis. The automatic clustering is an unsupervised method; therefore, it
does not need the training step. The normal activity baseline and sentiment-based methods
are supervised learning and they provide a model file which can be used in the investigation
phase.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This thesis contains eleven chapters where Chapter 3 to Chapter 10 make novel contributions
and represent the steps of the proposed framework.
1. Chapter 1 introduces the problem of anomaly detection for forensic purposes. In
addition, we present the proposed framework to address the problem and the thesis
contributions.
2. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive survey of the literature on forensic analysis of
operating system logs. We present a taxonomy of various techniques used in this area.
Additionally, we discuss the tools that facilitate the examination of the event logs.
This survey also includes a review of the publicly available datasets that are used
for operating system log forensics research. This chapter has been published in the
Digital Investigation [16].
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3. Chapter 3 presents a new tool, namely nerlogparser, to parse the log entries auto-
matically, where log parsing is modelled as a named entity recognition problem. We
use a deep machine learning technique, specifically the bidirectional long short-term
memory networks, as the underlying architecture for this purpose. Unlike existing
tools, nerlogparser is a fully automatic tool as the investigators do not need to define
any parsing rules. It is a generic tool because there is only one model to parse various
types of log files. This chapter has been published in the Proceedings of the 16th
Australian Digital Forensics Conference [17].
4. Chapter 4 proposes a method for the automatic clustering of security logs. First, we
present a new graph-theoretic approach for security log clustering based on maximal
clique percolation. Second, we add an intensity threshold to the obtained maximal
clique to consider the edge weight before proceeding to the percolations. Third, we
use the simulated annealing algorithm to optimize the number of percolations and
intensity threshold for maximal clique percolation. The entire process is automatic
and does not need any user input. This chapter has been published in the Proceed-
ings of the 33rd International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and
Applications [18].
5. Chapter 5 proposes a novel method to automatically detect an anomaly in the access
control log of an operating system. The logs are first pre-processed and then clustered
using an improved MajorClust algorithm to obtain a better cluster. This technique
provides parameter-free clustering so that it can automatically produce an analysis
report for the forensic investigators. The clustering results are checked for anomalies
based on a score that considers several factors. These factors include the total number
of members in a cluster, the frequency of the events in the log file, and the inter-arrival
time of a specific activity. We also provide a graph-based visualization of logs to assist
the investigators with easy analysis. This chapter has been published in the Digital
Investigation [19].
6. Chapter 6 proposes an automatic method to facilitate event log abstraction, avoiding
the need for the user to manually identify suitable parameters. We model event logs
as a graph and propose a new graph clustering approach to group log entries. The
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abstraction is then extracted from each cluster. This chapter has been published in
the Proceedings of the Australasian Computer Science Week Multiconference (Session:
Australasian Information Security Conference) [20].
7. Chapter 7 proposes a method for identifying anomalies in a forensic timeline. We use
deep autoencoders as a machine learning technique to establish a baseline for normal
activities in log files. Furthermore, we set an anomaly threshold of reconstruction
value based on the constructed baseline. We then plot these anomalous events on a
forensic timeline.
8. Chapter 8 proposes a sentiment analysis technique to automatically extract events of
interest from log messages in the forensic timeline. We use a deep learning technique
with a context and content attention model to identify aspect terms and the sentiments
in the forensic timeline. Terms with negative sentiments indicate events of interest and
will be highlighted in the timeline. This enables the investigator to quickly examine
the events and other activities recorded within the surrounding time frame. This
chapter has been published in the IEEE Access (Special Issue on Deep Learning:
Security and Forensics Research Advances and Challenges) [21].
9. Chapter 9 proposes a novel deep learning-based sentiment analysis technique to check
for anomalous activities in system logs. Log messages are modelled as sentences. We
identify the sentiments using the gated recurrent unit (GRU) networks. System log
datasets inherently have a class imbalance in the sense that the number of negative
sentiments is much lower than the number of positive ones. In order to address the
class imbalance, we build a GRU layer on top of a class imbalance solver using the
Tomek link method.
10. Chapter 10 investigates a fusion technique for anomaly detection comprising the three
main proposed methods, namely aspect-based sentiment analysis, detection based on
normal activity baseline, and data balancing combined with sentiment analysis for
detection. We use weighted majority voting as the fusion technique to determine
whether or not a log entry is an anomaly.
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11. Chapter 11 concludes the research and discusses the future work that will be un-




A survey on forensic investigation
of operating system logs
Event logs are one of the most important sources of digital evidence for forensic investi-
gation because they record essential activities on the system. In this work, we present a
comprehensive literature survey of forensic analysis on operating system logs. We present
a taxonomy of various techniques used in this area. Additionally, we discuss tools that
support the examination of the event logs. This survey also gives a review of the publicly
available datasets that are used in operating system log forensics research. Finally, we
suggest potential future directions on the topic of operating system log forensics.
2.1 Introduction
There are various forms of digital evidence. For example, the browsing history, chat logs,
authentication log files, and deleted files or images. Event logs are files that record the
important activities performed by the user, application software, or operating systems.
Therefore, these files are considered one of the main pieces of evidence for digital forensic
analysis. For example in the Windows operating system, the log files are usually found in
This chapter has been published in the Digital Investigation, vol. 29, pp. 1-20, 2019. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2019.02.005.
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the directory C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\, while in the Linux environment they
are located in /var/log/.
Log files serve various purposes. An event log can be used as evidence in court [22].
These files may assist in the reconstruction of an attack [23]. They can also support iden-
tification of relationships between separate events [24, 25]. Log files can be used to detect
anomalous user behavior or system activity [26, 19]. Accordingly, methods to maintain the
integrity of logs and to detect any modification have previously been studied [27, 28]. In
general, log forensics have been investigated extensively and a rich volume of literature is
available on this topic. In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive survey of this existing
literature.
This paper reviews various aspects of the forensic analysis of event logs focusing on
operating system (OS) logs. We construct a taxonomy on the basis of a generic inves-
tigation pipeline such as event logs recovery, event correlation, event reconstruction, and
visualization. Based on a generic forensic framework [1], we categorize existing publications
within this taxonomy. We then thoroughly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the
techniques in each category.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief description of other
relevant surveys and then outlines the contributions made by this work. Section 2.3 defines
the terminology used in this thesis. We present the survey methodology for event log
forensics in Section 2.4. A mind map of the event log forensics taxonomy is also depicted in
this section to describe the high level structure of the assorted methods used in this area.
The subsequent sections (Section 2.5 to Section 2.9) will describe a review for each step in
the generic framework. We also describe the forensic tools in Section 2.10 and the publicly
available datasets to support OS log forensics experiments in Section 2.11. The discussion
about datasets will assist future researchers to select the most appropriate data and case
study. We outline the current challenges and potential future directions of research on this
topic in Section 2.12. Finally, Section 2.13 concludes this study.
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2.2 Relevant surveys and our contributions
There are several other surveys connected with event log forensics. A recent survey by Khan
et al. [29] focuses exclusively on event log forensics in the cloud environment. Khan et al.
[29] analyze the accessibility of cloud logs, logging as a service, security requirements, and
possible security challenges faced in the cloud. There are several other surveys on the cloud
log forensics [30, 31, 32]. However, the survey by Khan et al. [29] is the most comprehensive.
Mishra et al. [30] focus on reviewing existing cloud forensics frameworks. Almulla et al.
[31] give other insights by classifying the cloud log forensics not only by the method, but also
by trending technology and the forensic framework. A different view of cloud log forensics
is presented by Farina et al. [32] by providing a review of remote forensics techniques, live
forensics, and cloud-facilitated forensics analysis.
Another related survey paper [33] discusses event reconstruction based on log files for
forensic purposes. However, Chabot et al. [33] do not provide any clear classification of
existing techniques and describe only a few studies on event reconstruction. A review of
web log forensics was presented in [34]. In addition to discussing the methodology, Lazzez
and Slimani [34] provide a comparison of several investigation tools for conducting the web
application forensics.
Compared with existing related survey articles, the contributions of this study are listed
below.
(a) This study provides a broad range of topics across a large number of papers, including
event log security and recovery, event reconstruction and correlation, event anomalies,
and visualization.
(b) We present a list of existing methods for each topic, provide a critical summary, and
analyze the respective advantages and disadvantages.
(c) This paper reviews methods for the forensic analysis of OS logs as this evidence is
commonly found when extracted from a forensic disk image.
(d) We present a mind map taxonomy to assist with the classification of research across
a range of areas related to forensic investigation of OS logs.
(e) We discuss forensic tools as well as public datasets focusing on OS logs.
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2.3 Terminology
For clarity, this section outlines the terminology used in this survey. An event is an iden-
tifiable action that happens on a device and is recorded in a log entry [35]. An event log
is a record of events, usually implemented in a log file or a table in a database. A log file
is a file that records activities from applications or operating system. This artifact is the
primary focus in event log forensics and contains log entries. A log entry is defined as a
single record in a log file. An event message refers to the main message in a log entry
excluding timestamp and any other fields such as hostname and application process name.
Operating system logs are log files in a particular OS such as Windows and Linux.
Additionally, digital evidence is defined as any data stored or transmitted using a com-
puter that supports a theory of how an offense occurred or how the data addresses critical
elements of the offense [36]. Although the digital data may not be directly related to an
attack, it will be considered as a digital evidence as long as it is discovered in a crime scene.
The forensic investigator is a person who analyzes the digital evidence, specifically event
logs in this case. An artifact is a digital object that will be investigated such as log file,
disk, memory, or an image file. However in this survey, an artifact will always refer to an
event log file from an OS unless otherwise indicated.
2.4 Survey methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology for constructing the taxonomy of event log
forensics. The detailed aspects of the methodology are explained in each subsection below.
2.4.1 Forensic framework for classifying studies
We refer to Generic Computer Forensic Investigation Model (GCFIM) [1] and map existing
publications into this framework. We chose this framework because it provides completeness
and can accommodate various methods for event log forensics. Another general advantage of
GCFIM is that it is created based on the identification of the common processes in forensic
investigation. GCFIM is built based on a detailed review of 15 digital forensic investigation
models.
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The following are the typical steps in event log forensics based on GCFIM framework.
(a) Pre-processing step as forensic readiness of OS logs
This step concerns secure handling of logs and provides an explanation of event logs as
a digital evidence. If the event logs are secured by design, then they will be forensically
ready to be examined when a cyber incident has occurred.
(b) Acquisition of OS logs
Acquisition refers to the recovery of event logs. This artifact may be already available
or the investigator may need to recover event logs from a device because they have
been deleted.
(c) Main analysis of OS log investigation
This is the main phase of the framework. The investigator will check if there are any
modifications to the logs. They can be accessed using a special query or retrieval
technique. In this phase, the most common analyses conducted are event correlation,
event reconstruction, or anomaly detection.
(d) Visualization of OS logs from investigation results
After the analysis is complete, the result needs to be visualized in order to provide
the forensic investigator with relevant insights. Visualization can also produce both
general and detailed events for further investigation.
(e) Post-process of OS log investigation
The last phase of the framework is a review of the overall investigation process. This
step includes evaluation of digital forensic investigation frameworks. The investigator
needs to evaluate which model is more appropriate for a particular case.
The description of these aspects in the event log forensics framework is summarized in
the Fig. 2.1. Sections 2.5 - 2.9 give a detailed description of each topic. A mind map of the
taxonomy of OS log forensics is provided in Fig. 2.2. Besides the framework, the mind map




forensic readiness of OS logs
Acquisition of OS logs
Main analysis of 
OS log investigation
Visualization of OS logs
Post-process of 
OS log investigation
- Guarantee the security of OS logs
- OS logs as a digital evidence
- Recovery of the OS logs from the device
- Retrieval of OS logs
- Detection of tamper operation
- Correlation and reconstruction of events
- Detection of anomaly 
- Visualization to present the analysis results
- Review the investigation process
Figure 2.1: Proposed framework of OS log forensics based on Generic Computer Forensic
Investigation Model [1]
2.4.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for literature
We define the inclusion and exclusion criteria for papers discussed in this survey as there are
many papers that relevant to OS log forensics topics. The inclusion criteria are explained
as follows.
(a) The papers consider an issue in one of steps in forensic investigation. The steps
include preprocessing for forensic readiness, acquisition of OS logs, and main forensic
examination such as tamper detection and event reconstruction. The content of the
paper should discuss one of these forensic aspects explicitly.
(b) The papers discuss forensic tools such as tools for extracting Windows event logs.
(c) The papers discuss case study and forensic dataset which is considering OS logs.
(d) The papers are written in English and standardized paper style.
Moreover, we specify the exclusion criteria for some papers that are not included in this
survey. The criteria are described below.
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Figure 2.2: A taxonomy of OS log forensics literature
(a) The papers discuss forensic analysis of network logs or network traffic saved in a
packet capture (pcap) file. For further information about this subject, the readers are
referred to a survey of network forensics [37].
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(b) The papers discuss business processes rather than event log forensics. The former
is already intensively discussed in the process mining research area. For more detail
about business event logs, the readers can check a survey paper on process mining
[38].
(c) The papers’ method or tools which do not explicitly concern about forensics. For
example, there are papers discussing anomaly detection in event log data, but they
do not explicitly discuss the forensic investigation. Therefore, we do not include these
kinds of papers in this survey.
(d) Cloud log forensics
Cloud computing has been an emerging area in information technology and therefore
there are many studies that examine event logs in a cloud environment. As discussed
previously, we have excluded cloud log forensics from the scope of this paper. Inter-
ested readers are referred to Khan et al.’s survey of cloud-based log forensics [29].
(e) Secure data provenance
The papers concerning secure data provenance are excluded. Provenance is informa-
tion containing where and how a data, such as log files, was written, who created the
data, and modifications involved [39]. Provenance can determine suspicious activities
in a system because of its tracking ability to both kernel and application actions.
Therefore, provenance is useful for event log forensics to provide digital evidence for
post-investigation. For a complete review of secure data provenance for various pur-
poses and applications, we recommend the reader to refer to a survey by Zafar et al.
[39].
2.4.3 Paper collection
There are three phases for paper collection in a survey paper. The first phase is to search the
literature. We explore the papers on event log forensics in the following online libraries from
several leading publishers: ACM Digital Library, ScienceDirect, IEEE Xplore, and Springer
Link. We also search through Google Scholar as this search engine is specially designed for
searching scientific literature. The term used for searching through these digital libraries is
“event log forensics”. We consider all the papers related to the area from 1997-2018.
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The second phase is filtering the search results. We filter the results whether or not
relevant to OS log forensics. After reading the paper, we removed results not relevant to
OS log forensics. The filtering is based on inclusion and exclusion criteria described in
Section 2.4.2.
The third phase is to conduct a recursive search for references. In each paper found
from the second phase, we check the references and open the potential article. We apply
the second phase to each paper. We want to trace the reference to its first publication
discussed about a certain topic. This process is assisted by Google Scholar feature “cited
by” represented by the quotation mark button from a particular paper title.
Furthermore, we identify some information about the papers when collecting specifically:
(a) full citation reference, such as author names, title, journal or conference name, and
year,
(b) classification and sub-classification of the paper within GCFIM as the formal forensic
framework used in this survey,
(c) summary of the proposed method, its advantages, as well as its disadvantages.
2.5 Pre-processing step as forensic readiness of OS logs
This section discusses the pre-processing step in OS log forensics. According Tan [40],
digital forensic readiness (DFR) has two aims. First, DFR is designed to maximize an
organization’s ability to acquire credible digital evidence. Second, DFR intends to minimize
the cost of investigation when a security incident has happened. In the context of OS log
forensics, DFR is related to building a secure log infrastructure, so it will be forensically
ready to be analyzed. In addition, Elyas et al. [41] suggested that DFR is not only related to
infrastructure but also be legal-ready. Therefore, we also discuss OS logs as digital evidence
that can be presented in courts.
2.5.1 OS log security
This phase deals with securing OS logs from modification so that they can be forensically
examined. This process is also referred as ante-mortem forensics where the system is ready
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to be investigated in future when an attack or a security incident happens. We classify
security of OS logs into five categories based on the methods used: 1) cryptographic ap-
proaches; 2) log centralization; 3) cryptographic log centralization; 4) virtual machines; and
5) secure data structures.
Cryptographic approaches
The standard technique to identify whether or not data is modified is using a hash func-
tion. It produces a fixed length string called a hash value from arbitrary data input. A
cryptographic hash has the property that it is infeasible to invert the hash value and so as
to calculate the original input data. Schneier and Kelsey [42] propose a basic method for
securing event logs for forensic purposes based on cryptographic hashes. It provides security
and integrity for event logs even on an untrusted device. This work became the foundation
for subsequent research on log security. In general, the method creates an authentication
key which is assumed securely generated and saved on the machine. This key is used to
cryptographically hash each log entry. Every single log entry becomes part of a hash chain
to authenticate all previous log entries [42]. However, the Schneier and Kelsey’s method has
a limitation. If an attacker is able to gain access to an insecure machine, where the event
logs are saved, then the attacker can continue to write log entries as if it is authorized [42].
To make the OS logs more secure, there is a method to prevent any edit or delete
operation on the log files [43]. They apply a decentralized management of log files in
several log servers based on a cryptographic hash function. It means the log files are split
into chunks and each chunk is possibly located in different servers. Each chunk is copied to
more than one server to provide redundancy for backup purposes. However, if redundancy
in these dispersion files is removed by the attacker, the detection of an attack is not always
possible [43].
Log centralization
Traditional logging systems such as syslogd [44], and its extension syslog-ng [45], can
provide backup and security to event logs on a Unix-based OS. These systems can be
configured on either the local or remote machine. Research has found that the centralization
17
of event logs can increase security and also standardizes the logging mechanism for forensic
purposes [46]. Sahoo et al. [46] present a system for securing Windows event logs against
software or hardware failures. The Windows event logs are converted to syslog format
because syslog is the common logging standard for various devices. The event logs are
collected proactively on the local machine and then sent to remote logging server.
The advantage of the centralization method is that it provides an automatic approach
to record Windows event logs on a dedicated logging server and also gives a monitoring
interface. The proposed method employs a service attached to a native Windows process.
This approach leaves the original log files on the local machine and sends the duplicates
to the server. Therefore, it is less vulnerable when the machine is compromised as there
are copies of event logs. The centralization method is more focused on maintaining the
confidentiality of event logs. Although this architecture can be extended to other platforms,
the method currently only supports Windows event logs. In addition, this approach does
not encrypt the log entries when they are sent to the server. The log duplicates in the server
are also not encrypted. Therefore, we need cryptographic log centralization to provide more
secure event logs as discussed in the next section.
Cryptographic log centralization
While centralization techniques and cryptographic log entries are separate methods, they are
provide greater security if combined into a hybrid architecture. A system can defend event
logs from malicious attacks by building a network processor and secure operating system
as proposed by Ra and Park [47]. A network processor is a hardware similar to central
processing unit (CPU) and is programmable for networking-related applications. For the
secure OS, the authors use a hardened version of Linux utilizing a security module based on
US Department of Defense requirements. This security module is well-known as Security-
Enhanced Linux (SELinux). The evaluation of this method shows it can successfully detect
unauthorized access attempts on a machine. However, there is a disadvantage in Ra and
Park’s approach. The proposed method imposes a time overhead for cryptographic process
which needs to be reduced to make the performance acceptably faster [47]. In addition, this
architecture only supports Linux-based environments in the given implementation.
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Another work proposes a mechanism to validate and authenticate syslog [48]. This
proposal adds various fields such as username, application, and system to each syslog entry.
It also adds an authentication mechanism before sending the logs to the server. However,
a proof of concept with experiments is not available in that work [48].
To deal with event logs from multiple sources including OS logs, Lin et al. [49] provide
an automatic forensic analysis by implementing a collection agent. This procedure first
aggregates the event logs, then normalizes and analyzes them in a central location. In
addition, a combination of hash functions, digital signatures, and timestamps are used to
preserve the integrity and authenticity of event logs [49]. However, there is a problem with
duplication of logs from the proposed log collection agent and some attacks are unable to
be reconstructed [49].
In addition, one can improve the authenticity of event logs using a distributed log
architecture, called BBox, along with event log encryption and tamper detection [50]. One
drawback of the BBox architecture is adding entries to the log file is rather expensive and
becomes a bottleneck. Therefore, the method needs more efficient data structures [50].
As centralization and cryptography provide many advantages, we outline a typical model
for this approach in Fig. 2.3. There are two main parts of the architecture, namely mon-
itored client and forensic server. The first part contains a log collection agent, which
processes OS logs and creates a cryptographic hash. The log entries are sent to the forensic
server with encryption enabled. On the server side, the log entries are decrypted and the
hash is verified. The server also normalizes OS logs for further analysis such as insertion
into secure database or tamper detection operation. The investigator can view and monitor
all log entries on the server.
OS log security using virtual machines
The use of virtual machines can preserve the integrity of OS logs as demonstrated by Chou
et al. [51]. The authors also propose using a kernel module to write OS logs so it can be
securely loaded together with other kernel modules. They tested two approaches and chose













Figure 2.3: A typical model for OS log security using centralization and cryptographic
approach
from the host operating system. However, there is no explanation about how the host and
guest operating systems can communicate securely [51].
In 2012, a study addressed secure methods for logging by employing a separate virtual
machine to store the OS logs [28]. The proposed mechanism compares the logs in a mon-
itored host operating system and the virtual machine. Although this method is able to
detect log loss and data tampering, it imposes a large overhead in sending the logs to the
virtual machine.
Secure data structures
In order to identify the modifications of an event log, a secure data structure can be con-
structed as an indexing engine. The tree-based data structure can provide incremental and
membership proof of each log entry [52]. This mechanism will provide evidence that the
OS logs are authentic and detect any tampering attempt. The merit of this approach is it
produces only a very small sized hash chain for a very large number of log entries. Although
this method was applied to syslog, it can be extended to the various types of event logs
thanks to the generic nature of the tree data structure.
Another approach starts with building a model for the secure data structure based
on combinatorial group testing [53]. The data structures included are arrays, linked lists,
binary search trees, skip lists, and hash tables. However, this secure data structure does
not consider existing log entries that get rewritten as usually the system will overwrite the
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Table 2.1: A summary of key publications in OS log security
Method Publication Advantage Disadvantage
Cryptographic
approaches
[42] Able to run in unsecure
machine
Invalid log entries are still
processed
[43] Disperse the log files Attack detection depends on
redundancy
Log centralization [46] Simplify logging mechanism Only support Windows
Cryptographic log
centralization
[47] Double security mechanism Produce cryptographic time
overhead
[49] Deal with multi source event
logs
A few reduplicate logs
[50] Complete package of log
security
A little bottleneck when adding
log entry
Virtual machines [51] Demonstrate that
virtualization is better than
kernel module
No explanation how host and
guest OS communicate securely
[28] Prevent both event log loss
and tampering




[53] Provide security in regular
data structure
Do not consider data that changes
over time
[52] Produce a small hash chain
for large logs
This method can be extended to
various type of logs
old log entries. This generic protocol can be applied to secure OS logs.
Besides the research in event log security to support the forensic investigation, there
are articles that provide a framework or a review in this area. Ahmad and Ruighaver [54]
define the requirements of an audit management infrastructure to improve log security. The
framework is based on a top-down approach to fill the gap between organizational security
policy and event log configuration. Ayrapetov et al. [55] present an improvement of the
secure OS logging mechanism. It presents a taxonomy of existing secure logging systems,
analyzes the unaddressed issues, and provides possible solutions for future research.
Two similar papers by Accorsi [56, 57] review existing secure OS log protocols. This
work presents a comparison of the security requirements fulfilled by the existing secure
protocols for OS logs as digital evidence. Accorsi emphasizes that the event log security
mechanism needs formal verification to guarantee the correctness of the proposed algorithm.
Furthermore, there is a need for a standard format for event logs as a digital evidence that
will be presented in court [56, 57]. Finally, we summarize the various methods in event log
security in Table 2.1.
21
2.5.2 OS logs as digital evidence
Event logs have been evaluated for their quality as digital evidence in courts, with one of the
earliest works that provides a framework of tests to evaluate digital evidence being found
in Sommer [58]. A log file can be used as an evidence when it has passed several tests such
as acquisition process test, chain of custody test, and quality of forensic presentation test.
The acquisition process test has two main aspects specifically accuracy and completeness.
First, accurate means free from any contamination when an acquisition is performed. The
procedure must be conducted by certified forensic investigator. Second, the acquired ev-
idence can tell a complete chronology of particular set of event sequences. In a chain of
custody, the log evidence has been acquired on a device, viewed, and investigated. This
evidence is possibly copied several times by the police or forensic experts. In this case, the
log evidence must be securely preserved and tamper-proof. To test the quality of forensic
presentation, the evidence in electronic form needs to be printed and presented in a court.
The authorities should offer two presentation forms, specifically a raw and detailed version
and an edited one. The latter version provides a narrative to explain what was done and
can be clearly understood by the court.
Another research article assesses the evidential weight of OS logs [59]. This work defines
three specific criteria namely accuracy, completeness, and utility to evaluate event logs
as digital evidence. Accuracy and completeness are based on criteria from Sommer [58].
Moreover, Ahmad and Ruighaver [59] add utility as one additional criteria. The utility is a
desirable quality of event logs that makes the evidence to expose some factors, specifically:
1) a proof of the correct working activities on the investigated systems; 2) an identification
of the host system and incidents in detail; and 3) an identification of any information
contained in event logs.
For Windows as the most common operating system, Ibrahim et al. [22] have analyzed
the sufficiency of Windows event logs as a digital evidence. Assessment of event logs based
on admissibility and weight regarding legal evidence is presented. The general standard for
admissibility of evidence is to prove that the evidence is relevant, authentic, and reliable.
It is also required that the evidence satisfies the legal rules and does not contain hearsay
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material. In assessing the weight of evidence, a number of features are put into consider-
ation based on requirements from Sommer [58]. The features are authenticity, accuracy,
completeness, clear chain of custody, and transparency of forensic procedure. However, this
method was only tested on Windows 2003 whereas the paper was written in 2012.
2.6 Acquisition of OS logs
In the acquisition phase, event logs are acquired from a device, specifically a hard disk.
The problem arises when the log files are removed, and therefore need to be recovered.
This section discusses acquisition of OS logs. In some cases, OS logs are deleted by the
attacker to wipe the digital evidence. Additionally, the deletion of a log file is a typical
malware behavior in Windows environment [60]. The forensic investigator needs to recover
this evidence to ascertain further information about the incident. Therefore, some studies
focus on the recovery of deleted log files before conducting the main forensic analysis.
File recovery can be performed without any file system metadata available. Exploiting
this property, Richard III and Roussev [61] created the Scalpel tool. This is a file carving
tool that recovers any files by analyzing the header and footer of a chunked segment on
the disk, which can then be reconstructed to get the whole file. Subsequently, Craiger [62]
proposed a technique to recover various digital evidence from a Linux environment including
event logs. This technique uses standard Linux commands such as dd to recover a file based
on a particular signature. The benefit of the Scalpel tool is that it can recover the deleted
file quickly and supports all major OS such as Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X. Although
the Craiger’s technique can use Linux standard commands and tools, it does not scale for
large quantities of event log data [62].
In the Windows environment, Murphey [63] proposes a technique for automatic recovery
and repair of Windows NT5 (XP and 2003) event logs. This method employs the Scalpel
tool for recovery. It then repairs the file by scanning for the trailer signature and validates
the result using the LogParser tool [64]. However, this approach has not been extended to
Windows NT6 (Vista) and newer versions [63].
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Furthermore, Schuster [65] investigates Windows Vista event logs and recovers them
by parsing the unique magic strings and block layout of a log file. Every type of log
file has these magic strings in the header that differ from one to another, assisting the
recovery process. In addition, this work offers a detailed description of Windows Vista
logs. However, not all elements in the XML file can be defined due to the unavailability
of official documentation from Microsoft [65]. Another technique exists to retrieve the
fragmented event log files automatically [66]. It is able to look for fragmented log files
without metadata by using a signature and the entropy difference between adjacent disk
clusters. Similar to Murphey [63], its main disadvantage is that it only covers Windows
NT5 event logs. Another improvement can be made by defining a better fragment boundary
of a log file that saved on the disk. The more accurate fragment detection will improve the
recovery results.
2.7 Main analysis of OS log investigation
This phase is the primary process of the forensic investigation. Various types of examination
are conducted on the acquired evidence as discussed in Section 2.6. The main objectives
of this phase are to detect a possible modification to OS logs, identify and reconstruct the
cause of incident by event correlation and reconstruction, and anomaly detection in log files.
In addition, this section also addresses event log retrieval and event log abstraction.
2.7.1 OS log retrieval
In the case of digital forensics, retrieval deals with how the investigator can save, search,
or perform a query on the event logs. This process can be classified based on the type of
storage used: 1) XML-based; 2) database; and 3) live capture.
XML-based log retrieval
Alink et al. [67] present a mechanism called XIRAF to manage and query digital evidence
including event logs from Windows. XIRAF extracts the digital evidence from a forensic
image and converts them into XML (eXtensible Markup Language) format. The investiga-
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Figure 2.4: A typical model for OS log retrieval using XML-based approach
tor then performs indexing and querying based on the XML database. Another study parses
Windows Vista event logs to facilitate more effective analysis [68]. The authors organize bi-
nary XML Windows Vista event logs and convert these to a readable XML-based structure.
Another approach, namely XLIVE, builds an XML-based structure to save various event
logs including OS logs and classify them [69]. This method then provides a framework for
automatic investigation. XLIVE also supports live capture of digital evidence as discussed
in the next subsection.
Although XIRAF [67] offers a quite complete query platform, it does not provide sup-
port for binary file indexing, such as BLOB types, to be correlated with other log files.
Another XML-based method [68] still needs further research for the unidentified data type
in Windows Vista event logs. In addition, XLIVE [69] needs to be extended to non-Windows
environments.
A typical model for event log retrieval based on an XML approach is given in Fig. 2.4.
First, the OS logs are preprocessed and the fields such as timestamp, process identifier,
and the main message are extracted. The log entries are then written into an XML-based
repository or database. The forensic investigator can access the event logs via query interface
to examine a particular event or analyze suspicious events via a log viewer.
Log retrieval using database
The performance of searching for a particular log message is important as a part of the
analysis. Takahashi and Xiao [70, 71] analyze the complexity of event log retrieval in the
searching process. They compare and calculate the complexity of a number of searching
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algorithms to retrieve event logs in terms of big O notation. Awawdeh et al. [72] suggest
implementing recording modules for event logs and saving the processed logs into a database.
The investigator can then perform a query to the database for further analysis.
Takahashi and Xiao [70] compare some search algorithms for event logs. They report
that the work can still be improved by evaluating other techniques as there are many such
algorithms. The later method [72] only uses a small portion of memory to process large
logs. In spite of this advantage, the method can be extended to other environments such
as Windows 8, Linux, and Mac OS X.
Live capture of OS logs
Live capture means the analysis is conducted in real time and there is no need to wait
until an incident occurs. Choi et al. [73] introduce live analysis of digital evidence in Linux
environments. They provide a framework for real-time analysis, specifically for evidence
collection, forensic analysis such as investigating running processes by a particular user,
and generating reports. This framework can be improved by generalizing the capability to
other Linux distributions.
On the other hand, one can use XML-based structures to perform live capture called
XLIVE [69] as discussed in the previous subsection. XLIVE can both capture volatile and
non-volatile data including event logs. There are four main modules in XLIVE: 1) the type
analyzer to detect the type of digital evidence, 2) the data collection module to organize
the evidence found, 3) the data parsing and writing to manipulate the digital evidence into
XML structure, and 4) the database and report module. An agent-based approach [72]
is another alternative for real-time evidence collection. Its main module to get event logs
is Windows Event Watcher which gathers all event logs generated by Windows such as
application logs, hardware event logs, and security logs.
Besides the aforementioned categories, there are specific studies on the Windows op-
erating system for event log retrieval. In [74], a deep analysis of Windows 8 event logs is
presented for the first time. This work explains a detailed anatomy of Windows 8 event
logs such as event types, log format, and log structure. It also provides forensic analysis of
26
Table 2.2: A summary of key publications in OS log retrieval for forensic purposes
Method Publication Advantage Disadvantage
XML-based [67] Provide a complete query
platform
Do not provide support for binary
file indexing
[68] Parse raw file from
unallocated space
There are some unidentified data
types
[69] XML-based framework for
event log capture
Only support Windows environment
Database [70] Review search algorithm
for event logs
Needs to check for other search
algorithms
[72] Small memory allocation
to process large logs




[73] Framework for live
capture of evidence
Only support Linux Fedora
[69] XML-based framework for
event log capture
Only support Windows environment
an unauthorized access attempt. Furthermore, the investigator can perform analyses in the
Windows environments using PowerShell. Barakat and Hadi [75] demonstrate PowerShell’s
ability for evidence collection, extraction, and identifying various forensic artifacts including
event logs. The use of PowerShell brings many advantages as it is a native tool supported
in Windows. The features from Barakat and Hadi [75] can be extended for newer Windows
versions. A summary of event log retrieval publications is shown in Table 2.2.
2.7.2 Tamper detection of OS logs
The detection of modification is needed to validate the integrity of event logs. It often
becomes a part of the same event log security process described in Section 2.5.1. The
difference with the previous phase is that the detection is performed after an incident has
occurred. We divide the approach of tamper detection into four main categories: 1) rule-
based; 2) cryptographic hashes; and 3) hardware-based.
Rule-based tamper detection
Métayer et al. [76] and Mazza et al. [77] propose a framework that defines formal criteria
of event log architectures that consider security and can detect any malicious modifications.
The formal rules for log correctness and consistency are modeled based on the B-method
[78]. However, the proposed architecture cannot handle incorrect log entries that may exist
[77]. In other words, Mazza et al. [77] assumes that log entries are always correct when
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appended to a log file for the first time. The modification detection is conducted after all
log entries saved.
Cho [79] presents a method for investigators to detect timestamp modification specifi-
cally in Windows file systems. The paper provides a detailed structure of a Windows journal
file that saves the operation sequences on the file system. The proposed method then an-
alyzes several types of timestamp tampering and creates the rules to detect the forgery in
various files. This work is the first use of the NTFS journaling system for forensic purposes.
The only limitation is when defining the rules for alteration attempts. If the rules have not
defined, the modification cannot be detected.
Tamper detection using cryptographic hashes
As an integral part of event log security, the cryptographic hash approach can be used to
detect the modification of an event log. If a single log entry is removed or tampered with,
it will break the hash value chain because each log entry contributes to the generation of
the hash code [42, 43]. The advantage of this hash-based approach is that it is very fast
because it uses an in-memory data structure with a low overhead.
Accorsi [50] implements this type of hash chaining method in a distributed architecture
and uses the public key cryptography to ensure only authorized machines can send log
entries to the designed server. This method provides a complete package of log security
specifically integrity, tamper detection, and retrieval of the log entries. The disadvantage
of the cryptographic hash is when the attackers can successfully access the machine, the
integrity of event logs will not be guaranteed anymore since they will break the log security
architecture.
Hardware-based tamper detection
Detection of alteration can also be performed in hardware-based secure storage for event
logs [27, 80]. For instance, AMD processor provides a feature called Secure Virtual Machine
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that can run a special protected code [27]. It also offers
Secure Loader Block (SLB) to work with Legitimate Logging Client (LLC). This hardware
technology protects the integrity of the OS logs and prevents tampering operations.
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Table 2.3: A summary of key publications in OS log correlation and reconstruction
Method Publication Advantage Disadvantage
Rule-based [81] Lightweight and
platform-independent
Need many rules for other applications
[82] Automatic recognition of
events
Depend on the pattern specification in
database
Database [83] Provide flexibility with query Manual recognition of pattern of attack
[84] Automatic correlation Not consider time zone in timestamp analysis
Semantic
model
[85] Automatic detection of event
sequence
Not include standarized ontology components
[25] The latest ontology approach Not supply experimental results
Tree or graph [86] Automatic reasoning Focus on network packet and event logs as
secondary




[88] Handle multiple logs from
different devices
It is assumed that device and logs are not
modified
[89] Manage various logs Assumed that time always synchronized
Finite state
machines




[91] Snapshot of VM can be
saved for later analysis




[92] Find the root cause of an
incident in real time
Can be extended to other operating systems
As outlined in Section 2.5.1, software-based technique generates overhead as each log
entry is sent to the server. In log tamper detection using software, further research is
needed for evaluating the sending mechanism. It may be possible to send some log entries
periodically rather than one by one to the server, to make sending many log entries faster.
On the other hand, hardware-based approach gives another insight into event log security
compared with those that only use software. However, the use of hardware-supported
techniques cannot prevent impersonation attacks as discussed in [27, 80].
2.7.3 Event correlation and reconstruction
Correlation and reconstruction of the events are closely related topics and accordingly are
considered together here. Investigators need to correlate multiple events, possibly from
separate log files, in order to reconstruct an attack. The classification of these topics are:
1) rule-based; 2) database; 3) semantic model; 4) tree or graph-based; 5) timestamp-based;
6) finite state machines; 7) virtual machines; and 8) live event reconstruction. Each category
is described below and a summary is given in Table 2.3.
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Rule-based correlation and reconstruction
Simple Event Correlator (SEC) provides lightweight and platform-independent event cor-
relation [81]. It implements a rule-based method to identify possible attacks on the system
from event logs. However, SEC needs many different rules for other application logs, so
the rules should be manually defined. Following SEC, Abbott et al. [82] provide automatic
recognition of events by creating logical matching pattern saved in an XML file. Similar to
SEC, this technique depends on the pattern specifications saved in the database.
To deal with massive log files, Herreŕıas and Gomez [93] create a formal model for the
events. The method uses this formal model in the correlation engine based on pre-condition
and post-condition rules. Although the paper offers automated solutions, no experiment
is presented in the paper. Furthermore, to reconstruct the events automatically, Herreŕıas
and Gomez [24] use predefined attack based rules and correlate events based on the log
properties. The author suggests further improvement for adding more rules in the knowledge
base.
In addition to the previous approaches, the investigator can run the correlation and
filtering of various logs including OS logs [94]. In this case, the filtering is related to
extracting and arranging event logs based on particular fields such as by protocol or IP
address. We can then use a top-down or bottom-up approach to correlate events. To deal
with large log files, this method requires some adaptation to distributed system platforms
[94].
Event correlation based on database
Since there can be multiple sources of logs including OS logs, an investigator should unify
those sources, build a database, and run queries to correlate the events [83]. Although it
gives flexibility through the query interface, this method requires that the forensic investi-
gator manually configure attack patterns in the database.
By using a database, the investigator can run an event correlation automatically [84].
One should normalize the Windows event logs before inserting them into the database. Next,
the investigator is able to discover and correlate the event using an SQL query. Despite its
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automatic behavior, this approach does not consider the timezone in timestamp analysis
[84]. In some cases, this will lead to inaccurate event correlation. To address this issue, the
forensic investigators have to take a note both of the time of examination and the timezone
of the investigated machine [95]. These timestamps need to be synchronized later in the
report.
Event correlation using semantic model
Schatz et al. [85] found that the investigator can detect a sequence of the events automati-
cally and semantically. This method constructs a semantic domain model for OS logs based
on a web ontology language. The authors combine the rule-based method with semantic
representation that can provide contextual events for correlation. Amato et al. [25] support
this idea by extracting the digital evidence and representing it as a semantic data model.
The analysis utilizes reasoning and the queries based on a semantic methodology. The
semantic approach enables more expressive way of representing events in terms of subject-
predicate-object form and search-ability [25]. Although these approaches offer automated
correlation, they do not include standardized ontology components [85]. Moreover, Amato
et al. [25] do not provide any experimental results.
Tree or graph-based event correlation and reconstruction
Wang and Daniels [96] introduce a reasoning framework to analyze event logs. They build
a graph-based structure for event logs, and employ local and global reasoning to correlate
events. They also provide a method to reconstruct the attack scenario from various event
logs, including OS logs, to support network forensic investigation [86]. The model of event
logs is graph spectral and then the procedure extracts the attack scenario based on the
suspicious graph structure. In addition, it also supports large scale event logs. A deeper
investigation for event logs is needed because the OS logs act as a secondary object in [86].
Note that Wang and Daniels [86] primarily focus on the network traffic.
To accommodate multiple sources of log files including OS logs, Arasteh et al. [87]
propose a tree-based data structure and analyze correlation using algebraic terms. Another
formal and unified verification model for event logs is presented by Saleh et al. [97]. The
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event logs are modeled based on logic for an electronic commerce protocol called ADM
logic and use a tree data structure to query the properties. The authors chose ADM logic
because it accommodates a temporal, dynamic, modal and linear logic. Saleh et al. [97]
also model event logs as a tree, analyze using algebraic logic, and demonstrate the model
implementation to Windows event logs. A tableau-based system [98] is used for event log
verification. However, both methods [87, 97] require efficient checking for the proofing part
of the mathematical model to speed up the analysis.
Timestamp-based event reconstruction
A timestamp can be extracted from a log entry and can be an important factor for recon-
structing events. In the case of consolidating event logs from various sources, Gómez et
al. [88] use Lamport’s logical clock to model events from timestamps found in different log
sources. Meanwhile, Schatz et al. [89] run an empirical study to observe temporal behav-
ior from Windows-based domain controller logs and other sources like user’s browser logs.
Both methods [88, 89] are able to handle multiple logs from different devices. However, it
is assumed that device and logs are not modified [88] and the time is always synchronized
[89].
Moreover, timestamps as a computer history model can be extracted from various event
logs to assist forensic analysis in event reconstruction [99]. An unique approach was pre-
sented by Koen and Olivier [100]. When log files are deleted by the attacker, the forensic
investigator can extract file timestamps to establish relationships between events. Despite
being automatic, this technique assumes that the file timestamp is not modified by the
application. This assumption becomes a limitation because the attacker may modify the
timestamp in a particular file. Zhu et al. [101] show that the reconstruction of an event
can be performed based on the state of the operating system as the state is saved based on
a particular timestamp. For instance, in Windows system state, a timeline is built by ex-
tracting and comparing the sequence of events in the saved system state. The disadvantage
of this approach is it demands as a minimum one snapshot to be compared. In addition, an
event may be removed between two snapshots so it cannot be investigated after an incident
occurred.
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A high-level event is one that human can understand such as “Connection from a USB
stick”. In event log files, such high-level events can be made up of many low-level events
recorded as log entries. To obtain a high-level event reconstruction, the investigator can
run an automatic analysis as described in [10]. The proposed procedure extracts low-
level timeline from various sources including Windows event logs and then reconstructs
high-level events using matching rules. Despite its automated fashion, this procedure only
provides a limited timestamp extractor for some types of event logs such as browser logs and
Windows XP logs. Additionally, there is a time overhead when processing each log entry.
To reconstruct an event in a falsified logs, Tang and Fidge [102] propose two algorithms,
specifically A* search and a heuristic method. These algorithms quantify the steps to
convert the predicted attacker’s events to actual events found in the falsified OS logs. They
report a drawback that the algorithm does not support large log files.
To cope with cross-drive devices, Patterson and Hargreaves [103] propose an automatic
method for timeline reconstruction. Similar to [10], this method reconstructs high-level
events from various devices. However, it requires a more complex example in the experiment
to prove the robustness of the method [103].
As timestamp-based methods are a dense research area, we provide a typical model for
this approach in Fig. 2.5. First, the timestamps and event messages are extracted from
various event logs. Second, these logs can be correlated based on a specific method or
from attack rules repository. The event logs can be from various sources especially OS logs
[88, 89], multiple computers [10, 103], or Windows states [101]. The investigator can check
a reconstructed event and analyze some events of interest found via the timeline viewer.
Event reconstruction based on finite state machines
A proposal for reconstructing the event automatically is presented in [90]. The authors use
a finite state machine (FSM) to model and reconstruct events by backtracking transitions
in the FSM. FSM-based reconstruction is an automatic procedure and it can be extended
to assist general purpose event reconstruction.
This work is improved in [104]. The authors improve the FSM for event reconstruction by








Extract timestamps and events








Figure 2.5: A typical model for event correlation and reconstruction with timestamp-based
approach
solves the limitation of FSM’s high load computation when backtracking each state of the
incident scenario. Although this method only supports simple cases such as an investigation
of network printer logs as described in [90], the protocol can be implemented for OS logs.
Event reconstruction using virtual machines
Another approach is to use the benefits of the virtual machines for event reconstruction.
For example, we can use a virtual testbed to reconstruct an attack where the main source is
Linux logs [91]. First, we need to build a virtualization architecture, replay the attack, clone
the images, and analyze the reconstruction. An improvement of this method is presented
in [105] that involves building a testbed in a virtual machine and then reconstructing the
event based on the replayed attacks.
The benefit of virtual machines is that the snapshot of the virtual machine can be saved
for later analysis [91]. In [105], the virtual testbed supplements the event reconstruction
hypothesis to simulate different attacks. However, the virtual machine approach is slower
than an actual machine in some aspects such as booting, rebooting, and the creation of a
forensic image. Additionally, some attacks cannot be replayed in the virtual environment
as they have a feature to detect a virtual machine.
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Table 2.4: A summary of key publications in anomaly detection in event log




[106] Build foundation for log anomaly
detection for forensic purposes
Cannot handle multiple event logs
[26] Framework for anomaly detection Performance can be increased by
improving the grouping steps
Timestamp-
based
[107, 108] Automatic analysis Detect inconsistencies without
providing correction




[110] A lightweight clustering method Many parameters required to be
set
[19] Automatic clustering and anomaly
detection
Do not consider semantic
relationship between events
Live event reconstruction
Almost all of the aforementioned methods deal with event logs after the attacks had oc-
curred. This approach is called as post-mortem analysis. To reconstruct an event in real
time, Olajide et al. [92] introduce automatic live event reconstruction to support forensic
investigation. This method correlates a live memory analysis with various machine logs
such as shell history and Linux logs. Furthermore, live reconstruction enables us to find
the root cause of an incident in real time. Although the experiment was only performed in
Linux environment, it could be extended to other popular platform such as Windows.
2.7.4 Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection is about identifying irregularities or suspicious activity in event logs.
These irregularities can be further examined by the investigator. We group this topic into
several categories: 1) user profiling and machine learning; 2) timestamp-based; and 3) event
log clustering. A summary of key publications in anomaly detection for event log forensic
investigation is given in Table 2.4.
Anomaly detection based on user profiling and machine learning
A normal activity profile of a particular user can be used to discover anomalies. In 2002,
Abraham and De Vel [106] identify irregularities based on user profiling from OS logs. The
proposed method applies association rules to detect an unusual event. The deviations will
be found if the profiling from raw event logs is different to the standard profile generated
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previously. In another study, Abraham et al. [111] use attribute-oriented induction to
generate a profile and then separate the outliers. The attribute-oriented induction represents
event logs as a hierarchy and generalizes the attributes in a database by processing the
hierarchy tree.
In a Windows environment, the investigator can generate user profiles using time win-
dows extracted from event logs and create event abstraction [26]. Event abstraction involves
grouping of similar log entries. The anomaly is defined as a different event from the trained
normal user profile. The possible improvement of this approach is to get better grouping of
application processes to increase the accuracy of user profiling [26].
Schindler [15] uses two Support Vector Machines (SVM) to detect an anomaly in log
data. The first SVM is for separating multiple predefined classes from each other. The
feature vectors are based on Windows logon, logoff, and firewall logs. The second SVM
is one-class SVM to classify previously discovered classes to normal and anomaly events.
Moreover, Hu et al. [112] proposed anomaly detection based on user activity. The method
first tackles various formats from multi-source logs including OS logs by creating a metadata
extraction to normalize the log entries. After that, the method constructs user-specific
models to issue alerts for users whose event patterns are not similar to their patterns in the
training phase.
To give an illustration of profiling for anomaly detection, we provide a typical model for
this approach in Fig. 2.6. Event logs are first preprocessed to make them ready for analysis.
A rule mining, such as association rules [106] or attribute-oriented induction [111], is used
to get base user profile. Additionally, a machine learning approach such as SVM [15] is run
in this step to generate base profiles for existing users. The investigation includes filtering
the profile, intra-profile analysis, and comparison of input log entries to the discovered base
profiles. This process will generate a report containing anomalies within the specific time
period.
Timestamp-based anomaly detection
In terms of temporal inconsistency, Marrington et al. [107, 108] examine this property in
event logs. The timestamp in the Windows logs is modeled using the Lamport relation and
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Figure 2.6: A typical model for OS log anomaly with profiling and machine learning ap-
proach
the method detects both out of sequence and missing events. One significant advantage of
this technique is it can run in an automated fashion. However, it detects inconsistencies
without providing a recommendation of correction in the event logs. This work can be
expanded to a non-Windows environment as it shows robustness in anomaly detection.
The timestamp-based approach is also deployed in a virtual machine environment [109].
With a similar Lamport model, the timestamp is used to detect out of sequence or missing
events in virtual OS logs. Unfortunately, this approach cannot detect user sessions in a
virtual machine. As discussed above, we can also generalize to different Windows platforms
and analyze event logs from various installed applications.
Anomaly detection based on event log clustering
Clustering-based event log analysis is a commonly used approach. Vaarandi [110] initiated
this research domain by proposing a technique, namely the Simple Log Clustering Tool
(SLCT). Each word in a log entry corresponds to an itemset and SLCT then analyzes
using frequent itemset mining to find the most common appearing words. SLCT also
employs density-based clustering, which identifies a dense region or group of similar words.
Afterward, SLCT defines an anomaly as the log entries that do not fit well to any of the
clusters found. Although SLCT is not directly designed for forensic purposes, it builds a
foundation of cluster-based anomaly detection for event logs.
Yen et al. [113] created Beehive, a method for mining and extracting knowledge from
log files automatically. Additionally, log types considered are Windows logs and security
application logs. Beehive extracts 15 features from log files and categorizes them into four
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groups, specifically destination-based, host-based, policy-based, and traffic-based. Beehive
detects suspicious host behaviors using a custom K-means clustering without specifying the
number of clusters in advance. An anomaly is defined as a cluster that deviates significantly
from others.
A recent technique detects anomalies automatically to support forensic investigations
by clustering [19]. The event log is represented as a graph. The method then builds a
parameter-free graph-based cluster and develops a statistical score to detect anomalies au-
tomatically. In spite of offering an automatic approach, this method does not include the
semantic relationship between event messages as it only considers word frequency. Further-
more, the proposed method runs slowly for large event logs.
To get the real-time analysis, there is an approach that uses incremental clustering to
detect anomalies in Linux Ubuntu logs and bug-tracking application logs [114]. This method
offers fast computation as it separates the training and testing processes. Therefore, there
is no need to recalculate the cluster every time a new log entry is created. In this real-
time approach, the transformation of log entry to the Euclidean space can be sped up by
changing the granularity from character-based to word-based.
2.7.5 Event log abstraction
Abstraction or signature of event logs is a template containing words and wild-cards repre-
senting all members in a group of event log entries [115]. The event log signature provides
an abstraction so that the forensic investigator will get a general insight or summary of
event logs.
The early works in event log abstraction are not explicitly intended to be applied to
forensic investigation [110]. However, there are two papers discussing deep learning for
event log abstraction in forensic analysis. Thaler et al. [116] find a log signature using a
supervised method with the combination of a feed forward neural network and long short-
term memory (LSTM). Afterward, a subsequent work by the same authors upgrades the
method to unsupervised approach using autoencoders with LSTM cells.
There is a disadvantage in [116] where the experiments were conducted on relatively
small datasets and it needs large event logs to demonstrate the generalization of the method.
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Another limitation found in [117] is that the proposed method requires a longer runtime to
train the model compared to the non-deep learning methods [110, 115].
2.8 Visualization of OS logs
The next step after the main investigation is to present the results of an analysis. The most
common technique to support a presentation of event logs is using visualization. Tassone et
al. [118] discussed various types of visualization techniques for forensic artifacts. There are
four common types of visualization for event logs data: 1) forensic timeline; 2) tree-based;
and 3) graph-based.
2.8.1 Forensic timeline
Since almost all OS logs contain a timestamp, we can create a visualization based on this
information to view a timeline of the event. The proposed tool by Olsson and Boldt [119],
named CyberForensics TimeLab, provides a scanner to read the source data to produce a
chronological order of events. The main advantage of a timeline visualization is that it uses
an automatic approach, so there is no user intervention. A caching mechanism is used to
handle large data to increase performance. The only limitation is that the pattern search
is yet to be automated.
Son and Lee [120] recommended building forensic timeline based on user behavior. The
user activities and respective time information are generated from various sources such as
Windows event logs, SetupAPI.log (containing USB device logs), browser logs, and instant
messenger logs. The visualization displays input event logs based on the timeline. The
proposed tool uses an intuitive display as date and time are shown in the x-axis and y-axis,
respectively. In addition, each extracted event has a unique color for identification. Using
this approach, it is possible to examine user behavior and when it has occurred.
2.8.2 Tree-based log visualization
Buchholz and Falk [121] create a timeline editor from various event logs. Unlike the timeline
approach [119], the visualization is based on the tree data structure to accommodate events.
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The tool was called Zeitline [122] and it imports the events from various sources. Zeitline
uses a tree-based visualization and query interface to assist the investigator. The main
benefit of Zeitline is it can provide both general and detailed event visualization based on
a tree hierarchy. However, Zeitline will run slowly when displaying large event logs due to
its GUI rendering in Java [121]. Moreover, it needs manual intervention from the forensic
investigator when adding a particular timestamp.
On the other hand, there is a framework for timeline visualization [123, 124]. They
review the Zeitline tool [121], identifies its disadvantages, and implements an improvement
in user interface aspects for timeline visualization. In [125], a proof of concept for forensic
visualization is provided. The proof comprises three main stages, namely data decoding,
data storage, and visualization. The forensic visualization included were a treemap, a
geographic map plot, and a word cloud.
2.8.3 Graph-based log visualization
Another approach to simplify event log analysis is visualization via graphs [126]. This
method builds virtual audit data spaces and constructs interactive 3D visualization based on
quantitative analysis of event interrelations. In our recent work, we also employ graph-based
visualization to present anomaly detection in event logs [19]. Graph-based visualization
offers a big picture of anomaly and non-anomaly event logs per cluster. However, it is
unable to provide visualization in chronological order.
A new and most updated tool to visualize event log timeline is Timesketch [127]. It
is a forensic tool from Google that provides timeline analysis for forensic purposes. The
main advantage of Timesketch is that it enables forensic investigators to collaborate to
manage and examine event logs at the same time. The supported inputs are logs that
formatted in CSV (Comma-separated Value) or JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) and
logs that extracted from the log2timeline tool [128]. Timesketch supports both tabular
and graph-based views for analyzed logs. The example of the graph view of Timesketch is
shown in Fig. 2.7. In this visualization, an investigator examines all users who logged in to
a Windows operating system when an application named GROOVE.EXE was started.
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Figure 2.7: Graph-based visualization of Windows event logs from Timesketch
2.9 Post-process of OS log investigation
This phase deals with the evaluation of investigation process. The forensic investigator needs
to review the model or framework used in the examination. There are many frameworks
available and the investigator can choose which one is appropriate for our particular case.
Do et al. [129] propose a framework for Windows event log forensics. This framework
contains the main steps of forensic investigation specifically for Windows event logs such as
identification, preservation, analysis, and presentation. However, the framework needs to
be extended to the latest versions of Windows. Futhermore, there are frameworks for live
analysis on Linux environment as presented in [73, 69]. These models offer a more complete
approach from acquiring the evidence to the investigation reports.
Like other digital evidence processes, the procedure for examining event logs follows
certain phases. In other words, a general digital forensic investigation framework can be
applied to different types of investigation including event logs [130]. For instance, one can
build a computer history model from various event logs to categorize forensic analysis in
event reconstruction [130].
Moreover, another approach is to perform a multi-tier investigation framework [131].
This hierarchical structure enables the investigator to see both the global and detailed
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processes for each phase of the examination. To get the global structure, the framework
can collapse the lower hierarchies and expand it again to get more details. Finally, a recent
review of various investigation frameworks is presented in [132].
2.10 Tools for OS log forensics
There are many tools and software for event log forensics. We classify these tools into two
categories: 1) general tools and 2) libraries. We describe each category as below.
2.10.1 General tools
As event logs are the part of the bigger digital evidence, specifically the hard disk, the
acquisition process can be conducted by general forensic tools. The three most popular
general-purpose tools are EnCase Forensic [133], Forensic Toolkit (FTK) [134], and Autopsy
[135]. The first two tools are commercially supported, while the later is an open source
project supported by the digital forensic community.
In case of event log forensics, some researchers share their code with the community.
For example, SEC (Simple Event Correlator), as discussed in Section 2.7.3, is a tool for
advanced event processing for event log monitoring, event log forensics, or any other task
involving event correlation [81, 136]. Another tool by Gladyshev and Patel [90], EARL
(Event Analysis and Reconstruction in Lisp) performs event reconstruction based on the
finite state machine. In addition, Timesketch [127, 137] and CyberForensics TimeLab [138]
have been discussed in Section 2.8.1. A complete list of event log forensic tools reviewed
here is shown in Table 2.5.
PyFlag is a tool to simplify the process of log file analysis and forensic investigations
[140]. PowerForensics is a tool that provides a framework for hard drive forensic analysis
including stored event logs [75, 141]. PSRecon acquires data including event logs from
a remote Windows machine and delivers this data to the server [142]. Kansa also uses
Windows Powershell to execute the agent modules from multiple machines in a network
[143]. This tool collects data including event logs for further analysis. For event logs
residing in a forensic memory images, the Volatility tool [159] provides a plugin called
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Table 2.5: List of event log forensics tools
Tool Event log Language License
SEC [81, 136] Custom Perl GNU GPL
EARL [90, 139] Custom Lisp GNU GPL
Timesketch [127] Custom Python and
TypeScript
Apache
CyberForensics TimeLab [138] Custom C# and Perl n/a
PyFlag [140] Custom Python GNU GPL
PowerForensics [75, 141] Windows log C# and PowerShell MIT
PSRecon [142] Windows log PowerShell Apache
Kansa [143] Windows log PowerShell Apache
Volatility evtlogs [144] Windows log Python GNU GPL
EVTXtract [145] Windows log Python Apache
FixEvt [63, 146] Windows log n/a n/a
LogParser [64] Windows log n/a n/a
evtx view [147] Windows log C++ Proprietary
evtwalk [148] Windows log C++ Proprietary
elmo [149] Windows log C++ Proprietary
log2timeline [128] Custom Python Apache
Event2Timeline [150] Windows log Python and JavaScript GNU GPL
AuditParser [151] Windows log Python Apache with commercial
support





GFI EventsManager [153] Custom n/a Proprietary and commercial
support
ELM Enterprise Manager [154] Windows log n/a Proprietary and commercial
support
Assuria Log Manager [155] Custom n/a Proprietary and commercial
support
Event Log Explorer [156] Windows log n/a Proprietary and commercial
support








evtlogs [144]. This plugin is developed by Jamie Levy and it can extract event logs from
Windows XP and 2003 memory images.
EVTXtract [145] and FixEvt [63] can recover and repair broken Windows event logs
due to unexpected crash. Also, Microsoft has an official event log parser called LogParser
[64]. This tool enables the forensic investigator to access the event logs and the registry.
Other advantages of LogParser are that it can correlate events and supports network traffic
analysis. LogParser is also able to examine Snort IDS logs and to provide SQL query feature
for retrieving particular events.
A set of tools are provided by TZWorks for Windows event log analysis namely evtx view
[147], evtwalk [148], and elmo [149]. evtwalk is a log parser for all versions of Windows.
evtx view provides a report for a particular category of events such as credential changes or
USB connections. The parser engine for evtwalk and evtx view is the same. Furthermore,
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elmo converts the raw event logs to be inserted into a SQLite database. From the database,
the forensic investigator can correlate and reconstruct the events. The input for elmo can
be a live Windows machine or a forensic image.
log2timeline provides a feature to extract timestamps from event log files from an operat-
ing system and visualize them [128]. Similar to log2timeline, Event2Timeline also provides
visualization for Windows event logs [150]. However, Event2Timeline needs an external
parser like Microsoft LogParser to preprocess the data. A cyber security company called
Mandiant provides the AuditParser tool [151]. AuditParser is used to convert the XML out-
put file from other Mandiant tools into tab-delimited text files. These files contain many
different types of evidence including event logs and other Windows artifacts.
The remaining tools are provided by a particular company with commercial support. In
Table 2.5, only Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana stack (ELK) [158] provide the source code,
while Splunk [152] opens some parts of the code’s tools. Other tools use proprietary licenses
and do not disclose the code. These tools include GFI EventsManager [153], ELM Enterprise
Manager [154], Assuria ALM-SIEM [155], Event Log Explorer [156], and EventLog Analyzer
[157]. In some cases, the forensic investigator may choose open source alternatives that can
provide comparable performance in event log examination. For example, Logstash has
powerful event filtering and conversion capabilities [160].
2.10.2 Libraries
The libraries for event log forensics are mainly for Windows logs. Parse-Evtx [65, 161] and
python-evtx [162] are Windows event log parsers written in Perl and Python, respectively.
Furthermore, the library for the legacy version of Windows event log format (.evt) and
new version based on XML structure (.evtx) is provided by Metz [163] and libevtx [164],
respectively.
These libraries have the main advantage that the investigator can focus on the content
of event logs as the parsing step is performed by the libraries. The choice of the library
can be based on the programming language preferred by the investigator. One limitation
of these libraries is that none of them is dedicated to event logs on Linux-based operating
systems.
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Table 2.6: OS logs from public forensic case studies and datasets
Source Case study or dataset Event log Year
Digital Corpora M57-Jean [165] Windows logs 2008
M57-Patents [166] Windows logs 2009
nps-2009-casper-rw [167] Linux logs 2009
Digital Forensic Research
Workshop (DFRWS)
DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2008 [168] Linux logs 2008
DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2009 [6] Linux logs 2009
DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2018 [169] Linux logs 2018
Computer Forensic Reference Data
Sets (CFReDS)
The Hacking Case [170] Windows logs 2007
Data Leakage Case [171] Windows logs 2015
The Honeynet Project The Forensic Challenge 2001 [172] Linux logs 2001
Scan 34 2005 [173] Linux and
application logs
2005
Challenge 5 of the Forensic Challenge
2010 [173]
Linux logs 2010
SecRepo [174] List of datasets Various event
logs
-
2.11 Public datasets for OS log forensics
The research community needs publicly available datasets to support experiments and
benchmark results for event log forensics research. There are a few public datasets namely
Digital Corpora, Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) Challenge, Computer
Forensic Reference Data Sets (CFReDS) from NIST, the Honeynet Project, and SecRepo.
Although these datasets contain various types of digital evidence, such as picture files,
documents, and memory dumps, we focus on datasets that have event logs as the main
object of investigation. These datasets are summarized in Table 2.6.
As shown in Table 2.6, the datasets have various ages from 2001 to 2018. The older
datasets can be used for educational purposes as the forensic case and techniques are evolv-
ing year by year. To deal with new environments such as OS logs on the Internet of Things
(IoT), the researchers can use the new datasets from DFRWS 2018.
2.11.1 Digital Corpora
Garfinkel et al. [175] argue that digital forensics need a standardized dataset or corpus
to make the research reproducible. The proposed dataset by Garfinkel [176] is hosted in
http://digitalcorpora.org/. There are some types of data such as cell phone dumps, disk
images, files, and network traffic dumps. In addition, they also provide some security
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incident scenarios so that researchers can investigate this case study using various methods
and tools.
The scenarios most closely related to event log forensics are M57-Jean case [165] and
M57-Patents case [166]. Although these cases are fictional, the attacks are real and need
to be investigated properly as if they are real cases. There are solution manuals for these
two scenarios for accredited lecturers and researchers. The M57-Jean case [165] is about
file leakage in a startup company M57.Biz. The file contains the salaries and social security
numbers of all staff. The forensic investigator can examine the disk image of one of the
staff’s laptop and explain how the file was leaked. While the main focus in this scenario is
a chat log, the investigation can correlate it with Windows event logs.
The next case, M57-Patents [166], gives the researcher a challenge to solve three types
of criminal activities involving illegal files, proprietary research exfiltration, and company
eavesdropping, with the latter being most relevant to event log forensics. In this scenario,
one of the staff installed a keylogger on the CEO’s computer. The investigator needs to
find out the identity of that person and how they performed the eavesdropping.
There is also a disk image data namely nps-2009-casper-rw [167]. This image is an ext3
file system dump from a bootable USB. The user of this disk image browses several US
Government websites. This case can provide event logs, especially browser logs and various
logs from a Linux system, to be analyzed forensically.
2.11.2 Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) Challenge
One of the most notable conferences in the digital forensics research area is the Digital
Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS). This conference not only provides a place to present
research results, but also issues an annual forensic challenge. The challenges associated with
event log forensics are DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2008 [168], 2009 [6], and 2017-2018 [169].
For each challenge, DFRWS has publicly posted the submitted solutions.
The main case of the DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2008 [168] is about investigating
unauthorized access to a company’s proprietary information. We need to deal with a kernel
log or browsing log to reconstruct the event timeline. Meanwhile, in DFRWS Forensic
Challenge 2009 [6], the researcher has to examine authentication logs to trace the attacker.
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Other log files included are login and logout logs in wtmp file and command logs in a bash
history file.
DFRWS challenge 2017-2018 case study is about a murder of a woman [169]. The murder
was reported by victim’s husband. They lived in an apartment. The investigator search
through an apartment and collected various IoT digital evidence such as a Raspberry Pi
connected via HDMI to TV, an Amazon Echo device, and a Google OnHub wifi router. The
log files containing useful information for forensic analysis are located in Raspberry Pi with
the OSMC (Open Source Media Center) operating system installed. OSMC is a Debian-
based operating system, so the structure of logs are similar to other Linux distributions.
2.11.3 Computer Forensic Reference Data Sets (CFReDS) Project
NIST created a dataset to support digital forensic research. There are various scenarios
that can be investigated by the research community. However, there are only two scenarios
related to event log forensics. These are the Hacking Case [170] and the Data Leakage Case
[171]. There are solution manuals for these two case studies so we can learn from the given
scenario. The Hacking Case [170] is about the investigation of an abandoned notebook
that has been used by a hacker. The investigator needs to check Windows event logs to
determine the last user to log in into the computer. Furthermore, there are many chat logs
in the forensic image that reveal information about the attacker’s contacts.
The second scenario, the Data Leakage Case [171], focuses on the leakage of secret
proprietary technology from an international company. This case is more complicated than
the first one. Most of the event logs included in this scenario are Windows event logs. From
these log files, the investigator can gather the login and logout information, application
logs, and reconstruct the event timeline.
2.11.4 The Honeynet Project
The Honeynet Project is a non-profit organization that focuses on internet security es-
pecially honeypot technology and digital forensics. This project offers a series of forensic
challenges. The challenges most related to event log forensics are Challenge 5 of the Forensic
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Challenge 2010 [173], Scan 34 2005 [177], and the Forensic Challenge 2001 [172]. Solution
files for each challenge are available from the Honeynet Project’s website.
The Forensic Challenge 2010 [173] concerns a compromised Linux system. The directory
/var/log/ has been imaged and the investigator needs to analyze the brute-force attack
recorded in the event logs, especially authentication logs. There is also an Apache access
log that is related to the attack. The challenge also requires that the researchers construct
a timeline of the incidents.
Scan 34 2005 [177] provides various log files from a honeypot system such as Apache
logs, Linux syslogs, Snort NIDS logs, and iptables firewall logs. There is a compromised
system that needs to be analyzed based on those logs. The investigator has to describe how
the attack was launched. This case also demands more examination of time synchronization
between log files.
The last challenge from the Honeynet Project is an old case study from 2001 [172], but is
nonetheless relevant to event log forensics. It involves analyzing RedHat-based Linux syslog
and bash history command logs. The researcher investigates the intrusion in a honeypot
server and collects information to identify the intruder. This challenge also requires that a
timeline should be created to describe the time of attack events.
2.11.5 SecRepo
SecRepo is a website that provides a list of the various security-related datasets including
event logs [174]. The list is categorized based on the platform such as network, system,
and malware. There are a huge number of event logs namely authentication logs from a
Linux system, honeypot logs, web server logs, FTP logs, and DNS logs. All data can be
downloaded for free with a specific license such as Creative Commons or Apache License.
Other datasets such as Digital Corpora and The Honeynet Project are included in SecRepo.
This website does not provide any scenario or case study. Therefore, SecRepo does not
give any solution materials. Unlike other datasets, SecRepo only provides various event logs
and links to other datasets related to computer security. However, SecRepo is very useful to
get information about dataset lists and the researcher can go further to the official website
of the datasets.
48
2.12 Open issues and future directions
Finally, we present the major open issues for each phase in the digital forensic investigation
of event logs. We also propose the future directions of this research area.
2.12.1 Pre-processing step as forensic readiness of OS logs
The forensic readiness of an event log is critical to support investigation when an incident
occurs. There is currently a trend towards network architectures supported by virtual
machines [28]. In future, we suggest the combination of cryptography, centralization, and
hardware-supported architectures can improve the security of event logs as described in [27].
Cryptography provides the security, centralization offers backup and easy management, and
a hardware-based approach will support software-based log security.
2.12.2 Acquisition of OS logs
The acquisition of data from recent hard disk technologies such as solid state drives (SSD)
is needed since existing techniques only deal with the traditional magnetic platter disk.
SSD controller hides the disk operations such as compression and garbage collection to the
host OS. Therefore, the data is inaccessible and only can be accessed via the memory cells
acquisition [178]. Bonetti et al. [178] provides a methodology to test forensic characteristics
of SSD. This leads a challenge for recovery of the data stored in SSD. In addition, a more
accurate method is needed to make sure that event logs can be properly recovered. Recovery
tools usually only support a particular platform. Therefore, it would be valuable to have a
generic tool that can run in any environment.
Another issue is about log rotation. This involves closing a log file and opening a new
log file for subsequent messages [179]. When an incident has occurred, the investigator
should first stop the rotation of log file to avoid the loss of potential evidence. If the log
files are already missing, then a recovery process is needed.
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2.12.3 Main analysis of OS log investigation
There are automatic methods for event log retrieval and event correlation or reconstruction
to assist the forensic investigator. However, there are a few methods for automatic anomaly
detection in the event logs. Along these lines, the present authors have proposed a method
to detect an anomaly in the authentication logs from OS without any user parameters [19].
As event logs can become very large, big data forensics has also become a major challenge
in recent years [180]. In addition, cloud computing creates a further challenge in certain
aspects such as ensuring the chain of custody, cloud log event correlation, and real-time
cloud log visualization [29].
The use of machine learning, especially the emerging field of deep learning techniques,
is also a promising field in event log forensics. There are only two papers describing the
use of deep learning for event log abstraction to support a forensic examination [116, 117].
Moreover, Du et al. [181] proposed a deep learning technique to represent event logs as
a natural language sequence and named the method DeepLog. The neural network model
used is Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM). DeepLog trains the model from log patterns of
normal activities, and then identify anomalies when log patterns different from the model
trained in an automatic fashion. Although DeepLog is not intended for forensic analysis
explicitly, it can operate in real time so that it can handle new log patterns over time.
Accordingly, this is likely to be a promising area for future work in event log forensics.
Furthermore, the event log forensics is also critical to the security of Internet of Things
(IoT) devices [182]. The existing frameworks, methods, and tools for forensics are not
designed for IoT as this is a new area in information technology. Therefore, we may need
existing approaches to be adapted to IoT forensics, especially for event logs. Similar to
the acquisition and preservation phases, most analysis techniques only support a particular
platform. These methods should be designed to handle various environments or can be
extended to suit other platforms. Generally, the existing methods are implemented on
a particular system such as Windows 7. However, these techniques could be recreated,
redesigned, and reimplemented for other operating systems.
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2.12.4 Visualization of OS logs
Presentation of event logs contains two main aspects, specifically visualization and prepa-
ration of an investigation report. Event log visualization is usually not intended for forensic
purposes only, but is focused on security incident analysis. The digital forensic community
should check the relevant research areas in order to improve the features and advance event
log visualization techniques. For example, the Zeitline tool [121] is not maintained anymore
by its developers, but this work is one of the most highly cited papers in the field.
The only visualization tool for event log forensics that has active developers is
log2timeline [128]. Additionally, a new tool named Timesketch [127] which enables col-
laborative timeline analysis is actively maintained. Therefore, we recommend the forensic
community keep supporting these open source visualization tools to make event log
examination easy and accurate.
2.12.5 Post-process of OS log investigation
There are many frameworks for digital forensic investigation. The investigators can select
models based on the needs of each forensic case. The existing tools should accommodate
the various models of investigations. At the moment, common forensic tools only support
a generic model. These features should be extended to accommodate a specific framework
based on the needs of the case, potentially employing a plugin-based architecture.
Another issue in post-process is anti-forensics. As discussed in [183], Windows log files
will execute regular expressions inserted in log entries. This will make the operating system
hang and unable to record log entries. This attack was demonstrated by Foster and Liu [184]
in Blackhat Briefings 2005. To overcome this anti-forensics technique the logging system
needs to filter the log entries, so the logging system only records the legitimate entries. In
addition, one of various event log security methods discussed in Section 2.5.1 should be
implemented, with an assumption that the attacker does not have any physical access to
the computer.
The common way to attack log files is to delete them. Eterovic-Soric et al. [185]
have demonstrated how to delete Windows 7 event logs with minimal suspiciousness to the
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investigators. The technique first stops logging services and there is a window time of 60
seconds before Windows restarts the services. During this time, the attacker can remove the
log file at a binary level for several minutes. Eterovic-Soric et al. [185] also reported that
this technique generates several errors in the system logs. Therefore, if the gap between log
entries and some of the error logs are suspicious, then the investigators need to pay more
attention to this issue. As the anti-forensics technique continue developing, we also need to
create more sophisticated forensic analysis methods.
2.12.6 Tools for OS log forensics
There are a range of tools for event log parsing of Windows logs. On the other hand, there
are only a few libraries to parse or analyze event logs on Unix-based operating systems.
However, these libraries are not integrated into a single library compared to the Windows
log parser [163, 164]. The parsing techniques mostly use regular expression or Grok rules.
One difficulty of event log parsing is that the configurations of event logs such as syslog
vary from one server to another and the system administrator usually configures logging
based on their needs. However, there is a common pattern of these Unix-based event logs.
Therefore, a generic library, especially for Unix-based OS, should be developed. Recent
work by Studiawan et al. [17] proposes the nerlogparser tool which provides a generic
model for parsing various semi-structured log files such as OS logs. nerlogparser parses log
files based on named entity recognition (NER). NER is a mechanism to recognize named
entities from a text data. In event logs, nerlogparser defines named entities as words or
phrases containing common fields in a log entry such as timestamp, host name, or service
name. Recognizing named entities is equivalent to determining each field in a log entry. The
nerlogparser uses a deep learning technique namely bidirectional long short-term memory
networks to perform NER. However, nerlogparser still has a possible drawback when there
is an input from a particular log file that has a completely different log entry structure and
nerlogparser cannot recognize the log format.
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2.12.7 Public datasets for OS log forensics
Most public datasets for event log forensics are at least three years old. The research
community needs an up to date dataset to accommodate the recent attack models [186].
For instance, there is a tool namely EviPlant to create digital forensics case study or images
[187]. Researchers can use this tool and share the generated data with the digital forensics
community.
2.13 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive survey of operating system (OS) log forensics
research. This work is structured based on each phase of a digital forensic investigation
framework. For each phase, we describe the existing methods in the literature and identify
their respective advantages and disadvantages. We also provide a list of tools for conducting
OS log examination. Furthermore, publicly available datasets are described in detail.
There are several open issues in the context of OS log forensics research. One of the main
issues is to encourage the research community to use standard datasets so the performance
of the proposed methods can be compared and evaluated against each other. The use of
open source tools are also urgently needed to advance the state of the art techniques for OS
log investigation.
As time goes by, attackers use more sophisticated and complicated techniques to evade
the forensic methods and tools. More sophisticated methods are needed to identify and
analyze such attacks on computer systems. Therefore, in this thesis, we propose an auto-
matic detection of anomalies in a forensic timeline. The proposed framework offers end to
end detection without user input parameters. The next chapter discusses the first step of
analysis by automatically parsing the log entries using a deep learning technique, namely
bidirectional long short-term memory.
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Chapter 3
Automatic log parser to support
forensic analysis
Event log parsing is a process to split and label each field in a log entry. Existing ap-
proaches commonly use regular expressions or parsing rules to extract the fields. However,
such techniques are time-consuming as a forensic investigator needs to define a new rule for
each log file type. In this paper, we present a tool, namely nerlogparser, to parse the log
entries automatically, where log parsing is modeled as a named entity recognition problem.
We use a deep machine learning technique, specifically the bidirectional long short-term
memory networks, as the underlying architecture for this purpose. Unlike existing tools,
nerlogparser is a fully automatic tool as the investigators do not need to define any parsing
rules and it is generic as there is only one model to parse various types of log files. Experi-
mental results show that nerlogparser achieves superior performance compared with other
traditional machine learning methods.
3.1 Introduction
In a forensic analysis, the first step before investigating event logs is to parse a log file.
Event log parsing is a mechanism to separate each field in a log entry. Afterward, a label is
This chapter has been published in the Proceedings of the 16th Australian Digital Forensics Conference,
pp. 1-10, 2018. Available: https://doi.org/10.25958/5c5268c766686. This paper also received a Best Paper
Award.
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Jan 18 09:33:03 victoria init: Switching to runlevel: 0
timestamp hostnameservice message
Figure 3.1: An example of event log parsing from a syslog file [2]
given to each split field. Event log parsing is needed for general log analysis as the forensic
investigator requires data from log entries such as timestamp, hostname, service name, or IP
address. In addition, the main message is also important as it contains further information
such as errors, alerts, or some informational entries. An illustration of event log parsing is
shown in Figure 3.1.
Existing solutions for log parsing include applying regular expressions (regex) and Py-
Parsing [188]. For example, regex is used to extract each fields in a syslog before running
forensic event correlation [83]. Schatz et al. [85] uses regex for handling the unstructured
and heterogeneous logs before they are fed into a forensic event knowledge base. In an event
reconstruction case, the investigator also need to define a pattern in log files. In [189], regex
is used to identify events from a message in a log entry. After acquiring a well-structured
log, the extracted events can be examined to check for a misuse activity or attack.
Furthermore, the investigator has to define regular expression rules in the first place
to get each log entry chunk before running the analyses. Such analyses include event log
abstraction or template generation and anomaly detection [190]. Another parsing rule is Py-
Parsing that has more human-readable rules than regex. For example, syntax Word(alphas)
will parse a string containing all lowercase and uppercase letters. In [191], the use of Py-
Parsing is demonstrated to extract the fields from a Hadoop log and then save them in the
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format.
The problem with existing approaches is that the forensic investigator needs to define
regex or PyParsing rules for every log file. In some cases, the same type of log files can
have different regex as the system administrator can set different configurations to the file.
It is very time-consuming and there is a need to maintain a large list of regex or PyParsing
rules to parse log files.
In terms of log format, we deal with semi-structured log files in this research. We define a
semi-structured format as log file that has a structure but not one that is explicitly stated as
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it is only separated by space or tab characters. Another type of log format is the structured
format that has an exact template. The example of a structured log format is Windows
logs as the entries are saved in an XML file. The parser for the structured format is usually
available from the vendor. For instance, the parser of Windows event logs is LogParser as
an official log parser from Microsoft [64] or python-evtx [162] that developed by the open
source community. The proposed tool in this chapter aims to automatically split and label
each field in a semi-structured log file.
We model log parsing as named entity recognition problem [192]. This issue is a popular
topic in natural language processing research area and involves identifying an entity in a
text such as a person, organization, and country name. We use a deep machine learning
technique to train various log files such as Linux logs, web server logs, and honeypot logs.
We chose the bidirectional long short-term memory (BLSTM) approach [193] because this
architecture is originally designed to detect sequences. In the case of a log entry, the
sequence refers to the fields such as timestamp, hostname, service name, and the main
message. The bidirectional model is used to increase the detection performance as the
procedure runs in both forward and backward context in the sequence.
In addition, an embedding technique is employed at the beginning of the BLSTM layer
to give a better word and character-level representation of the log inputs before processed.
Finally, we propose a tool called nerlogparser that stands for named entity recognition
for event log parser.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are:
1. We propose nerlogparser, an automatic tool for event log parsing that:
(a) does not require forensic investigators to define any parsing rules; and
(b) provides genericity as there is only one model file to parse various types of log
files;
2. The application of deep learning techniques, specifically BLSTM, to parse event logs
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Figure 3.2: Log parsing position in a typical forensic analysis
3.2 Terminology
In this section, we define terminology used in this work. An event is an identifiable action
that occurs on a device such as a computer and it is recorded in a log entry [35]. An event
log is a record of events, usually represented in a log file. A log file is a file that records
activities from applications or operating system. A log entry is a single record in a log file.
An event message refers to the main message in a log entry excluding timestamp and any
other fields.
A field or an entity is a meaningful part in a log entry and can contain one or more words
such as IP address and service name. A label or entity name is the name for a particular
field or entity. Note that event log parsing discussed in this chapter is different from event
log abstraction or template generation as described in [190]. We define log parsing as a
process to split and label each field in a log entry. Meanwhile, log parsing in [190] generates
abstractions or templates for entries from a given log file.
3.3 The proposed event log parser: nerlogparser
Parsing is the first step before analyzing log-related forensic data as shown in Figure 3.2.
To assist a forensic investigator to parse log files, we propose an automatic event log parser
to make log easier to examine. First, we model log parsing as named entity recognition
problem. Second, we explain the input representation of log entries. Finally, we depict a
deep learning architecture to automatically parse log files. Each step is described in detail
in the following sections.
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Jan   18  09:33:03 victoria init: Switching to runlevel: 0
timestamp hostnameservice message
B-TIM I-TIM I-TIM I-HOS I-SER O O O O
Figure 3.3: IOB tag for named entity recognition from Figure 3.1
3.4 Log parsing as named entity recognition problem
The original definition of named entities are phrases that contain the names of persons,
organizations, and locations [192]. Extracting named entities from a text is commonly
called as named entity recognition (NER). In the context of log files, we redefine named
entities as a word or phrases containing common fields such as timestamp, hostname, service
name, or IP address. In a log parser case, recognizing named entities is equivalent with
identifying each field in a log entry.
The most common format of NER is IOB (Inside-Outside-Begin) tagging [192]. The
I-XXX tag is for words inside a named entity of type XXX. If there are two words of type
XXX are located next to each other, the first word is tagged with B-XXX to confirm that it
is a start of an entity. Furthermore, O tag is for words that outside of predefined named
entities. An example of named entities in a log entry from Figure 3.1 with IOB annotation
is shown in Figure 3.3.
From Figure 3.3, we can easily decode the notation that I-TIM means timestamp, while
B-TIM is the first word in the entity, I-HOS means hostname, and I-SER is the service name.
Each word in the main message is tagged as O because it is outside of defined entities.
NER is a classification problem and existing NER methods use traditional machine
learning approaches such as näıve Bayes [194], perceptron [195], stochastic gradient descent
[196], and passive-aggressive classifier [197]. Features are extracted from the data instead of
the raw data are fed to the classifier. In machine learning, a feature is a measurable property
of the observed data. The common predefined features used in traditional machine learning
for NER are a particular word wi as an entity itself, part of speech (POS) of word POSi,
wi+1 as the next word, POSi+1, wi+2, POSi+2, wi−1 as the previous word, POSi−1, wi−2,
and POSi−2. POS is a category to define how a particular word is used in a sentence, such
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as noun and verb. These features suggest that a specific entity will appear in a special
position in a sentence indicated by its surrounding words.
On the other hand, deep learning has emerged as a new approach in NER research
area [3, 198, 199]. The main difference between traditional machine learning approaches
and deep learning is that we do not need to define the features of the input data. Deep
learning techniques can learn features in an incremental fashion. Another advantage of
deep learning is that it provides an end-to-end solution. In the learning or training phase,
end-to-end means that the developer will only need to give the input data and basic initial
parameters for training. While in the testing phase, the users only supply the data and
they will be parsed based on the models generated in the learning phase. We use a deep
learning technique for NER for log parsing as explained in the next sections.
3.5 Word and character embedding as input representation
Raw data needs to be prepared so that it can be fed into a deep learning network as an input.
The text log entries should be converted into vectors of numbers. Therefore, we use word
embedding to represent raw log entries as vectors. Word embedding can accommodate
meaning, a relationship between words, and context in a text [200]. Every word will be
represented as a unique embedding. In the training phase, nerlogparser starts with taking
the input of one sentence, split the sentence by space, and it is called tokens. The log entries
that have been processed into tokens are converted to a sequence of word embedding.
We use GloVe [200] as pretrained word embedding. Specifically, we used version glove.6B
300 dimensions, which is trained on 6 billion tokens. It is trained on Wikipedia English data
[201] and English Gigaword [202] containing news data corpus collected over several years.
GloVe trains the corpus and gets the embedding of each word based on statistical properties
such as word occurrence in a context or a sentence. GloVe is employed to initialize the look
up dictionary for word embedding. We chose GloVe as word embedding because it uses
Wikipedia data and news corpus, which are representative enough to get the similarity and
context between words. Vocabulary used in the training of GloVe are common words and
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Figure 3.4: Character and word embedding for word init: based on a model by Lample et
al. [3]
it uses six billion words in total, so we do not have any problem when using it in the log
data.
We investigate another input representation namely character embedding. It is similar to
word embedding but the representation is at a character-level. The advantage of character
embedding is that it learns the prefix and suffix for a particular word. Therefore, it will
provide a more representative and adaptable model for a given log entry format. Illustration
for word and character embedding as data input representation is depicted in Figure 3.4
where l is a left context, r is a right context, and e is an embedding.
We use the character embedding model proposed in [3]. A dictionary containing char-
acters and its embedding is constructed. The embedding for each character in a particular
word are set in both direction order for a forward and a backward LSTM, respectively.
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Moreover, a word embedding is generated from its characters by concating its forward and
backward model of BLSTM. The character-based model is then concatenated with a word-
level model from a word lookup dictionary. In the testing phase, any words that do not
have an embedding are set to a UNK (unknown) embedding. We set the hidden dimen-
sion by 100 for the forward and backward character LSTM, respectively. Therefore, the
character-based model of words has a dimension of 200.
3.6 Bidirectional long short-term memory (BLSTM) as the
main architecture
We assign an entity name to every token in a log entry using a bidirectional LSTM (BLSTM)
[193]. BLSTM is derived from recurrent neural networks (RNN) [203], which is a variant
of neural networks designed to process sequential data. In event log parsing, the sequences
are each field in a log entry such as timestamp, hostname, service name, and IP address.
The input of RNN is a sequence of vectors and it yields another sequence of information
or label about the input sequence. RNN can learn long dependencies between sequences but
it tends to have a bias with recent input sequences and also has gradient vanishing problems
[204]. LSTM [205] solves this problem by providing a memory-cell to accommodate long
dependencies. An LSTM memory-cell unit is composed of several gates, which control the
proportions of information to forget and to pass on to the next step. We follow these
standard equations from [205] to update an LSTM unit at time t:
it = σ(Wiht−1 +Uixt + bi) (3.1)
ft = σ(Wfht−1 +Ufxt + bf ) (3.2)
c̃t = tanh(Wcht−1 +Ucxt + bc) (3.3)
ct = ft  ct−1 + it  c̃t (3.4)
ot = σ(Woht−1 +Uoxt + bo) (3.5)
ht = ot  tanh(ct) (3.6)
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where ht is the hidden state vector storing information at time t and xt is the word em-
bedding as the input vector. The operator σ is the element-wise sigmoid function and 
is the element-wise product. Wi,Wf ,Wc,Wo denote the weight matrices for hidden state
ht, while Ui,Uf ,Uc,Uo are weight matrices for different gates for xt. Lastly, bi,bf ,bc,bo
are the bias vectors.
From the LSTM equation, there are two inputs of each direction of LSTM: 1) the
hidden state from the previous time step ht−1 and 2) the embedding from the current
step xt. Afterwards, it produces a new hidden state. An original LSTM moves from left
to right or forward direction to learn the sequences. To get the reverse context, one can
add another LSTM
←−
ht that processes sequences from right to left or backward direction.
These two directions will provide much more information about sequence and it is called
bidirectional LSTM [193]. The hidden representations from both LSTMs are concatenated





of BLSTM architecture for a log entry without the main message is shown in Figure 3.5.
Each word becomes an element a sequence vector and the output is each respective label
such as Jan: B-TIM, 18: I-TIM, 09:33:03: I-TIM, where the label follows IOB tagging
format.
In NER problem, there are strong dependencies between adjacent labels and it should
be beneficial to take advantage of these connections. Thus, BLSTM gives an effective repre-
sentation of each field that catches a context in the surrounding words in a log entry. Unlike
traditional machine learning that needs features definition before training, BLSTM learns
features based on both context directions. To predict an entity label for each token, ner-
logparser uses a softmax output layer. In the softmax layer, BLSTM predicts a normalized
distribution over all possible labels for every token.
3.7 Experimental results
3.7.1 Datasets
To test the performance and to get the generic model for nerlogparser, we use various types
of log files from different environments such as the Linux operating system, supercomputer,
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Figure 3.5: An illustration of named entity recognition with BLSTM for a log entry exclud-
ing the main message
distributed systems, and honeypots. We also use common logs such as web server logs. The
different kinds of attacks recorded in the log files for training are not important. In log
parsing, we look for a various field structure of log entries in many log files, rather than the
content of the log message. Therefore, certain kinds of attacks or any undiscovered attacks
do not limit the ability to train and test the log parser model. Accordingly, nerlogparser is
not affected by the content of the log message.
The first dataset is log files from the BlueGene/L supercomputer system. This dataset
was collected from Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL) and contains alert and non-
alert messages [206]. The second dataset is the forensic image data from Digital Corpora
namely nps-2009-casper-rw [167]. This image is an ext3 file system dump from a bootable
USB. Therefore, we extract log files from the directory /var/log/ to be analyzed.
Other datasets are coming from DFRWS (Digital Forensic Research Workshop) 2009
and 2016. In the DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2009 [6], forensic researchers investigated
Linux logs including authentication logs to trace the attacker in two hosts namely “jhuisi”
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Table 3.1: List of event log datasets
Dataset # of lines
BlueGene/L [206] 10,000
Digital Corpora casper-rw [167] 11,086
DFRWS 2009 jhuisi host [6] 11,737
DFRWS 2009 nssal host [6] 107,093
DFRWS 2016 [207] 3,304
Honeynet Challenge 5 [173] 124,386
Honeynet Challenge 7 [2] 8,712
Kippo honeypot [19] 10,094
Proxifier [190] 10,107
SecRepo access logs [174] 10,039
Zookeeper [190] 10,000
and “nssal”. The more recent challenge [207] provided a case in a Software-Defined Network
(SDN) environment. The forensic investigators needed to carve and parse the log files from
an OpenVSwitch (OVS) switch before examining the SDN event logs.
The Honeynet Project also offers some challenges related to event log analysis. The
Forensic Challenge 5 2010 [173] concerns a compromised Linux operating system. The
directory /var/log/ has been imaged and the investigator needs to analyze the brute-force
attack recorded in the log files. The Forensic Challenge 7 2011 [2] provides a disk image of
a compromised Linux server and a forensic analysis is required in order to understand what
really happened. From the provided hard disk dump, we extract the log files and parse
them.
Furthermore, we also include log files from Kippo which is an SSH (secure shell) hon-
eypot. A Kippo was installed and configured on a DigitalOcean droplet with public IP
address so everyone including real attackers and botnets can reach this server. We have
used this dataset previously in Studiawan et al. [19]. We also incorporate logs from Prox-
ifier as a proxy client and Zookeeper as a distributed system coordinator. Both Proxifier
and Zookeeper logs have been used in [190] to analyze event log abstraction.
In addition, we add web access logs from Security Repository (SecRepo) [174] as web logs
are commonly analyzed by system administrators. SecRepo is a website that provides a list
of the various security-related datasets including event logs. Web server logs from SecRepo
64
are generated by the website visitors. We only take the first 10,000 lines in BlueGene/L
and Zookeeper as these datasets are huge with total 4,747,963 and 74,380, respectively, for
only one type of log file. The summary of datasets and their number of lines is displayed
in Table 3.1. In addition, a full list of datasets used in this thesis is shown in Appendix A.
3.7.2 Training of nerlogparser
For training and testing phase, nerlogparser is implemented in Python 3 and using Ten-
sorFlow [208] as deep learning library. For traditional machine learning implementations
that will be compared with nerlogparser, we use Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) [209]
and scikit-learn [210]. To train all of the models, we use a computer with 12 cores of CPU,
64GB of RAM, and NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 8GB and GTX 1050 Ti 4GB GPUs. The
output of training phase is a model file that can be used directly by a forensic investigator
to parse log files.In the preprocessing step, each word is converted into lowercase and the
digit character is converted to “NUM”. As nerlogparser is a supervised learning method,
we need to build labelled entries from the datasets. We use PyParsing [188] to parse log
entries and each field is labelled based on IOB tagging format. We split each file in the
datasets in these proportions: 60% for training, 20% for development, and 20% for testing.
These proportions are common practice in machine learning research and applications [211].
Hyperparameters used in the deep learning architectures are explained as follows. The
maximum epoch for training is 15 with a dropout rate of 0.5. We use the batch size of
15 and early stopping for three times. This means that the training will stop if there is
no more improvement after three epochs. We use Adam [212] as the learning method in
BLSTM architecture. Adam is good for general cases because it is efficient, only needs a
small amount of RAM, and is invariant to gradient scaling. We set learning rate to 0.001
and learning rate decay to 0.9. For LSTM hidden states, we set it to 100 where character
embedding is activated and 300 when only word embedding is defined.
Table 2 shows the training process to get the best evaluation metrics with 15 epochs.
The best performance for nerlogparser model is achieved in 13th epoch with 100% precision,
99.96% recall, 99.98% F1, and 99.99% accuracy. As early stopping is set to three, the
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Table 3.2: Training with 15 Epochs for the nerlogparser
Epoch Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
1 13.92 4.28 6.54 59.08
2 74.00 74.15 74.07 90.42
3 96.39 97.20 96.79 97.95
4 98.55 99.86 99.20 99.50
5 99.98 99.94 99.96 99.98
6 99.99 99.95 99.97 99.98
7 99.98 99.95 99.96 99.98
8 99.99 99.96 99.98 99.99
9 100.00 99.96 99.98 99.99
10 99.99 99.96 99.98 99.99
11 100.00 99.96 99.98 99.99
12 100.00 99.96 99.98 99.99
13 100.00 99.96 99.98 99.99
14 99.99 99.96 99.98 99.99
15 99.99 99.96 99.98 99.98
training stops when there is no improvement after three epochs or the total epochs is
finished.
3.7.3 Performance evaluation
We test the performance of architecture combinations where BLSTM become the basis. We
test BLSTM and char + BLSTM. The default input representation for BLSTM is a word
embedding, while the default output is a softmax layer. “char + BLSTM” means that it
uses both word and character embedding.
We compare the performance of nerlogparser with existing traditional machine learning
methods for NER. The compared methods are multinomial näıve Bayes [213], perceptron
[195], stochastic gradient descent [196], and passive-aggressive classifier [197]. However, the
implementation is not exactly as stated in these papers as we use scikit-learn library and
NLTK for this experiment. For traditional machine learning methods, we use the default
parameter from scikit-learn. For non-default parameters, we set the batch size for log data
to 500.
The evaluation metrics used to measure the performance of the methods are precision,
recall, F1 score, and accuracy. The results of this comparison are depicted in Table 3 where
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Table 3.3: Comparison of performance metrics in percent (%) for traditional methods and
two settings of the nerlogparser
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
nerlogparser (BLSTM) 99.82 99.65 99.73 99.82
nerlogparser (char + BLSTM) 99.98 99.94 99.96 99.98
Perceptron 75.80 89.30 82.00 93.30
SGD 91.00 65.00 75.80 80.90
Multinomial NB 93.70 94.70 94.20 96.90
Passive-aggresive 99.00 98.70 98.90 99.30
the bold value indicates the best performance. Based on the results shown in Table 3, char
+ BLSTM gives the best performance with even values for all metrics: 99.98% precision,
99.94% recall, 99.96% F1 score, and 99.98% accuracy.
In our experiments, the traditional machine learning methods are inferior to the deep
learning technique because they use handcrafted features. Perceptron gives fair results
with precision of 75.80%, recall of 89.30%, and F1 scored 82.00%, with an accuracy of
93.30%. This is because the output from the first layer becomes the input to the second
layer. Therefore, the classification errors in the first layer will influence the accuracy of the
second.
SGD provides the worst performance compared to other methods with only 75.80%
F1 score and 80.90% accuracy. SGD is sensitive to feature scaling, so it needs a very large
dataset to give the best model. It seems that the dataset used in this experiment is not large
enough for SGD. Even if the size of the datasets were increased, it is unlikely that SGD
would outperform nerlogparser as the BLSTM-based method are known to also perform
better when supplied with more data.
The improved version näıve Bayes called multinomial näıve Bayes also gives fair results
with an F1 score of 94.20% and accuracy of 96.90%. The Bayesian-based method assumes
that the feature is independent of each other. In NER case for log data, this assumption
is not always true as each entry is highly related to surrounding entries. Besides, data
input are assumed to be in normal distribution in näıve Bayes and power-law distribution
in multinomial näıve Bayes. In real-world log files, the data distribution is not always same
as assumed in those methods.
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Passive-aggressive classifier provides excellent results and the best for traditional ma-
chine learning with 98.90% and 99.30% for F1 score and accuracy, respectively. The memory
requirement of passive-aggressive is minimized and it can run in online mode meaning that
it updates the model one sentence at a time. The passive-aggressive is a large-margin learn-
ing algorithm that attempts to separate correct and incorrect sequences. The performance
metrics are comparable to the BLSTM-based method. However, nerlogparser can achieve
the accuracy very close to 100% and this performance is critical to parse event logs to avoid
parsing errors.
Compared to the aforementioned methods and BLSTM-only architecture, nerlogparser
with “char + BLSTM” model provides the best performance. The reason is that the
combination of character and word embedding gives a good vector representation for log
entries as it learns the prefix, suffix, left and right adjacent token of a particular word. As
BLSTM was designed to process sequences, it also supports the excellent performance of
nerlogparser as we model a log entry as a sequence of fields that we assign labels to each of
them.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose nerlogparser, an automatic event log parser based on the named
entity recognition model. We use bidirectional long short-term memory to detect a sequence
of fields in a log entry such as timestamp, hostname, IP address, service name, and the main
message. To increase the accuracy, we also employ character-level embedding in the input
layer of BLSTM.
The forensic investigators can use pretrained nerlogparser model to parse log files. Note
that as the proposed tool is automatic, the end users do not need to provide any input
parameters. In addition, investigators can train their own domain-specific log files. As
presented nerlogparser is trained on log files from some common systems such as Linux,
web servers, and SSH honeypot.
nerlogparser can be used in the subsequent steps for anomaly detection as discussed in
the rest of this thesis. The parsed log entries can be then processed for log clustering (Chap-
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ter 4), cluster-based anomaly detection (Chapter 5), detection using deep autoencoders





Computer security events are recorded in several log files. It is necessary to cluster these
logs to discover security threats, detect anomalies, or identify a particular error. A problem
arises when large quantities of security log data need to be checked as existing tools do not
provide sufficiently sophisticated grouping results. In addition, existing methods need user
input parameters and it is not trivial to find optimal values for these. Therefore, we propose
a method for the automatic clustering of security logs. First, we present a new graph-
theoretic approach for security log clustering based on maximal clique percolation. Second,
we add an intensity threshold to the obtained maximal clique to consider the edge weight
before proceeding to the percolations. Third, we use the simulated annealing algorithm to
optimize the number of percolations and intensity threshold for maximal clique percolation.
The entire process is automatic and does not need any user input. Experimental results
on various real-world datasets show that the proposed method achieves superior clustering
results compared to other methods.
This chapter has been published in the Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Advanced




A server records a certain activity to system or kernel logs. Another log file keeps authenti-
cation events for the operating system, such as auth.log. Both successful and failed login
attempts are recorded in this authentication log file [214]. Other security applications also
track their operations into specific log files, such as Snort Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
logs.
System administrators may need to investigate these log files to check for incidents in
relation to a certain application server. The use of command line tools such as grep or
awk are time-consuming because we need to develop the correct search parameters [12].
These tools are unsuitable for convenient identification and reviewing of security-relevant
events. In addition, the command line tools are non-automated and require considerable
user expertise. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what has occurred in the last couple
hours in terms of security attacks to a server. A sophisticated tool is required for the
investigation of log files.
The use of event log clustering is important for security threat discovery, specifically by
using clustering as a basis for anomaly detection [215, 216]. Vaarandi and Pihelgas [217]
state that a cluster which has less log pattern frequency than other clusters becomes an
outlier. More recent work has used a log clustering method to identify a problem or a
particular error in large-scale online service systems [218].
The existing methods use many user input parameters to cluster event logs. Therefore,
the users will get a difficulty to determine the appropriate parameter values for various log
files. For example, Simple Log Clustering Tool (SLCT) needs one mandatory parameter and
other 13 options that can be set by the users [110]. The improved version of SLCT, known
as LogCluster, requires one mandatory parameter and other 26 options, excluding optional
formatting features such as color, debugging mode, and the version of the tool [217]. To
find any good parameter combination is a time-consuming task. The main challenge in the
log clustering case is that we need an automated technique to get good clusters without
any user intervention.
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Contributions. We propose graph-based clustering for security logs and name the
proposed method ASLoC (Automatic Security Log Clustering). We focus on security-
related logs as log examination is greatly required for security analysis. In summary, the
contributions of the paper are as follows:
1. ASLoC preprocesses log entries without any regular expressions or predefined rules;
2. Security logs are represented as a graph data structure, so that the logs will be grouped
naturally as the log entries are connected by their similarity;
3. We model the logs as a maximal clique graph and relax it to a weighted graph. This
is because the proposed graph model considers the string similarity between two log
entries as an edge weight;
4. The clusters are determined using maximal clique percolation which needs two pa-
rameters, specifically the number of percolations and the intensity value. We use
simulated annealing (SA) [219] to optimize these two parameters; and
5. ASLoC will make the investigation of the security logs significantly easier for the
system administrators as no input parameters are needed.
4.2 Related work
Clustering-based event log analysis is a commonly-used approach although the existing
methods do not always focus on security logs. One of the techniques for analyzing event
logs is to cluster the logs based on the similarity of the text in the event messages [220, 217].
Vaarandi [110] initiated this research domain by proposing a technique namely Simple Log
Clustering Tool (SLCT), which utilizes density-based clustering.
IPLoM (Iterative Partitioning Log Mining) uses several phases in a hierarchical ap-
proach to obtain clustering results [221]. Other work by [220] proposed Baler for log clus-
tering in high-performance computing (HPC) infrastructures. This technique first parses
log messages then generates tokens and patterns. The tokens and patterns are treated as
“meta-clusters” and processed using the Levenshtein distance to measure their similarity
to other groups. The process is continued until they form “meta-patterns” and final results
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are produced. The clustering of event logs can also be applied to log data streams in real
time [222].
Moreover, LogCluster is the improved version of SLCT [217]. The preprocessing step of
LogCluster is similar to that of SLCT, but LogCluster considers the position of the word in
the log lines. LogCluster maintains the frequent words found in the log message as cluster
candidates. It then selects some of the candidates based on a user-specified threshold.
LogCluster will join the candidates to the larger group for easier observation [217].
4.3 Proposed method: ASLoC
ASLoC has four phases as shown in Fig. 4.1. First, the security log is parsed to generate
a unique message. Second, a graph is constructed to represent the preprocessed raw logs.
Furthermore, we describe improved maximal clique percolation for log clustering in the
proposed weighted graph. In the last phase, the optimal parameters are found using the
simulated annealing (SA). Each phase is discussed as follows.
4.3.1 Log preprocessing and the graph model
The preprocessing procedure first reads every line of a log file and converts it to lower case.
This conversion is important for calculating string similarity in order to create an edge in the
proposed graph model. For example, the terms “Invalid” and “invalid” will be considered
as different words if they are not converted to lower case. Any unnecessary symbols, such
as underscore, dash, and colon, are also removed from the log message. The next step is to
delete numbers, so the procedure leaves only alphabetic characters in the log messages.
The last step will delete stop words such as “from” and “for”. Stop words are extremely
common words and are removed from computation because they are insignificant for the
clustering. We use stop words from the NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit) Python library
[209]. In addition, we remove any word that always appears at the beginning of each line
such as month name Dec. We denote all raw logs as L = {l1, l2, . . . , l|L|}, where |L| is the
number of L. We then define L′ as the preprocessed security logs. We filter L and take
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Security logs Preprocessing log entries Building graph model
Clustering based on
maximal clique percolation
Finding the clustering optimal
parameters with SA
Final clustering results
Figure 4.1: A block diagram of ASLoC as the proposed clustering method
only the unique messages for the graph model. This is denoted by M = {m1,m2, . . . ,m|M |}
where |M | is the number of unique messages.
The graph model provides a natural structure of text data because an edge in a graph
represents string similarity. Furthermore, we choose the graph representation because it
produces a natural initial grouping. If the string similarity between two security log entries
is zero, then we will not create an edge between them. After completing the first phase,
we construct an undirected and edge-weighted graph, defined as G = (V,E). Every unique
message in M is now represented as a vertex v in the set V . E is a set of weighted edges.
The edge eij from vi to vj is constructed when the cosine similarity between two messages
in vi and vj is greater than zero. Please note that i ≥ 0, j < |V |, and i 6= j.
We then define w(v) as the vertex weight and w(eij) as the edge weight. The vertex
weight w(v) is the number of members in the list of each element in a unique message m.
We can determine this value by maintaining a list that contains the index of L. The list
represents the individual row of security logs that refers to m. In addition, this list will make
the ASLoC easier to traverse back to the original raw logs when presenting the clustering
results. The edge weight w(eij) is a value of the cosine similarity between the two vertices
in a range [0, 1].
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4.3.2 Weighted maximal clique percolation as the clusters
A clique is a complete subgraph of a graph G. The maximal clique provides a clique that
cannot be extended with one more adjacent vertex. This means that a maximal clique is
not a subset of a larger clique found [223]. To find all maximal cliques in a graph G, we
use the Bron-Kerbosch algorithm [224] and it is implemented using NetworkX graph library
[225].
In our case, we need an algorithm that considers the edge weight in the proposed graph
G. After generating all maximal cliques in graph G, we filter them by using an intensity
value. A low intensity value indicates a good cluster candidate for an individual maximal
clique. This intensity threshold has been introduced in [226].
We denote I(C) as the intensity of a maximal clique C, E(C) is a set of edge weights in
C, and |E(C)| is the total number of edges in C. It should be noted that this threshold has
been used in k-clique percolation [226] but not used for maximal clique percolation. We
modify the power of I(C) to (|E(C)|−1) instead of (2 / k(k− 1)) in [226] to adapt with the
maximal cliques. In other words, I(C) is the geometric mean of all edge weights in C as






For the percolation step, we consider only the valid maximal cliques, V (C). V (C) is a
maximal clique C with an intensity I(C) more than the threshold, where:
V (C) =

C, if I(C) > threshold
∅, if I(C) ≤ threshold
(4.2)
We use the SA algorithm [219] to estimate an optimal value of the intensity threshold
because it can provide global solutions. SA is better than other methods such as hill
climbing because the latter can reach only a local optima in the search space.
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Furthermore, a percolation is defined as an intersection between two maximal cliques.
These cliques share at least k− 1 vertices [227]. Note that k is the number of percolations.
A percolation is constructed using a maximal clique graph G′ = (V ′, E′), where G′ is an
undirected, unweighted graph, and V ′ contains every maximal clique C in G [227]. The
edge E will be created if v′i and v
′
j in V
′ share k − 1 vertices. The percolation result will
be equivalent to a cluster in G. When no percolation is found, the maximal clique itself
is considered as the cluster. In a special case, such as in a small size security logs, if no
maximal cliques are found, each vertex in the graph G will be set as a cluster. To obtain the
number of generated clusters, we detect the connected components in G′ and then continue
the process in the initial graph G to retrieve each of the cluster members.
4.3.3 Finding the optimal parameters using simulated annealing
Two main parameters are applied to control the weighted maximal clique percolation process
namely the number of percolations k and the intensity threshold I. To obtain the best
parameters, we use the SA method. This process is applied to the percolation step to get
the best cluster configuration.
SA is derived from a metallurgical process in material cooling introduced by Metropolis
et al. [228]. A material such as metal is processed starting at a high temperature and then
cooled slowly according to a particular cooling schedule. The algorithm will accept the new
energy state based on Boltzmann’s probability exp(−∆E/Tcur) where ∆E = Enew−Ecur is
the difference between the new and the current energy. Therefore, the system will achieve
a thermodynamic equilibrium at a certain time. The best configuration at a specific energy
level is achieved at the equilibrium and becomes the global solution.
In this research, the cooling schedule in the annealing process uses the static decrement
rule by a cooling factor α where Tnew = αTcur [229]. In terms of parameter optimization,
the energy will be replaced by an objective function first proposed by Kirkpatrick et al.
[219].
Furthermore, the initialization of proposed ASLoC algorithm runs as follows. First,
the procedure finds the weighted maximal clique in graph G. The current parameters kcur
and Icur are selected randomly in a defined range. Subsequently, a cluster is generated by
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performing percolation using current parameters. In this case, the energy E is an internal
evaluation of clustering using the Calinski-Harabasz index (CH).
The next step in the algorithm is to set the initial value of the best parameter
(Cbest, Ebest, kbest, Ibest) with the current configuration. The procedure then sets the new
temperature Tnew using the cooling factor α and initializes the iteration counter to zero.
The default design of SA is a minimization of energy, while CH is looking for a maximal
value. Therefore, we multiply CH by -1 to obtain the minimum value and to conform with
SA.
The start of the main ASLoC iteration is similar to the initialization step except for
the new random selection of a pair parameter kcur and Icur. The new calculated Enew
and previous energy Ecur are then evaluated. If new energy Enew is less than or equal to
the current energy Ecur and current Ebest, then the best parameter is set to the current
configuration. On the other hand, if exp(−∆E/Tcur) is more than a random value from
uniform distribution in [0,1], then Ecur is set to new energy Enew. Before continuing to the
next iteration, the procedure updates new temperature Tnew and increments the counter.
The main iteration will stop if Tnew is bigger than Tmin and the counter is less than or
equal to the maximum iteration N . The procedure then returns the final best parameters
(Cbest, Ebest, kbest, Ibest).
4.4 Experimental results and analysis
This section comprises the evaluation metrics, the description of the datasets, the configu-
ration of SA, and the main experiments. Also, we compare ASLoC with other five methods
to see their performance using the same datasets.
We use internal evaluation to examine the clustering performance based on the clustering
results themselves. We do not use external evaluation metrics such as precision, recall, and
F-measure, because the internal one does not need a label from the dataset to evaluate
the clusters. In addition, cluster labeling is not feasible in real-world security log files
which are very large. The performance measurement of ASLoC uses two standard internal
clustering evaluation metrics, specifically Calinski-Harbasz index (CH) [230] and Davies-
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Bouldin index (DB) [231]. We choose these metrics because CH and DB use a centroid to
represent a cluster which significantly reduces the computation time. A cluster centroid is
defined as a concatenation of the preprocessed log entries in a particular cluster.
4.4.1 Description of the security log datasets
For this research, we used five security log datasets that are publicly available. To test
the robustness of ASLoC, these datasets have different types of format and event messages.
First, we use the first bundle of the dataset from Hofstede et al. [232], which includes
mainly SSH brute-force attacks recorded in authentication logs. This data is taken from
November 1 to December 31, 2014. It contains 187,591 lines and has been anonymized by
replacing any usernames with “XXXXX” and hostnames with the anonymized IP address
of the observed hosts. The second authentication logs dataset was provided by Sconzo [174]
in SecRepo (Security Repository) website. These logs are from an operational Linux-based
server and recorded from November 30 to December 31, 2014. No sanitization has been
performed on the logs. This dataset contains 86,839 lines of event logs.
The third dataset consists of 69,039 lines of Snort IDS logs provided by Chuvakin from
The Honeynet Project [177]. This log is part of the Scan of the Month 34 Challenge and
intended for the forensic analysis of a honeypot system. The next Snort IDS log dataset
was created by National CyberWatch Center in Mid-Atlantic Collegiate Cyber Defense
Competition (MACCDC) 2012 [233] and contains 469,010 lines. The last dataset is a syslog
from a real-world honeypot installed in a RedHat-based Linux [234]. There are 25,567 lines
in this dataset. Similar to other datasets, no anonymization and no modification are applied
to this syslog.
4.4.2 Experimental results
There are several parameters to run the SA part of ASLoC. There is no formal definition to
set the parameters, so we refer to the previous research on SA [235]. We define Tmin = 10
−99,
Tmax = 10, and α = 0.9. The optimum energy E to achieve is the Caliski-Harabasz index
(CH). The trial of k is started from 2 to the maximum number of vertices of the biggest
maximal clique found, x, because the number of percolations cannot exceed this value. The
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Figure 4.2: The example of CH for an authentication log (red-triangle dot is the optimum
value and the green crosses are the trial values in ASLoC)
intensity calculates the geometric mean of edge weight in an individual maximal clique.
This edge weight is cosine similarity in the range [0, 1]. Therefore, we set the intensity
threshold I = {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}. SA parameters are defined internally and no user input
is required. The maximum iteration for a brute force approach is the total combination
of a set of k and I. ASLoC runs only 30% of this total maximum iteration to achieve the
optimal solution, so we set the maximum iteration to N = 0.3.
To implement and manipulate the graph model, we used the NetworkX library [225].
An example of finding the ASLoC parameters is depicted in Fig. 4.2. To achieve the best
performance in terms of internal evaluation of clustering results, we need to define the best
parameters k and I in the maximal clique percolation using SA.
In Fig. 4.2, the data plotted is from an authentication log on December 4, 2014 from
Hofstede et al. dataset [232]. The optimal parameters obtained by ASLoC have a red-
triangle marker with k∗ = 6, I∗ = 0.4, CH∗ = 2338.49, while green-cross markers indicate
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the trial process of SA. The x-axis shows the number of percolations k, y-axis as intensity
threshold I, and z-axis as SA energy, which is CH in this case.
We evaluate the CH and DB per day for all log files in each dataset. After that, we cal-
culate the mean of the evaluation metrics for each dataset. The mean of the best SA energy
will be compared with existing log clustering algorithms as shown in Table 4.1. Any similar
messages in the log entries, such as Failed password ... or Accepted password ...,
will be grouped together and this will enable the security analyst or system administrator
to more easily analyze the security logs as no parameter settings need to be inputted. This
output can be used as part of a broader process for security log analysis, such as outlier
detection. An outlier is defined as any cluster that has a small number of log entries and has
possibly recorded potential threats. This particular cluster will require further investigation.
The larger the logs, the bigger will be the generated graph. This is because large
logs have more unique event messages and these are represented as vertices in the graph.
Therefore, ASLoC will need to undergo more trials to obtain the optimal parameters. The
ASLoC behavior of CH is similar to that of DB as depicted in Table 4.1. ASLoC generates
a high value of CH and a low value of DB for all datasets, which indicates a good clustering
performance.
ASLoC can produce different optimal parameters, k∗ and I∗, for each dataset because
it will adapt to the input security logs, while simultaneously providing high CH and low
DB. If multiple parameters produce the best CH, as shown in Fig. 4.2, ASLoC will take
that appears the last in the iteration of the trial process.
To objectively measure the performance and demonstrate the robustness of the proposed
method, we compare ASLoC with other methods such as Improved MajorClust [19], IPLoM
[221], LogSig [236], LKE [237], and LogCluster [217]. Improved MajorClust [19], LKE [237],
and LogCluster [217] employ clustering as the part of anomaly detection in event logs. On
the other hand, IPLoM and LogSig use clustering as the preprocessing step to generate
log abstraction [221] or event signatures [236]. Only Improved MajorClust uses the graph
data structure as the basis for the clustering model, while other methods use non-graph
approaches.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of CH (the higher, the better) and DB (the lower, the better) for
all datasets. Note that the bold values indicate the best results
Method
Auth logs I Auth logs II Snort logs I Snort logs II Syslog
CH DB CH DB CH DB CH DB CH DB
ASLoC 9333.64 0.63 3395.24 0.98 9618.57 0.53 1387.57 0.51 940.63 0.74
Improved 780.34 1.09 1454.05 1.44 5910.23 1.08 157.41 1.76 83.83 1.01
MajorClust [19]
IPLoM [221] 486.93 2.33 577.59 1.47 4221.02 1.20 75.31 1.22 103.22 2.07
LogSig [236] 2516.98 1.07 3294.07 1.99 5105.77 0.94 289.52 1.86 290.55 1.36
LKE [237] 332.49 1.27 1946.88 1.19 4661.18 0.77 110.49 1.28 156.14 0.95
LogCluster [217] 613.13 4.05 2885.87 1.12 1402.81 1.58 252.85 3.08 391.64 5.48
The main advantage of ASLoC compared with other methods is that it does not require
users to input parameters and determines the parameters automatically. Only Improved
MajorClust does not user input, but its performance is not as good as that of ASLoC as
shown in Table 4.1. The values in Table 4.1 are obtained by running multiple runs of the
same clustering technique. We then choose the best value from these multiple experiments.
To make the comparison, we define the parameters used by other methods as follows. The
parameters used for IPLoM are file support threshold = 0, partition support threshold =
0, upper bound = 0.9, lower bound = 0.25, and cluster goodness threshold = 0.175. These
IPLoM parameters are recommended in the source code implementation of IPLoM [190].
The parameter for LogSig is the number of clusters where we set the value from 2 to 9
and choose it based on the best CH discovered. Moreover, the parameter for LKE is a
threshold value for the edit distance between two log entries. We select the threshold = 5
as recommended in [190]. We use an option rsupport = (10, 20, . . . , 90) for LogCluster and
take only the best evaluation metrics after trialing these rsupport values. This parameter
defines the relative support threshold of the total number of log lines in percentages. For
instance, rsupport = 10 means LogCluster will find clusters that match at least 10% of the
log entries in an input file.
Table 4.1 shows the comparison of CH and DB for ASLoC and the compared methods.
The values in bold are the best values of each dataset. We can see that the proposed method
has the best CH and DB for all datasets. Although processing similar datasets, ASLoC
obtains a higher value of CH for authentication logs I with 9333.64 and a lower CH with
3395.24 for authentication logs II because the first dataset is anonymized and the second
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is not. This anonymization reduces the number of unique strings for the username, so the
grouping results are better. These internal evaluation metrics indicate that our method
outperforms the others for all datasets and obtains the highest CH for authentication logs
I dataset with 9333.64 and the best DB for Snort logs II dataset with 0.51.
Improved MajorClust has a low performance, especially in regard to the Syslog dataset
with CH = 83.83 and DB = 1.01, because it only considers the edge weight of the neigh-
boring vertices. Although the preprocessed logs in a neighboring vertex are not so similar,
it is still considered as the same cluster as long as the edge weight is greater than those of
the other neighbor vertices.
On the other hand, IPLoM also produces a low clustering performance for almost all
datasets, specifically in Snort logs II with CH = 75.31. This value is very low compared
to that obtained by ASLoC (CH = 1387.57) as shown in Table 4.1. IPLoM is unable to
process the log message well because the parameter needs to be repeatedly tuned to find
the best performance, while we use only the static parameter values for all datasets based
on previous research [190]. It is not trivial to achieve the best configuration for five IPLoM
parameters for various security log datasets.
We need to configure the number of clusters to run LogSig. LogSig uses a technique
similar to K-means clustering to group the event log messages [236]. Since it is not feasible
to test all possible number of clusters, we use only 2 to 9 clusters in our experiments. This
is the major drawback of LogSig. However, LogSig has a generally stable performance for
all datasets compared to other methods although ASLoC still has better clustering results.
LogSig achieved the slightly inferior values compared to ASLoC. For example, the CH of
LogSig and ASLoC for authentication logs II dataset are 3294.07 and 3395.24, respectively.
LKE joins two clusters if any two log entries between them have an edit distance smaller
than an input threshold. Therefore, it cannot generalize well in many types of datasets.
In addition, the testing of various thresholds is very time-consuming, taking days or even
weeks [190] because LKE uses hierarchical clustering to group the log lines.
We run LogCluster with rsupport = (0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9) and choose the clustering results
based on the best CH and DB. LogCluster has a fair performance for Authentication logs
II dataset compared to other methods with CH = 2885.87 and DB = 1.12. However, Log-
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Cluster shows a poor performance for four other datasets indicated by high DB as depicted
in Table 4.1. The reason for this output is that LogCluster has many optional parame-
ters, such as wsize for filtering out infrequent words from the word frequency estimation
process and csize for filtering out cluster candidates which match less than rsupport log
entries. There are 15 parameters related to cluster generation in total. On the other hand,
we use only the mandatory parameter, specifically rsupport in this experiment. Similar to
other methods, tuning many parameters of LogCluster is impractical and requires security
expertise to set appropriate parameter combinations.
The mean performance of ASLoC for all datasets are 4935.13 and 0.68 for CH and
DB, respectively. This good performance is greatly affected by the graph data structure
to model the security logs. Similar log entries are first grouped by their unique messages
and a single unique message becomes a vertex in the graph. The edge indicates the cosine
similarity between two messages. These vertices are then clustered by their maximal clique
percolations. Following these procedures, the security logs will be well-grouped and show
good clustering results.
4.5 Conclusion
In this work, we present a graph-theoretic method for security log clustering. The proposed
approach has achieved state of the art performance. ASLoC proved to be accurate at
finding clusters, indicated by Calinski-Harabasz (CH) and Davies-Bouldin index (DB)
with a flexible number of percolations and intensity threshold for weighted maximal clique
percolation. Importantly, ASLoC can run automatically without user inputs by employing
SA to optimize the internal parameters.
Automatic log clustering is a foundation work for cluster-based anomaly detection. In
the next chapter, we discuss another automatic graph-based clustering. We then extend
the clustering algorithm to produce anomaly identification in access logs, such as Linux
authentication logs. Graph visualization is also provided to assist the forensic investigator.
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Chapter 5
Graph clustering and anomaly
detection of access control log for
forensic purposes
Attacks on operating system access control have become a significant and increasingly com-
mon problem. This type of security threat is recorded in a forensic artifact such as an
authentication log. Forensic investigators will generally examine the log to analyze such
incidents. An anomaly is highly correlated to an attacker’s attempts to compromise the
system. In this chapter, we propose a novel method to automatically detect an anomaly in
the access control log of an operating system. The logs will be first preprocessed and then
clustered using an improved MajorClust algorithm to get a better cluster. This technique
provides parameter-free clustering so that it automatically can produce an analysis report
for the forensic investigators. The clustering results will be checked for anomalies based on
a score that considers some factors such as the total members in a cluster, the frequency of
the events in the log file, and the inter-arrival time of a specific activity. We also provide
a graph-based visualization of logs to assist the investigators with easy analysis. Experi-
mental results compiled on an open dataset of a Linux authentication log show that the
proposed method achieved the accuracy of 83.14% in the authentication log dataset.




Access controls limit what actions user can perform in a specific environment such as an
application or operating system. In this research, we mainly consider the access controls in
an operating system. For example, this log is available in auth.log under the /var/log/
directory in a Debian-based Linux environment or /var/log/secure in RedHat family
distributions. It provides a log of Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) that record
the user’s granted access [214] and also secure shell (SSH) accesses, both failed and successful
ones. This artifact is important evidence for the forensic investigators or security analysts
to trace the attackers and analyze the incidents in a server.
For auth.log analysis, there is OSSEC (Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection
System Security), which also considers other log files to detect suspicious activities in a host
[238]. Some examples of OSSEC implementation to detect access violations and multiple
failed logins were presented in [239] while its complete guide is described in [240]. Other
research on auth.log investigation was proposed by Sato and Yamauchi [28]. They first
provided an architecture for securing log files and then proposed tampering detection of
system logs including auth.log. In addition, Basin et al. gave a brief explanation of possible
attacks and a simple examination using existing tools to check the traces for attempted
attacks. As a result, we can see a trail in the security log such as auth.log [12].
One of the applications that record activities in auth.log is the SSH server. Detection
of brute force attacks is critical because recent reports show this type of attack is frequently
conducted where SSH service is widely targeted [241]. Instead of doing forensic analysis,
most research have conducted a proactive mechanism to prevent the dictionary attack [242,
243]. The authors presented a detection and defense architecture for SSH threats based
on the authentication log. Another attempt to create a model for brute force profiling
was proposed by Javed and Paxson where the model accounted the detection and user
authentication failures [244].
The application of text clustering in digital evidence has also been proposed to increase
the relevance of the search results [245]. Several papers have tried to cluster the event log
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and detect its outliers, but the threshold for the anomaly scores was not sophisticated since
the user must tune it manually to get the best results [110, 246].
In this work, we consider SSH records as well as PAM authentication in auth.log. The
proposed method identifies any log activities that are suspicious and labels them as out-
liers after the clustering phase. We propose a parameter-free algorithm to cluster this log
and conduct anomaly detection, which refers to establish a baseline norm and detecting
deviations from it. These deviations can be an attack or other strange events which need
attention from the forensic analysts. However, the experiments focus on brute force pass-
word attacks as this is the most common type of access control violation [241]. The term
parameter-free means that the clustering algorithm will run without any initial guess or any
parameter supplied.
Most existing techniques need a manual input of the number of clusters. The classical
k-Means and its variants still need the number of clusters as a parameter to run [247]
while hierarchical clustering requires a specific level at which to cut the generated tree or
dendrogram [248]. Density-based clustering and its extensions are other alternatives, but
they require the neighborhood size to be passed as a user-defined variable [249].
Another technique, namely MajorClust, is a parameterless method that clusters nodes
based on its natural structure in the graph [250]. MajorClust has been extended to a fuzzy
version [251] and probability-based approach, so it can work well with several structures
on the local scale [252]. However, we will improve MajorClust by adding a condition when
the processed node’s cluster is not the same as the heaviest neighbor node’s cluster, we
will force it to follow the cluster of the heaviest one. Therefore, an event will stick to the
most similar one instead of following the others, which are not so similar but has more
edge weight aggregation. This will improve the performance of clustering so that it will be




We define some formal terms in this chapter. An event log or a log file is a file that
records activities from an application or services such as authentication log from SSH server
application. A record is defined as a single entry in the event log. Then, an event is defined
as a message in a record.
The proposed method is illustrated in Figure 5.1. First, the raw log will be preprocessed
and converted into a graph model. Second, we enter the clustering phase which consists of
four steps:
1. Cluster graph using improved MajorClust (Phase 1);
2. Create new representation of graph based on multiple longest common substring
(MLCS) to solve the overfitting problem (Phase 2);
3. Refine the new form of cluster by running improved MajorClust once again (Phase
3);
4. Produce clustering result using initial graph representation (Phase 4).
After that, we conduct anomaly calculation on the clustering results based on a score
considering several properties that characterize each cluster. An estimated threshold for
anomalousness is provided to detect this behavior automatically. The last step is to provide
a visualization of the detected outliers. The details of each phase are described in the
following subsections.
5.2.1 Log preprocessing and proposed graph model
In this research, the digital evidence to be investigated is the authentication log file
(auth.log) in a Linux environment. It is assumed that the log file has not been tampered
with or modified by the attackers. The full set of features for analysis are datetime,
hostname, service or process name, process identifier (PID), and the event. The feature
used in log preprocessing step is only the event since we focus on the content of the log and
we do not consider other fields. It should be noted that we do not delete any fields from the
log, rather only temporarily omit these features in the clustering process. For example, we









Phase 2: create new
representation of 















Figure 5.1: Block diagram of the proposed method
include the hostname of the server, type of log and its process ID (PID), e.g., sshd[2790]
and CRON[2839]. We filter all events, so it will produce only the unique one and attach
the row log identifier to every unique event.
Furthermore, all numeric characters and stopwords in unique events are removed. We
include some additional words that are not included in standard English stopwords but exist
in the log record, e.g., preauth, from, for, port, sshd, ssh, and root. To identify non-standard
stopwords, we conducted the experiments and checked the results of the graph clustering.
If the results are not formed well, we analyze the string message and add the stopwords in
order to increase the clustering accuracy. The added stopwords commonly appear in the
string and if not removed it will send the different messages into one cluster.
Moreover, a tf−idf (term frequency−inverse document frequency) procedure is imple-
mented in every filtered line to produce its numerical representation. Note that in our case,
document d refers to a single line of log record l. First, term frequency, tf , is not only the
number of occurrences of term t in log l but it is normalized with the total number of terms






Figure 5.2: Proposed graph model for authentication log
Second, we need to calculate inverse document frequency of term t, idft, as shown in the
equation below:




where N is the number of lines in the event log, and dft is the total number of lines in which
the term occurs. We modify a basic formula of tft,l and idft from [253] to conform with the
real event log and avoid a zero value. Finally, we calculate tf−idf of term t as follows:
tf−idft,l = tft,l × idft (5.3)
The next step is to build a graph G = (V,E,w) where V , a set of vertices, represents
each unique event, E, a set of edges, depicts relationship between two vertices where its
weight, w, is the cosine distance to measure the similarity between two events in a single
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log record l as seen below [253]:
w(l1, l2) =
~V (l1) · ~V (l2)
|~V (l1)||~V (l2)|
(5.4)




~Vi(l1)~Vi(l2). On the other hand, the denominator is the product of their
Euclidean lengths and defined as
√∑d
i=0
~V 2i (l) where d is the total number of the term
calculated in a record l. This cosine similarity distance becomes the edge weight of two
vertices. An example of the proposed graph model is shown in Figure 5.2. We can see that
every vertex is connected to other vertices except its zero distance since the edge is only
created when the cosine similarity is greater than zero.
To provide a more clear illustration of cosine similarity in the event log, we give a step
by step example of how this measurement is calculated between two events as follow.
Step 1: Two events from an event log
Dec 1 23:05:20 ip-172-31-27-153 sshd[28547]: Invalid user test from 192.208.179.82
Dec 1 23:36:42 ip-172-31-27-153 sshd[28578]: Invalid user admin from 187.76.79.142
Step 2: Preprocessing
l1: invalid user test
l2: invalid user admin
Step 3: Calculating term-frequency (tf)
Event invalid user test admin
l1 1 1 1 0
l2 1 1 0 1
Step 4: Calculating normalized term-frequency (tf) based on Equation 5.1
Event invalid user test admin
l1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0
l2 0.3 0.3 0 0.3
Step 5: Calculating inverse document frequency (idf) based on Equation 5.2
idfinvalid = 1 + log 2/2 = 1
idfuser = 1 + log 2/2 = 1
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idftest = 1 + log 2/1 = 1.693
idfadmin = 1 + log 2/1 = 1.693
Step 6: Calculating tf − idf based on Equation 5.3
Event invalid user test admin
l1 0.3*1 0.3*1 0.3*1.693 0
l2 0.3*1 0.3*1 0 0.3*1.693
Event invalid user test admin
l1 0.3 0.3 0.508 0
l2 0.3 0.3 0 0.508
Step 7: Calculating the numerator of cosine similarity
|~V (l1)| · |~V (l2)| = 0.3*0.3 + 0.3*0.3 + 0.508*0 + 0*0.508
= 0.09 + 0.09 + 0 + 0
= 0.18
Step 8: Calculating the denominator of cosine similarity
|~V (l1)| = sqrt(0.32 + 0.32 + 0.5082 + 02)
= sqrt(0.09 + 0.09 + 0.258 + 0)
= sqrt(0.438)
= 0.662
|~V (l2)| = sqrt(0.32 + 0.32 + 02 + 0.5082)
= sqrt(0.09 + 0.09 + 0 + 0.258)
= sqrt(0.438)
= 0.662
Step 9: Calculating the cosine similarity based on Step 7, 8, and Equation 5.4
w(l1, l2) = numerator / denominator
= 0.18 / (0.662 * 0.662)
= 0.18 / 0.438
= 0.412
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5.2.2 Event log clustering based on improved MajorClust
The first phase to detect the anomaly is to cluster the generated graph using the Major-
Clust algorithm. For the sake of completeness, we include a brief technical description of
MajorClust. For details of the algorithm, the reader is referred to [250]. Initially, each node
is attached to its own cluster. For each vertex, the procedure will accumulate the edge




w(eij ), 0 ≤ i ≤ m (5.5)
where ci is the i
th neighboring clusters, w(e) is the edge weight for each neighboring node
in a particular cluster, m is the total of the neighboring cluster i, and n is the total member
of vertices in the cluster ci. The next step is assigning each vertex to a cluster, which has
maximum weight aggregation and is defined as:
c∗ = arg maxi(ci) (5.6)
This process is continued until all possible combination checking for current and assigned
clusters for each node is accomplished.
However, we identified a major drawback in the original MajorClust technique when we
applied it in a auth.log file. It will fail to cluster a large number of nodes since it only
depends on the accumulated weight of the neighboring vertices. A node will only depend
on the aggregate weight of the neighbors although it is less relevant and does not consider
the more similar cosine distance.
This shortcoming is illustrated in Figure 5.3 and indicated by a large green node with
label pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user root. This node should cre-
ate its own cluster since it is closer with another vertex with a more similar event.
Therefore, we improve the MajorClust by supplying the additional requirement that
when the current cluster is not the same as the heaviest neighbor node, we force the oper-
ating node to follow the cluster of the heaviest one. The heavier the edge weight, the closer
the distance between two events in the log record since it represents the cosine similarity. By
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Figure 5.3: The drawback of MajorClust with more vertices
deploying this improvement, an event will stick to the most similar one instead of following
the others, which are not so similar but has more edge weight aggregation. We then refine
Equation (5.6) as follows:
c =






where c is the current cluster considering additional checking, h is a neighbor node with the
heaviest edge weight, and c(h) is the cluster label of h. The illustration of this improvement
is depicted in Figure 5.4. We can see that the node in the previous figure has created a new
cluster as expected (indicated by vertices in red).
Nevertheless, this improvement triggers another problem. The generated cluster is over-
fitting since it produces many small clusters with only two or three vertices as shown in
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Figure 5.4: The improvement of MajorClust algorithm
Figure 5.5. This issue was found when the proposed procedure processed the first 500
records of the first-day log in the dataset. We solve this problem by running one additional
round of MajorClust called the refine cluster phase and is described as follows. First, we
represent each cluster as a single node. We maintain the start and end time of the overall
event log for each cluster to be considered for the anomaly score calculation. The frequency
of an event occurring in all nodes in the cluster and updated tf−idf is also counted.
To represent an event of a newly formed node, we need a string which reflects all events
in a cluster. We can consider this as the longest common subsequence problem with many
strings, or well-known as the multiple longest common subsequence (MLCS) technique.
Solutions of this classical problem have been proposed in the recent literature [254, 255].
For each cluster c, we will check for the most common substring occurring in the raw log.
The terms ”subsequence” and ”substring” will be used interchangeably since the substring
has the same meaning as a subsequence in our case, and we then describe MLCS concisely.
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Figure 5.5: Overfitting cluster produced by improved MajorClust
Let l = l1l2 . . . lp be a single log string in a particular cluster where the subscript
number represents the index of a character in l, s = sw1sw2 . . . swq , p and q are their length
respectively, s is called subsequence of l, sub(l, s), if it meets the following:
sub(l, s) =

1 ≤ v ≤ q if 1 ≤ wv ≤ p
1 ≤ t < u ≤ q if wt < wu
(5.8)
Furthermore, let L = {l1, l2, . . . , lo} be a set of raw events in the specific c, o is total
number of logs within each c, multiple longest common subsequence for set L is a sequence
of s if and only if (i) s is the subsequence of li for 1 ≤ i ≤ o and (ii) s is the longest one
satisfying (i). We then apply MLCS to all clusters to find the longest substring of L.
After that, we run the MajorClust algorithm again using current graph composition.
The result of the refine cluster phase is given in Figure 5.6. After this phase is complete, we
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Figure 5.6: The result of refine cluster phase
convert the generated graph back to its original nodes representation since we still maintain
the initial vertices of the formed new node. This technique will provide us with a better
clustering result as shown in Figure 5.7. The output of this phase is a complete graph where
each node has its own cluster label property.
It should be noted that the algorithm converges smoothly. The reasons are two-fold.
First, the clustering algorithm works on a node by node basis. When a node is processed,
the node is flagged, and the algorithm moves to the next node and so on. Second, the
proposed improvement of MajorClust will ensure a node to have the same cluster as its
heaviest edge neighbor. Using these two conditions, the algorithm will smoothly converge
without any oscillation.
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Figure 5.7: The final clustering of improved MajorClust algorithm
5.2.3 Anomaly detection of possible attacks
The nature of an anomaly is that it is different from other clusters [256]. Ideally, it will have
a fewer members than others, but this assumption is not always true. Based on our extensive
experiments and analysis on the public datasets from Security Repository (SecRepo) [174],
the anomaly is the biggest cluster which has many nodes and the smallest cluster as well.
In the context of the access control log, the anomaly is highly correlated with total attacks
or failed authorization of login attempts. The proposed technique will assist the forensic
investigator to examine the real-life log that usually has a very large size.
One approach to discover the anomaly from the clustering result is to check the number
of cluster members. If the number is below the given threshold, then it can be decided that
there is an outlier in the cluster [257]. However, this procedure is not suitable for the access
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control case since the anomaly can occur with a large number of members in a cluster.
Thus, we develop our own score to determine whether or not a cluster is an anomaly.
To achieve good outlier detection results, we define some parameters to calculate the
anomaly score in every cluster, i.e., total event frequencies, total nodes, total members,
and the inter-arrival rate of the event time. Note that the anomaly score measurement is
conducted after the refine cluster phase and before it is converted back to the original graph
representation.
We define the anomaly score as the ratio of event frequency per cluster to the total
frequency in the graph. It is then multiplied by the inter-arrival rate between the first and
the last events in a cluster. The high or low event frequency is likely to be an anomaly
because the legal event will have a normal frequency. Furthermore, a very high or a very low
inter-arrival rate can also be regarded as an anomaly. The event frequency and inter-arrival
time between events are mainly used to detect SSH brute-force attacks. For example, some
research include the event frequency [243] and inter-arrival rate of the events [258] as a part
of the score to detect the malicious SSH activities. Both variables are considered in [244]
as well.
First, we need the mean of frequency, µf , to characterize the number of members in a






where fi and Ni are frequency and total nodes per vertex from the refine cluster phase,
respectively. In addition, n is the total member of vertices in the cluster ci. The anomaly
will occur when there are so many events occurring in the adjacent time while the normal
event shows the opposite behavior. Formally, the inter-arrival rate of all events in a cluster,






where t1 is the first time an event occurred, tn is the last one, and both of them are measured
in seconds. When the denominator produces a zero value, it means that there are several
events in a second, and we set tn − t1 with very small value to show that its arrival rate is
very high in the short time frame.
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where M is total members in c, N is total nodes in a cluster, F is total frequencies in c, and
z is total clusters in the analyzed log data. We refer to Equation (5.9) and (5.10) for µf
and I, respectively.
Estimation of anomaly threshold
To decide whether or not a cluster is an anomaly, we estimate a threshold to provide a
recommendation for the forensic investigator or security analyst. We introduce an estima-
tion for the anomaly parameter. There are three types of activities recorded in the log
file: low intensity, normal, and high intensity [244, 259]. Low intensity refers to a sporadic
attack while high intensity usually related to a brute-force attacks. In addition, the normal
activities will produce a non-suspicious log.
First, the anomaly score that is calculated before is normalized to [0,1] as below. This





where ai is an anomaly score in a cluster i, A is a set of anomaly scores for all clusters, and
a′i is a normalized score of ai.
Next, we fit this normalized score to a quadratic equation since this equation fits the
characteristics of the dataset where low and high intensity event will be defined as anomalies.
The quadratic equation fits a′ as axis to [0,1] and a′′ as ordinate to [0,1]. The higher a′′





i − 4 (5.13)
Subsequently, we have a second normalization step for anomaly score a′′ to range [-1,1]
where 0 is the threshold for the anomaly decision. The final anomaly score per cluster αi
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is depicted below where p = −1 and q = 1 as the range boundaries.
αi = p+
(a′′i −min(A′))(q − p)
max(A′)−min(A′)
(5.14)
If the αi score is less than 0, then a cluster i is set as an anomaly and vice versa. Thus, the
user is not required to enter the parameter to calculate the anomaly score.
5.2.4 Visualization of access control anomaly
In order to help the investigators in analyzing and getting a better understanding of the
security log, there are some methods available for log visualization. For example, Takada
and Koike created Tudumi, a visualization tool for auditing syslog, wtmp, and sulog based
on layered concentric disks [260]. For each layer, there were some notations such as spheres
and cubes to represent the user and his activities. The treemaps model to display clustering
result from the Simple Log file Clustering Tool (SLCT) [110] of the event log was introduced
and named LogView [261]. Another approach was using parallel coordinates to plot several
logs, e.g., network, database, and syslog.
Elvis (Extensible Log Visualization) is a recent implementation to display an Apache
log, syslog, and auth.log [262]. This technique was based on a custom organization
(categorical and geographical) and log augmentation. Visual Filter enabled the security
analyst to inspect the whole logs, creates a filter visually, performs navigation, and sub-
selects the part of the log interactively [263]. In addition, Trethowen et al. introduced
VisRAID to visualize remote access logs, especially for intrusion detection purposes and
focused on timeline visualization [264].
However, existing methods do not apply graph visualization to the assistance tool for
log analysis. Naturally, since the clustering is based on a graph, the proposed visualization
also heavily relies on this model. Therefore, we propose analysis and anomaly display of
the authentication log based on graph visualization. We categorize the visualization into
two types: static and dynamic. The static model displays the graph after the analysis is
complete while the dynamic one provides live visualization when the analysis is running.
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Figure 5.8: Initial clustering result of the first day in the dataset (November 30, 2014)
We use Gephi for the graph visualization for both types [265]. We then exploit the
streaming server plugin [266] and its Python client implementation [267] to support a dy-
namic model. In the static mode, the visualization is displayed after the clustering and
anomaly detection process is finished. The output of the forensic analysis is a graph file,
i.e., dot file and then it is exported to Gephi. To get the intuitive display, we use two steps
of the graph layout algorithm: first Force Atlas 2 [268] and then Fruchterman Reingold
[269]. These two algorithms have been natively integrated into Gephi.
Force Atlas 2 produces clustered nodes, but there are still many overlaps between them,
Fruchterman Reingold will remove these obstacles, and provide a clearer layout. While
in the dynamic mode, the visualization follows the analysis process starting from creating
nodes, edges, graph clustering, refining the cluster, and anomaly detection. The result
is clean and concise since the procedure has removed unnecessary edges that connect one
cluster to the other one. For example, Figures 5.2 to 5.7 are produced in the static mode.
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Figure 5.9: The result of refine cluster phase from Figure 5.8
5.3 Experimental results and discussions
5.3.1 Functionality testing for SecRepo dataset
The dataset for the experiments is taken from the public and open Security Repository
(SecRepo). It includes 86,839 lines of auth.log taken from November 30 to December 31,
2014, and mainly contains failed SSH login attempts [174]. This kind of attack will be
flagged as an anomaly in the whole log file. We utilize NetworkX to create and manipulate
the graph [225], Gephi as graph visualization tools [265], a Gephi streaming server plugin
[266] and Gephi streaming client [267] to dynamically draw a graph to Gephi, and Natural
Language Toolkit (NLTK) to provide English corpus for log text preprocessing, especially
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Figure 5.10: Anomaly detection in refine cluster phase
in providing stopwords [209]. We utilize the Python programming language version 2.7 to
assemble all of these libraries and provide this log forensic tool.
Figure 5.8 shows the initial clustering result of the first day in the dataset (November 30,
2014) while Figure 5.9 illustrates the refine cluster phase. There are too many small clusters
in the initial step and it is fixed in the next phase. The anomaly detection result is depicted
in Figure 5.10 where the red vertices represent the anomaly and the green represents the
normal events. This figure is completed with the label of an event in the access control log.
The outlier is measured when a cluster is on the refine cluster phase based on the estimated
threshold.
We can see in Figure 5.10 that the detected anomaly is an invalid user event
as shown in the largest cluster. There are small clusters with similar events such as
invalid user tomcat, invalid user cms, invalid user dev, and invalid user google.
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Figure 5.11: Final result of the forensic analysis in the first day of authentication log
(November 30, 2014)
These clusters create their own cluster since the nodes inside them have the neighbor with
the heaviest weight and do not follow the bigger cluster, which has less cosine similarity.
In addition, the pam_unix(cron:session) session is a daemon event run in the
background so it is successfully categorized as normal. The other two nodes in green,
i.e., connection close by and connection reset by peer is a false positive since these
events will only happen when there are failed authorizations. The calculation of the
accuracy and performance of the proposed method will be explained later in this section.
Figure 5.11 is the full version of Figure 5.10 which is converted back to its initial graph
representation where it has 688 rows of the event log and is modeled into 173 nodes and
9,694 edges. To produce a good display of anomaly detection, these visualizations are
generated after two runs of the layout algorithm, i.e., Force Atlas 2, then followed by
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Fruchterman Reingold, and successfully implemented in the Gephi graph editor for both
static and dynamic modes.
5.3.2 Evaluation metrics
Furthermore, we use some standard measurements to evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed method such as true positive (tp), true negative (tn), false positive (fp), false neg-
ative (fn), sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy. The sensitivity and specificity are defined









While sensitivity is focused on measuring the improved MajorClust’s ability to detect
a normal event, the specificity and accuracy will provide an overall measure since it also
includes true negative (tn) as denoted below:
Accuracy =
tp+ tn
tp+ fp+ fn+ tn
(5.17)
In this case, true negative refers to detected anomaly record is also defined as anomaly
in the dataset. Before calculating tp, tn, fp, and fn, we label the dataset with normal and
anomaly then compare it to the proposed method’s decision.
5.3.3 Comparison with existing methods
To compare the robustness of the improved MajorClust and proposed anomaly score, we
evaluate other methods to the same testing dataset. We run the Simple Log Clustering
Tool (slct) version 0.05 [110] and LogCluster version 0.03 [217] as the clustering-based
anomaly detection in event logs. In addition, we also compare the proposed method with
two rule-based anomaly detections, i.e., OSSEC version 2.8.3 [238, 239, 240] and swatch
version 3.2.3 [270]. These two applications can be turned into forensic analysis tools since
they were initially designed to monitor real-time log file. We also compare the proposed
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Table 5.1: Parameter tuning -s for slct and --support for LogCluster
Value of -s or Accuracy Accuracy











method with standard MajorClust and improved MajorClust without refine cluster phase.
They will be combined with the proposed outlier detection mechanism since they do not
have one.
Parameter tuning for sclt and LogCluster
To objectively compare those methods, we have trained other tools’ parameter to get their
best accuracy. Therefore, the dataset was divided into two parts. The first part is November
30 to December 14 as the training set and the second one is December 15 to 31 as the testing
set. The training set is used for parameter tuning while the testing set is for performance
comparison as presented in Subsection 5.3.3.
The parameter -support or -s in slct and --support in LogCluster have been tuned
from 10 to 100. Then we checked which value generates the best accuracy. Based on the
experiments, parameter -s for slct is set to 100 which means that the threshold for the
number of cluster member is 100 lines. As a consequence, log lines that do not belong to any
cluster will be defined as an anomaly. The similar parameter is applicable to LogCluster
and we set the option --support to 100 since it produces the best accuracy. The result of
parameter tuning for slct and LogCluster is presented in Table 5.1.
The rules used in OSSEC and swatch are based on regular expressions. Since
the swatch tool does not provide any standard rules, we set them by adding three
106
Table 5.2: Comparison of proposed technique and the other methods
Methods Sensitivity (%) Specificity (%) Accuracy (%)
Proposed method 70.59 82.21 83.14
Proposed method without 88.24 50.25 52.43
refine cluster phase
Standard MajorClust [250] 0.00 78.08 73.61
slct [110] 87.50 4.88 13.54
LogCluster [217] 73.21 17.94 23.73
OSSEC [238] 25.11 30.12 29.59
swatch [270] 100.00 54.13 58.94
most frequent malicious strings in the event log. They are ([iI]nvalid [uU]ser,
Did not receive identification string, and reverse mapping). On the other hand,
the OSSEC tool has provided the set of rules in an XML file. We followed these default
rules.
Comparison results
The comparison of the proposed technique and the state of the art is given in Table 5.2.
As shown in Table 5.2, the best sensitivity value was achieved by swatch. This indicates
that it has a very good capability to detect the normal activities in the log since we manu-
ally configure the regular expression rules that commonly occurred in the testing set. The
proposed method achieved the best sensitivity and specificity rate of 70.59% and 82.21%,
respectively. On the other hand, the other techniques produce lower specificity. The im-
proved MajorClust is able to provide highest accuracy value (83.14%) while the others do
not. The difference in accuracy is significant which indicates that existing methods are
unable to properly detect the suspicious logs in the testing data.
We can see that the standard MajorClust without modifications does not work well and
even it gives zero sensitivity. On the other hand, the refine cluster phase is hardly needed
to improve the accuracy. Note that these two methods use the proposed anomaly score
estimation.
The drawback of previous clustering-based anomaly detection is the assumption that the
outlier is the data residing on a small cluster. This idea does not work in the authentication
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Table 5.3: The most frequent events in the authentication log (testing dataset)
No Event Frequency
1 Invalid user 12,743
2 Received disconnect 11,464
3 pam_unix(cron:session) 2,708
4 IP does not map back to the address 1,328
5 Reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo failed 1,216
log with a high number of attacks since these violations produce many records and can create
the largest cluster in the analysis. Moreover, the rule-based anomaly detections contribute
to the poor performance of anomalous discovery when the supplied regular expressions do
not suit with the case. The default rule should be updated regularly by the network analysts
in order to make sure all security breaches are detected. However, it can produce good true
positive rates (sensitivity).
To supply the forensic investigator with more insight, we also enumerate the most
frequent events when processing the auth.log file as presented in Table 5.3. The
invalid user shows that there is an attempt from an unregistered user to login to the
server. The event received disconnect means that an error occurred in the authenti-
cation process. The attacker is usually trying to conduct SSH brute force and the server
decides to disconnect the connection.
There are warning messages such as IP does not map back to the address and
reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo failed in the event. The system records these
two events because the client’s reverse DNS record does not match with the hostname used
to identify the client’s identity. Event pam_unix(cron:session) means that the daemon
activity is generated from the default configuration of Linux operating system. This record
is written when the system checks the authentication mechanism and it happens every hour
by default. From this analysis, we can infer that there are so many attempts to violate the
access control, especially SSH, in the server.
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5.3.4 Experiment on the Kippo log
In this section, we present one more experiment to another dataset, i.e., Kippo log, to prove
that the proposed method works well on another dataset with another attack. We chose
these logs because the investigator can analyze the attacker’s activity using various logs
recorded on an SSH honeypot [271]. The activity investigated includes access gaining and
post-compromise. Another analysis that can be performed is the time of day attempted
intrusions such as unauthorized attempt [272]. Kippo is an SSH honeypot and created
in Python [273]. We install and configure Kippo on DigitalOcean droplet with public IP
address so everyone including real attackers and botnet can reach this server. All the
activities were recorded from 14 to 20 February 2017.
Beside the attack from the internet, we add one more activity that is usually done by
the attacker before attempting penetration. The attack is a part of reconnaissance step
to get banner or fingerprint of the SSH server version using the telnet application. This
experiment shows that the proposed method performs well with 52.89% sensitivity, 92.77%
specificity, and 87.35% accuracy.
5.4 Conclusion
We propose an improved MajorClust algorithm to cluster the authentication log as the
basis of anomaly detection of suspicious activities related to access control violations. The
experimental results show that the proposed method is able to provide assistance to the
forensic investigator, security analyst, or system administrator in inspecting and visualizing
the log file. In the experiment, it achieves 70.59% of sensitivity, 82.21% of specificity, and
83.14% of accuracy.
In this thesis, the automatic cluster-based method is the first approach for anomaly
detection in event logs. The second approach is detection based on a deep learning method,
namely autoencoders, as discussed in Chapter 7. The preprocessing step for applying deep
autoencoders is to generate abstraction of log files. It is described in the next chapter




Automatic event log abstraction to
support forensic investigation
Abstraction of event logs is the creation of a template that contains the most common
words representing all members in a group of event log entries. Abstraction helps the
forensic investigators to obtain an overall view of the main events in a log file. Existing log
abstraction methods require user input parameters. This manual input is time consuming
due to the need to identify the best parameters, especially when a log file is large. We
propose an automatic method to facilitate event log abstraction avoiding the need for the
user to manually identify suitable parameters. We model event logs as a graph and propose
a new graph clustering approach to group log entries. The abstraction is then extracted
from each cluster. Experimental results show that the proposed method achieves superior
performance compared to existing approaches with an F-measure of 95.35%.
6.1 Introduction
The various events of operating systems and other software are recorded in one or more
log files. When there is a security incident, the forensic investigators may need to examine
these files. As a log file usually contains numerous entries, it takes a lot of time to extract
This chapter has been published in the Proceedings of the Australasian Computer Science Week
Multiconference (Session: Australasian Information Security Conference), pp. 1-9, 2020. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1145/3373017.3373018.
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the main activity from the event logs. Therefore, abstraction of event logs is required to
identify the most commonly occurring messages in the files. In other words, an abstraction
is the set of string patterns that occur most commonly in a particular log file.
Another purpose of abstraction is to parse the event logs because the abstraction will
represent every field in a log line [190]. On an enterprise level such as a user’s credit account
application, event log abstraction is needed for source code profiling and monitoring [274].
The abstraction can also serve as a clustering tool because one abstraction represents a group
or cluster of log entries [221]. Furthermore, abstraction can reduce the computation time
as one abstraction represents many log lines for anomaly detection and analysis [237, 275].
Event log abstraction is called as system events in [102] and it is extracted from raw
logs. The abstraction can be used to detect system failure and problems such as insufficient
memory or database errors [276]. The network administrators can utilize an abstraction as
a log template. Moreover, abstraction makes the process of checking large log files efficiently
[277].
Existing methods such as Simple Log Clustering Tool (SLCT) [110] and LogCluster
[217] require one mandatory parameter known as the relative support threshold (rsupport).
This parameter means that SLCT and LogCluster will find clusters that match at least
rsupport% of log entries in an input file. However, there are 14 and 26 optional parameters
for SLCT and LogCluster, respectively. Iterative Partitioning Log Mining (IPLoM) needs
five parameters [221, 115]. LogSig needs the number of clusters as an input [236], but it
is not trivial to determine the best number of clusters for a log file. Other techniques,
such as Thaler et al. [116, 117], need model training. Some more recent methods also
need parameters in order to run. For example, Spell requires a message type threshold
[278], while Drain needs a tree depth value, maximum child value, and event log similarity
threshold [4].
The aforementioned approaches have two main characteristics. First, they require user
inputs. The process of obtaining the optimal input parameters for different cases is difficult.
Second, the existing methods need a training step, which takes time while the investiga-
tor has to examine the event logs immediately to solve a forensic case. To address these
problems, we propose an automatic approach to generate event log abstraction without re-
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quiring any user input or model training. The use of more forensic tools with an automatic
procedure is also recommended in [16].
Using raw event logs as input, we automatically preprocess them with an automatic log
parser [17]. Therefore, the user does not need to define any parsing rules such as using
regular expressions. We then group the preprocessed event logs based on the word count
because an abstraction that will be extracted from each word in a group of log entries.
We then consider the similarity of messages in event logs by refining the previous grouping
results with graph-based clustering. The last step of the proposed method extracts the
event log abstraction from each cluster.
Contributions. To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
1. We propose a novel graph model for logs with a new edge weight namely weighted
Hamming similarity.
2. We propose automatic graph clustering based on Girvan-Newman community detec-
tion [279] and a modularity value [280] to obtain the best cluster configurations.
3. We extract log abstractions from each cluster automatically without the need for user
intervention.
4. The automatic feature of the proposed method still provides the best performance
with an F-measure of 95.35%.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 gives an overview of related works on
event log abstraction. Section 6.3 defines the problem that is addressed in this chapter.
Section 6.4 describes the proposed method. Experiment results are given in Section 6.5. In
Section 6.6, we provide the conclusion of this research.
6.2 Related work and motivation
This section reviews the related work on event log abstraction. Subsequently, we demon-
strate the advantage of discovering abstractions for log forensic investigation.
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6.2.1 Related work
We use several terms related to event logs adopted from [16] as follows. An event is an
action occurring on a particular device and is recorded in a log entry. An event log is a
record of events and usually saved in a log file. Moreover, a log file is a file that records
activities from applications or an operating system. Furthermore, a log entry is defined as
a single record in a log file.
SLCT was one of the earliest methods used for event log abstraction and involved
both frequent-itemset mining and density-based clustering [110]. However, SLCT does not
consider the position of the word in each line. Subsequently, the LogCluster method [217]
improved SLCT by taking the word position into account. However, it should be noted that
SLCT and LogCluster were not intended to be abstraction methods but rather their main
aim was to cluster event logs. To represent each cluster, SLCT and LogCluster extract the
most frequent line patterns. Subsequently, these patterns become the abstractions of the
logs. One mandatory parameter for LogCluster is rsupport value. This parameter means
that LogCluster will find clusters that match at least rsupport% of log entries in an input
file. Additionally, LogCluster has many optional parameters, such as wsize for filtering
out infrequent words from the word frequency estimation process and csize for filtering out
cluster candidates which match less than rsupport log entries.
IPLoM has four phases: grouping by word count, grouping by word position, grouping
by bijection search, and discovering abstraction for each group [221, 115]. The last step of
IPLoM gives a label to the formed clusters and this label becomes the abstraction. There
are five parameters for IPLoM, specifically the file support threshold, partition support
threshold, upper bound and lower bound for bijection search, and cluster goodness threshold
[115]. LKE (Log Key Extraction) uses hierarchical-based clustering to group the log lines
[237]. LKE then joins two clusters if there are any two log entries with an edit distance
smaller than an input threshold from the user. Another method known as LogSig uses
a technique similar to classic k-means clustering to group the event log messages [236].




#1 Mar * * nssal * removing removable location: *
#2 Mar 8 * nssal * Invalid user * from *
#3 Mar 8 * nssal * Failed password for * from * port * ssh2
..
Figure 6.1: An illustration of event log abstraction generated from a log file to assist a
forensic investigation.
More latest work on event log abstraction are LogMine [281], Spell [278], and Drain
[4]. LogMine groups log entries incrementally before generating an abstraction for each
cluster [281]. LogMine is designed to support scalability to process large log files using
the map-reduce technique. Spell method creates real-time abstractions as input log entries
are created [278]. Spell uses the longest common subsequence (LCS) technique to get
abstractions and an input threshold is used to set the appropriate LCS length. Recent
research, namely the Drain method, proposes a fixed-depth parse tree to model event logs
[4]. The abstraction is generated by traversing the tree with several restrictions from the
input parameter, specifically tree depth value, maximum child value, and log similarity
threshold.
The aforementioned works on event log abstraction were not explicitly intended to be
applied to forensic investigations. However, two papers discuss event log abstraction for
forensic analysis using deep learning technique [116, 117]. Thaler et al. [116] find a log
signature using a supervised method with the combination of a feed-forward neural network
and long short-term memory (LSTM). Afterwards, Thaler et al. [117] upgraded the method
by applying an unsupervised approach using autoencoders with LSTM cells.
6.2.2 Motivating example
For a given log file, a forensic investigator can acquire general insights about what has
occurred in a specific situation from event log abstraction. For example in Figure 6.1,
the input file is an auth.log file containing authentication-related events on a Linux op-
erating system. An activity that needs further examination as shown in Figure 6.1 is
removing removable location. This means that there is an unplugged removable disk.
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This may or may not be a normal activity as an attacker may have physical access to the
restricted computer. Other two activities, failed password and invalid user, are suspi-
cious. Event invalid user means that there has been a typical brute-force attack where
the attacker or botnet has attempted to use all usernames and passwords from a dictio-
nary. On the other hand, event failed password means that an attacker has repeatedly
attempted to acquire the password using an automatic tool.
In summary, by discovering log abstractions, we want to provide a general insight from a
log file without having to inspect it line by line. For a suspicious abstraction, an investigator
can examine into log entries in more depth to obtain further details.
6.3 Problem description
Abstraction of event logs is a template that contains the most common words representing
all members in a group of event log entries. In other words, the aim of event log abstraction is
to extract a log template from a set of log entries [278]. An abstraction method distinguishes
the constant part and variable part of each log entry [190]. The constant part is a word
coming from a system or application logging module. The variable part is the word that
changes and comes from a system or application that is running. An example of a variable
part is the IP address and port number. An illustration of event log abstraction is presented
in Fig. 6.2. The wildcard or asterisk symbol (*) indicates the variable part in a group of
log entries. This symbol is commonly used in event log abstraction literature.
Formally, we denote all raw log entries from a log file as L = {l1, l2, . . . , l|L|}, where li
is a particular log entry and |L| is the length of L. Given a set of raw logs L, we need to
find event log abstractions A = {A1, A2, . . . , An}. Before finding A, we need to identify n
clusters {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} from L. An abstraction is extracted from each cluster.
Furthermore, each abstraction Ai is a sequence of words, Ai = {ti1, ti2, . . . , ti|Ai|}, where
ti is a i-th word extracted from Ci and |Ai| is the length of Ai. The procedure checks each
lj in each Ci. On the other hand, lj consists of words tk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ |lj |. For each
tk ∈ li, if tk has the same word index position for all log entries in Ci, ∀lj ∈ Ci, then tk
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Cluster #1:
Jan 18 09:31:32 victoria dhclient: DHCPACK from 10.0.2.2
Jan 18 10:56:40 victoria dhclient: DHCPACK from 10.0.2.2
Feb  6 13:31:12 victoria dhclient: DHCPACK from 10.0.2.5
Abstraction #1:
*    * *        victoria dhclient: DHCPACK from *
Cluster #2:
Feb  6 12:56:48 victoria init: Switching to runlevel: 0
Jan 18 17:13:49 victoria init: Switching to runlevel: 6
Feb  6 13:03:53 victoria init: Switching to runlevel: 6
Abstraction #2:
*    * *        victoria init: Switching to runlevel: *
Figure 6.2: Examples of event log abstraction that is extraced from each cluster.
becomes the constant part of abstraction Ai, tik = tk. Otherwise, tk will be replaced with
wildcard character and acts as the variable part of the abstraction Ai, tik = ∗.
Several names are used for event log abstraction. Some papers refer to it as the event
log signature [116, 117] or message signature [236]. SLCT [110] and LogCluster [217] define
abstraction as line patterns while IPLoM [221] uses the term a line format. In the other
literature, abstraction is referred to an event log template [277], event log parsing [190],
system events [102], or log keys [237]. In this work, we choose the term “event log abstrac-
tion” as used in [274, 115, 276] and define it as a template containing words and wildcard
characters representing all members in a group of event log entries.
6.4 The proposed method
The proposed method is summarized in Figure 6.3. First, we have raw event logs as dig-
ital evidence. Second, we preprocess the logs automatically without regular expression or
other rule-based parsers. Then we group the preprocessed logs based on the word count. To




Improve grouping with automatic
graph clustering
Get the event log abstraction per cluster
Grouping based on word count
Figure 6.3: The proposed method for automatic event log abstraction.
sages by means of automatic graph-based clustering. The last step extracts the abstraction
for each cluster found. Each step is described in a separate subsection below.
6.4.1 Event log preprocessing
The preprocessing stage involves two main steps: log parsing and creating unique messages
from given raw logs. Event log parsing is a procedure to split and label each field in a
log entry. We parse the log files using nerlogparser [17], a log parsing tool which is based
on named entity recognition (NER). In the area of natural language processing, NER is a
process used to extract named entities from text. In the context of log files, nerlogparser
defines named entities as words or phrases containing common fields in a log entry such as
timestamp, host name, or service name. Therefore, identifying named entities is equivalent
to determining each field in a log entry. The nerlogparser uses bidirectional long short-term
memory networks to perform NER [17].
Automatic event log parsing with nerlogparser is illustrated in Fig. 6.4. The main
advantage of nerlogparser is that it supports fully automatic parsing because it provides a
pre-trained model. Therefore, the investigators do not need to define any rules or regular
expressions. It is also a generic tool as there is only one model file to parse various types
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Input: 
Jan 18 09:31:32 victoria dhclient: DHCPACK from 10.0.2.2
Process: automatic parsing with the nerlogparser tool
Output:
Timestamp : Jan 18 09:31:32
Host name : victoria
Service : dhclient:
Message : DHCPACK from 10.0.2.2
Figure 6.4: An example of event log parsing for a log entry.
of log files. Note that event log parsing discussed in this research is different from [190] as
they refer to event log parsing as event log abstraction.
In the second preprocessing step, we extract unique messages from the log entries. A
unique message is a message from the parsing step that different to the others. Each message
from a particular log entry will be attached to a unique message. As we have described in
Section 6.3, all raw logs are denoted as L. Formally, we define L′ as the parsed logs from L.
We then extract unique messages from L′ and these are denoted by M = {m1,m2, . . . ,m|M |}
where |M | is the number of unique messages. A particular log entry li will be attached to
one of these unique messages.
Note that we focus on the abstraction of the message for each group of log entries.
Therefore at this stage, the proposed abstraction does not consider other fields such as
timestamps or host name. These are considered in the final stage when extracting the
abstraction.
6.4.2 Grouping based on word count
The next step in event log abstraction is to group the extracted unique messages based on
word count. We split the discovered unique messages based on space character then count
the word length. This assumption is based on the fact that an abstraction is a representation
of a group of log entries having the same length. The same message templates are likely to









Figure 6.5: Illustration of the proposed graph model where a unique message is modeled as
a vertex and weighted Hamming similarity as an edge weight.
abstraction is extracted from the always-occurring word in a group of unique messages with
the same length.
At this stage, it is trivial to extract an abstraction as the log entries have been grouped
based on their length. However, in a real-life log file, the log entries are very diverse in
terms of number of words or vocabularies, so we need to refine these groups based on the
string similarity. We discuss this issue in the next section.
6.4.3 Graph model for log messages
Before performing automatic graph-based clustering, we describe the proposed graph model
for log messages as illustrated in Figure 6.5. For every discovered count-based word group,
we construct an undirected and edge-weighted graph, defined as G = (V,E). Every unique
message m ∈ M is now represented as a vertex v in the set V . E is a set of weighted
edges. The edge eij from vi to vj is created when the weighted Hamming similarity between
two messages in vi and vj is greater than zero. Note that i ≥ 1, j ≤ |V |, and i 6= j.
We denote w(eij) as the edge weight. The edge weight w(eij) is a value of the weighted
Hamming similarity between the two vertices in a range of [0, 1]. As shown in Figure 6.5,
a log message that shares no similarity with other vertices will be naturally separated from
the main connected component of the graph. This property is the main advantage of the
proposed graph model.
We maintain a vertex property p(v) which comprises the members in a vertex v. We can
determine this value by maintaining a list that contains the index i from li ∈ L. The list
represents which individual row of a log entry l refer to a unique message m. In addition,
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this list will make the proposed method easier to traverse back to the original raw logs when
retrieving the clustering results.
The edge weight w(eij) in the graph G is the weighted Hamming similarity H
′ between
two unique messages represented in two vertices, respectively. Before calculating H ′, we




1, if ti = tj
0, if ti 6= tj
(6.1)





sim(txi, tyi), txi ∈ mx, tyi ∈ my (6.2)
where |mx| is the length of log message mx. Note that mx and my already have the same
length as discussed in Section 6.4.2. The reason for choosing Hamming similarity is that
the edge weight should take into account the position of a word in a log entry because the
abstraction will be generated based on word order. Moreover, we modify the Hamming
similarity to be weighted Hamming similarity because the positions of words are important
for calculating similarity and we want to give more weight to similarity between string
messages.
As suggested in [237], the constant parts of a log message tend to be placed at the
beginning of a log entry. Therefore, words at the beginning of a log entry are more likely to
be part of event log abstraction than words at the end of a log entry. Formally, we denote
weighted Hamming similarity H ′ between two log messages (mx,my) as follows:
H ′(mx,my) =
∑|mx|
i=1 (|mx|+ 1− i) sim(txi, tyi)∑|mx|
i=1 i
(6.3)
where (|mx| + 1 − i) is one-based index and it is reversed to give high similarity for the
words occuring at the beginning of a log entry. Similar to Eq. 6.2, we also define txi ∈ mx
and tyi ∈ my in Eq. 6.3.
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best cluster ← dict()
max modularity ← -1
clusters ← GirvanNewman(graph)
for cluster in clusters do
modularity ← get modularity(cluster, graph)
if max modularity < modularity then
max modularity ← modularity




6.4.4 Grouping with automatic graph clustering
The previous grouping step considers only the word count. Therefore, the next step is to
cluster the log entries based on the similarity of the messages. To provide an automatic
clustering approach with the proposed graph model, we use Girvan-Newman community
detection [279] and the modularity value [280] as the basis for log clustering. In this work,
a community refers to a cluster in a particular graph. Furthermore, a cluster can be viewed
as a subgraph in a particular graph. Note that we represent each discovered count-based
word group as a graph as discussed in the previous section.
Get clusters. The proposed procedure for automatic clustering is shown in Algorithm 1.
In the GetClusters procedure, it first initializes best cluster as a dictionary data structure
and max modularity to -1 where modularity lies between -1 and 1. We use the NetworkX
graph library [225] to get clusters using the Girvan-Newman method. The GirvanNewman
function is a Python generator, meaning that it generates a new cluster configuration when
called in each loop.
To retrieve the clusters, the Girvan-Newman method identifies edges in a graph that are
mostly between other pairs of vertices. It uses an edge betweenness value which is the num-
ber of shortest paths between pairs of vertices [279]. It then progressively removes the edge
with highest edge betweenness value. We modify the Girvan-Newman method by changing
the rule to cluster the vertices. The original Girvan-Newman uses edge betweenness as the
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final clusters ← dict()
for cluster in clusters do







criteria to group vertices. Instead of using edge betweenness, we use the lightest edge wmin




where w(E) is all edge weights in a processed graph G. The reason for this modification is
that in our case, the light edge weight means that the two messages that are represented in
two vertices are not similar as the weighted Hamming similarity value is low. By removing
less similar edge weight, the clustering procedure will yield clusters that have the most
similar messages.
For each cluster configuration, we then calculate the modularity value. Formally, mod-












where w(ei,j) denotes the edge weight between vertices vi and vj and zi is the sum of
weighted degree of vi where zi =
∑
j w(eij). Moreover, Ci is the cluster where vertex vi is





The best cluster configuration is determined by the highest modularity value. Finally, the
procedure returns the best cluster configuration after certain iterations.
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Build micro-clusters. The main algorithm for event log clustering is shown in the Au-
tomaticClustering procedure from Algorithm 2. This procedure finds micro-clusters from
the given graph. The “automatic” feature here means that the forensic investigator does
not need to input any parameters. The initial valid clusters are connected components of
the generated graph. The components are a set of subgraphs such that there are no edges
between them. A component that has only one vertex builds its own cluster. In addition,
we process the subgraph component that has two or more vertices.
Furthermore, the AutomaticClustering procedure calls GetClusters to obtain all clusters
from the input graph. For each cluster, the procedure checks its vertices members. If it has
more than three vertices, the procedure will run AutomaticClustering recursively. It will
stop the recursion when the size of the cluster is three or less vertices. Three vertices can
form a simple subgraph. On the other hand, too many vertices can make a subgraph too
complex as it can capture too much of variations in the messages. Therefore, the abstraction
may not be meaningful as there will be too many wildcard symbols. Consequently, we use
three vertices as the size of micro-clusters.
The aim of the recursion is to build micro-clusters with the size of three or less vertices
because the entries in a log file have various messages. The micro-cluster will enable the
grouping of diverse messages. The micro-clusters that are not similar to others stay as they
are in the abstraction extraction step. In a log file with diverse log messages, many messages
do not bear any similarity to other messages so they will construct their own cluster.
At this stage, the clusters now have a new composition with better grouping since we
consider both the word count and the string similarity. For each cluster, we remember each
log entry line number as denoted in vertex property p(v), so we can traverse back and get
the log entries for each cluster.
6.4.5 Extraction of event log abstraction
The next step is to automatically extract an abstraction for each micro-cluster found. We
need to find the same word with the same index position, which then becomes the constant
part of the abstraction. If a particular word differs from other words in the same index
position, this becomes the variable part of the abstraction. Therefore, these words will
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parsed logs ← preprocess(log file)
length groups ← get length groups(parsed logs)
abstractions ← dict()
for length group in length groups do
graph ← create graph(length group)
clusters ← AutomaticClustering(graph)
for cluster in clusters do




merged abstractions ← merge(abstractions)
final abstractions ← get final(merged abstractions)
End Procedure
be replaced by an asterisk symbol. The overall process of the proposed method including
the extraction of abstraction discussed in this section is summarized in Algorithm 3. The
algorithm contains cross-references to the relevant sections of this paper to assist the reader
in reviewing the explanation of each step.
To obtain the word indices for the asterisk symbol, we first determine all indices for all
words, then find all indices for all the constant words in all log entries in a particular cluster.
The word indices for the asterisk sign Iast are acquired from all indices, I, subtracted by
the constant word indices, I ′. Thus, Iast = I−I ′ and we replace the word that has an index
position in Iast with an asterisk character.
Merging abstractions. An abstraction is extracted from a micro-cluster and there is a
possibility that this abstraction will be very similar to others. Therefore in the next step,
we apply a merging procedure in order to obtain more compact abstractions. First, we
find pair combinations (Ai, Aj) from all abstractions to be compared. Two abstractions Ai
and Aj will continue to be checked for merging if there is a weighted Hamming similarity
between them (H ′ > 0).
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We consider an abstraction Ai as a sequence of words, Ai = {ti1, ti2, . . . , ti|Ai|} and
Aj = {tj1, tj2, . . . , tj|Aj |}. For each tix and tjx where x = 1, 2, . . . , |Ai|, we check the
possibility of merging Ai and Aj based on the following rules:
1. If tix = tjx then merge = true, and
2. If tix 6= tjx ∧ (tix = ∗ ∨ tjx = ∗) then merge = true.
If tix and tjx do not follow these rules, then we will not merge two abstractions Ai and Aj .
For the comparison checking of tix and tjx, we do not consider symbol characters, numbers,
and punctuation to get more intuitive abstraction merging results. For example, the IP
address and port number are considered as a variable part of the abstraction.
Final abstractions. In all previous steps, we consider only the message field in a log entry.
In the final abstraction extraction step, we consider all other fields such as timestamp, host
name, and service name. These fields are also important in assisting a forensic investigation.
For each abstraction Ai, we check each parsed log entry that is saved in the vertex
property p(v). We retrieve all fields excluding the message field. For all fields from lj
(excluding the message field) where lj is a log entry assigned to an abstraction Ai, we
extract the constant and variable part and it is denoted as Bi The final abstraction result
Fi is a concatenation of Bi and Ai. Formally, Fi = concat(Bi, Ai).
6.5 Experimental results
In this section, we describe the experiments used to test the performance of the proposed
method. We discuss event log datasets and explain the experimental settings. We then
compare the performance of the proposed method with existing approaches when applied
to various datasets.
6.5.1 Public digital forensic datasets
This experiment uses five public datasets related to event log forensics as summarized in
Table 6.1 where # Abs means the number of abstractions for all log files in a particular
dataset. These datasets represent various scenarios related to a forensic investigation. Open
datasets were selected to aid reproduction of these experimental results and to allow future
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Table 6.1: List of public forensic datasets
Dataset # Files # Lines # Abs
Digital Corpora (Casper) [167] 15 11,086 3,422
DFRWS 2009 (Jhuisi) [6] 25 11,737 3,488
DFRWS 2009 (Nssal) [6] 40 107,093 5,573
DFRWS 2016 (DF16) [207] 1 3,304 102
Honeynet Challenge 7 (Honey) [2] 12 8,712 2,039
comparisons with subsequent methods. The first dataset is a disk image namely nps-2009-
casper-rw from Digital Corpora [167]. It is an ext3 file system dump from a bootable USB.
The user of this disk image browses several US Government websites. This dataset provides
event logs, especially various logs from a Linux system.
The Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) provides an annual forensic challenge
which is associated with event log forensics. In the DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2009 [6],
the researcher has to examine various log files to trace an attacker who illegally transferred
secret data. There were two hosts involved namely “jhuisi” and “nssal”. These two hosts
were Sony PlayStation 3 (PS3) devices that running a Linux operating system. The DFRWS
challenge in 2016 [207] provided logs from a Software-Defined Network (SDN) environment.
We have carved and parsed the log files from an SDN OpenVSwitch (OVS) switch for this
experiment.
The Honeynet Forensic Challenge 7 2011 [2] also provides a disk image of a compromised
Linux server and a forensic analysis is required in order to understand what has occurred.
From the provided hard disk dump, we extracted the log files and parsed them. For all
datasets except DFRWS 2016, we recovered the directory /var/log/ from the forensic disk
images. In this directory, we retrieved some common log files such as authentication logs,
kernel logs, and system logs.
6.5.2 Experimental settings
We run the experiments on a computer with an Intel Core i7 processor, 4 GB RAM, with
Linux Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The proposed method is implemented with Python 3 programming
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Table 6.2: Parameter settings for experiments
Method Parameter settings
Proposed method none
IPLoM [115] file support threshold = 0
partition support threshold = 0
upper bound = 0.9
lower bound = 0.25
cluster goodness threshold = 0.175
LogSig [236] number of cluster = ground truth cluster
Drain [4] tree depth = 4
similarity threshold = 0.4
maximum child = 100
LogMine [281] levels of pattern hierarchy = 2
maximum distance = 0.001
distance weight = 1
Spell [278] message type threshold = 0.5
language. We use the NetworkX library [225] to manipulate the graph and perform graph
clustering based on the Girvan-Newman method.
To measure the performance of the proposed method, we manually build the ground
truth for event log abstractions. To build the ground truth, we created a dictionary of essen-
tial words and phrases from operating system log files. For example, “accepted password”,
“connection closed”, and “failed password”. For each word and phrase in the dictionary,
we checked if a log entry contains them. We grouped all log entries based on these words
and phrases. Note that each word or phrase created one group. The next step is to check
the word length in each group. We grouped all log entries based on the word length. From
this final group, we checked for the constant and variable parts and then extracted the
abstraction. The abstractions from all of the final groups become the ground truth.
We use the F-measure as the evaluation metric. We follow the definition of F-measure in
[190, 4] as these papers also related to event log abstractions. The F-measure is related to
several values specifically true positive (TP ), false positive (FP ), and false negative (FN).
A true positive is when a method assigns two log messages with the same abstractions to the
same abstractions. A false positive is calculated when a method assigns two log messages
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with the different abstractions to the same abstractions. A false negative is when a method
assigns two log messages with the same abstractions to the different abstractions.














For each dataset, we calculate the F-measure for each file and then obtain the mean F-
measure for all log files.
6.5.3 Comparison with existing methods
We compare the proposed method with five other methods, specifically IPLoM [115], LogSig
[236], Drain [4], LogMine [281], and Spell [278]. All source codes, datasets, and abstraction
ground truth are publicly available in a GitHub repository1. We use the source code of
existing methods from [190, 4]. The proposed method, IPLoM, LogSig, LogMine, and Drain
are implemented in Python 3. However, Spell is implemented with Python 2. Therefore,
Spell is located in a different repository2.
Before running the experiments, we define the parameters used by existing methods as
shown in Table 6.2. Note that the proposed method is parameter-less, so we do not need
to specify any inputs. The parameter for LogSig is the number of clusters. Since it is not
an easy task to get the most appropriate number of clusters in various log files, we directly
get this value from ground truth. The choice of the parameters for all methods is based on








Casper Jhuisi Nssal DF16 Honey
IPLoM [115] 93.72 87.58 88.15 10.90 89.31
LogSig [236] 77.16 80.33 79.71 12.00 85.50
Drain [4] 90.01 87.49 89.05 17.50 94.12
LogMine [281] 72.06 74.17 66.17 14.60 77.49
Spell [278] 82.00 82.02 79.00 10.80 83.70
Proposed method 94.94 96.32 92.11 97.10 96.26
on previous works [190, 4], these parameter values have been demonstrated to produce the
best performance.
To run an objective and fair comparison, we use the nerlogparser tool [17] in prepro-
cessing step for all methods. By using nerlogparser, we do not need to define any regular
expressions to parse the log files from all datasets. We also give the same process when
discovering abstractions. For all methods, we first extract an abstraction from the messages
and then concatenate them with an abstraction from other fields from the log entries in the
same cluster.
Table 6.3 shows the comparison of the proposed method with five other methods. IPLoM
uses heuristic rules that are constructed based on the characteristics of log messages specifi-
cally grouping by word position and bijection search. The bijective relationship in a group of
log entries can accurately capture the most frequently occurring words. Therefore, IPLoM
demonstrates good performance for four datasets. The best IPLoM performance is found for
the Casper dataset with a 93.72% F-measure while the proposed method achieves 94.94%.
With the number of clusters supplied from ground truth, LogSig shows a fair perfor-
mance with the best F-measure of 85.50% achieved for the Honey dataset. LogSig cannot
cluster log messages precisely although the number of clusters is set to be the same value
as ground truth. The reason is that the clustering is performed based on a local search
algorithm. As explained in the LogSig paper [236], the use of the search-based optimization
algorithm can lead to local optima. For instance, message session closed for user root
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and session closed for user ubuntu are assigned to two different clusters because in
the grouping search process they are already trapped in local optima.
Drain performs well on four of the five datasets. The reason is that Drain considers the
first few words in a log entry as contributing most significantly to its abstraction. These
few words are also used to construct a fixed-depth tree. To avoid over-clustering, Drain
does not employ words that have no digits when traversing the tree data structure. For
the Honey dataset, Drain can achieve an F-measure value (94.12%) close to that of the
proposed method.
The overall lowest F-measure is shown by the LogMine method. LogMine performs
over-clustering for all datasets because the clustering process is conducted incrementally
for each log entry. If a log entry similarity with an existing cluster representation is less
than the given threshold, it will be grouped with that particular cluster. In addition,
LogMine’s clustering procedure is also sensitive to parameter settings [281]. Although
LogMine has a log-merging procedure, it was unable to merge accurately in some cases.
For example with the Casper dataset, the message Registered protocol family 20 and
Registered protocol family 1 should be assigned in one cluster, but LogMine did not
merge them.
Spell also shows a fair performance compared to the proposed method. Spell mainly
employs the longest common subsequence (LCS) technique to obtain the abstractions. Un-
fortunately, LCS cannot capture any potential abstraction that has separate substrings.
LCS will capture the longest substring, but it apparently fails to capture the second longest
substring. This situation can lead to the under-clustering of log entries. The best F-measure
for Spell is 83.70% for the Honey dataset which is quite below that of the proposed method
with 96.26%.
DFRWS 2016 is the most challenging dataset overall. In this dataset, log entries are
dominated by a message containing term br0<->tcp:192.168.1.1:6633: with 2,908 of to-
tal 3,304 entries. There is another very similar word from this dominating word, specifically
WARN br0<->ssl:192.168.1.1:6633:. The string similarity technique in existing methods
cannot separate these two similar words which are located at the beginning of log messages.
Therefore, these log entries are assigned in a same cluster. As a consequence, the existing
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methods produce low F-measures between 10.80% to 17.50%. On the other hand, we de-
velop weighted Hamming similarity which prioritizes the words occurring at the beginning
of a log entry. As a result, we obtain 97.10% F-measure for DFRWS 2016 dataset.
In general, the proposed method achieves the best F-measure with an overall mean
score of 95.35%. There are several reasons for this superior performance. First, we employ
a new distance measure named weighted Hamming similarity to calculate the similarity
between two words in a group of log entries. This similarity not only considers the order,
but also gives higher weight to the words at the beginning of a log entry. The proposed
graph clustering works by progressively removing the lightest weighted Hamming similarity.
Intuitively, this novel approach can produce the best cluster configuration. Therefore, the
proposed method achieves the best performance in terms of discovering abstractions as
supported by the F-measure score.
6.5.4 Over-clustering and under-clustering
The most important procedure in discovering event log abstractions is the clustering step.
If the clustering is performed well, then good abstractions will be produced. Based on our
intensive experiments on five datasets, the existing methods produce over-clustering results.
Therefore, they generate abstractions that are too detailed.
The takeaway message is that we need to get the best cluster composition from event
logs. This enables us to obtain the most descriptive abstractions as each abstraction repre-
sents one cluster. The intuitive and descriptive event log abstractions are important as the
system administrators or the forensic investigators will be able to analyze the more detailed
problems found in the log messages based on information from the abstractions.
However, over-clustering and under-clustering problem are not applicable to the LogSig
method. The reason is that LogSig has a problem with the local search algorithm and not
the number of clusters. Note that the number of clusters for LogSig is configured based on
the ground truth for the experiments in this chapter.
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6.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes an automatic method of event log abstraction. Being automatic,
there is no need for a forensic investigator to supply any parameters. This is a significant
improvement as the existing approaches either need many user inputs or need a model
training. The proposed method achieves the highest mean F-measure of 95.35% across all
datasets.
In each abstraction, we can extract several features such as frequency, duration, and
inter-arrival rate of an event. These features are then supplied to a deep learning technique,
namely autoencoders, to build a normal baseline activity. We can then define anomalous
events based on this baseline. The next chapter explains the feature extraction and its use
for the deep autoencoders.
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Chapter 7
Anomaly detection in a forensic
timeline with deep autoencoders
An investigator needs to analyze a forensic timeline after a cybersecurity incident has oc-
curred. Log entries from various sources are used to generate a forensic timeline. Finding
the anomalous activities recorded in these log records is a difficult task if manual inspection
or keyword searches are used. In this work, we propose a method for identifying anomalies
in a forensic timeline. We use deep autoencoders as a machine learning technique to estab-
lish a baseline for normal activities in log files. Furthermore, we set an anomaly threshold
of reconstruction value based on the constructed baseline. We then plot these anomalous
events on a forensic timeline. Our experiments indicate that the proposed method achieves
superior performance compared to other log anomaly detection methods.
7.1 Introduction
Timeline analysis is one of the main forensic capabilities to investigate a cyber attack [7].
For instance, the attack can come from a human attacker or botnet [282] aiming to steal or
to illegally access a server. After a cybersecurity incident, an investigator needs to create
a comprehensive timeline from forensic artifacts. We can retrieve the timestamps from log
This chapter is under review in Journal of Information Security and Applications.
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files in an operating system to create a timeline. In an investigation, it is very important
to recognize suspicious activities and the preceding events in the timeline [8].
The forensic timeline gives an insight into the events that took place before, during,
and after a specific cybersecurity attack [9]. Therefore, we can say that the creation of the
timeline is crucial to the reconstruction of the incidents. The reconstruction of incidents
involves the analysis of forensic artifacts and the creation of a timeline of events related to
a particular case [9].
A security incident recorded in forensic artifacts can be regarded as an anomaly. For
example, from a forensic disc image, the investigator is able to examine anomaly files in
a folder [283]. In examined folders, a new file generated by an intruder is classified as
an anomaly. To identify this type of anomaly, the iterative z algorithm [284] is applied.
Marrington et al. [108] examined timestamp inconsistencies in Windows event logs. The
timeline is created on the basis of the Lamport relationship, where out-of-sequence and
incomplete events are also assessed.
An anomaly is a data pattern that is not closely related to the normal data behavior
[285]. In the log files, anomalies are records that occur repetitively (high frequency) (e.g.,
brute force attacks) or occur infrequently (low frequency) (e.g., an unforeseen stoppage of
a particular service). The third type of anomaly is malicious events with normal frequency.
They are several illegitimate activities that generate the same type of activities and within
the same frequency range as legitimate actions. The investigator needs to identify such
anomalous events.
The forensic investigator searches for unusual occurrences on the forensic timeline. How-
ever, current techniques require a manual search [8] or the input of keywords with a strong
probability of occurrence [7]. The use of predetermined dictionaries does not offer flexibility,
as newly discovered log messages can be recorded in log files. Several other approaches can
be used to generate a forensic timeline [10, 11], but none of these can identify anomalous
activities in that timeline.
Anomalous activity inspection could take a considerable amount of time if initiated via a
manual command in the prompt or from a terminal [12]. Event management software, such
as Splunk [13], requires users to input thresholds with popular statistics-based methods,
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timestamp   service message
..
Jan 18 09:31:32 dhclient: DHCPREQUEST on eth0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67
Jan 18 09:31:32 dhclient: DHCPACK from 10.0.2.2
Jan 18 09:31:32 dhclient: bound to 10.0.2.15 -- renewal in 34568 seconds.
…
Jan 18 09:32:04 kernel: [   57.636952] eth0: no IPv6 routers present
Jan 18 09:33:03 shutdown[2256]: shutting down for system halt
Jan 18 09:33:03 init: Switching to runlevel: 0
…
Feb  6 15:17:08 sshd[2099]: Failed none for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port 34445 ssh2
Feb  6 15:17:12 sshd[2099]: Failed password for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port 34445 ssh2
….
Anomalous events
Figure 7.1: An illustration of anomalous events in a tabular-based forensic timeline.
namely the Z-score and the interquartile range (IQR). In different cases [14], the fixed
threshold cannot be adjusted to accommodate the constantly changing log records. The
use of conventional machine learning techniques [15] is another approach, although this
method is not very accurate.
In the forensic timeline, the investigator can manually recognize the anomalous occur-
rences. However, it is time-consuming; thus, a more convenient approach with a better
detection efficiency is required [16]. The description field in log files gives valuable knowl-
edge about events and they are the main sources of information when creating a forensic
timeframe. They may involve anomalous behaviors as shown in Figure 7.1. There are log
messages that depict anomalous instances, namely “failed password” and “invalid user”.
These examples are highlighted inside the red box.
It has been suggested that deep learning methods can be adapted for forensic applica-
tions [16]. Compared to conventional approaches, deep learning techniques offer superior
performance. Therefore in this research, we employ deep autoencoders to build a baseline
model for normal events. The autoencoders is a deep learning method that learns the input
vectors and produces an output representing the generic values of the inputs. The anoma-
lous events will produce very high reconstruction errors when compared with the baseline
value.
Contributions. In general, the contributions of this work are as follows.
1. The proposed model is a novel application of the deep autoencoders for detecting
anomalies in operating system log files as the main source of a forensic timeline.
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2. We use a sparse variant of deep autoencoders to detect anomalous events, which can
be visualized in a forensic timeline. This approach will assist the forensic examination
in analyzing the timeline containing numerous activities.
3. We present various features from log files, not only event frequency.
4. Once the model has been trained, it can be used to detect the anomalous events in a
forensic timeline with a recommended anomaly threshold value and various security
incident scenarios.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 7.2 describes the forensic timeline
analysis and related research on anomaly detection. The threat model and assumptions
used in this chapter are provided in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 explains the proposed method.
Experiment results and analysis are reported in Section 7.5. In this work, we mainly focus
on Linux log files as presented in the experiment section. Section 7.6 concludes this paper.
7.2 Related work
In this section, we discuss the work related to the analysis of a forensic timeline. Subse-
quently, we briefly review the use of autoencoders for anomaly detection and their applica-
tions in event logs. Finally, we discuss anomaly detection in forensic investigations.
7.2.1 Forensic timeline analysis
The investigator needs a tool to extract and visualize the timestamp and the system activ-
ities in order to create a forensic timeline. Log2timeline [8, 286] is a convenient software
designed to create a forensic timeline from a file, image file or mount point, and save it as
a file that can be future processed or analyzed. This tool provides a detailed timeframe of
different log providers, including user logs and OS logs. Log2timeline creates a CSV archive
that other forensic software can further analyze and interpret.
Timeline2GUI [7] is a tool for assessing a log2timeline CSV output. To analyze the
log records, it includes a graphical user interface. Timeline2GUI offers a search box that
can be used to find relevant events using a specific keyword. Timeline2GUI or log2timeline
can extract the items within the CSV reports produced by log2timeline. Moreover, Time-
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line2GUI provides two previews giving a summary of all activities, namely a reduced view
and a detailed view for more accurate logs. It also incorporates color highlighting to indicate
particular events, such as red for application execution.
To create a forensic timeline, one can use other commercial software, such as EnCase
and FTK [287]. As illustrated in [288], it is crucial for a forensic examination to establish
an incident history from various objects in an operating system. Esposito and Peterson
[288] presented the log2timeline SQL query evaluation of the CSV data record. Next, the
CSV document is loaded into a spreadsheet for Microsoft Access. Also, several queries are
used to examine significant events, including application behavior, web history, access to the
latest files, and executed programs [288]. Following security incidents, a forensic timeline is
also required and is modeled on the semantic correlation [9] and ontology-based approaches
[11] to analyze the relationship between incidents and their timeline.
Although other software, such as Zeitline [121] and CyberForensic TimeLab [119], can
be used to create an investigative timeline, these tools have not been recently updated.
More modern analysis applications, such as Timeline2GUI [7] and Timesketch [289], are
available for the digital investigation community.
In this research, we use Timesketch [289] because it is the latest and improved ap-
plication for displaying the activity timeline. It is a Google forensic tool that allows the
investigative examination of a timeline. The main benefit of Timesketch is that it allows
multiple forensic investigators to work together to maintain and assess the timeline simul-
taneously. Timesketch takes preprocessed timeline data as input in a JSON (JavaScript
Object Notation) or CSV (Comma Separated Value) format. For example, a timeline cre-
ated with the log2timeline in a CSV format can be exported to Timesketch [286]. It also
allows tabular or graph-based views of the files being examined.
7.2.2 Anomaly detection with autoencoders
In information systems research area, autoencoders are used to detect anomalous events in
business process logs [290, 291]. Nolle et al. [290, 291] assume that anomalous events in
business process logs are less frequent than the normal ones. Therefore, they trained both
normal and anomalous datasets in the autoencoders. However, in our case, the anomalous
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events have very different feature values. Therefore, this can contaminate the training when
builds the baseline vectors and then produces inaccurate reconstruction errors.
The autoencoders are also used to detect anomalies in supercomputer logs [292]. The
log messages are modeled with a word embedding technique before being fed to the autoen-
coders. There are two types of the autoencoders. The first type is used for creating word
embedding for log messages to generate fixed dimensional input vectors. The second au-
toencoders then identify anomalous executions inside the supercomputer logs. The method
produces anomaly scores but not anomaly decisions.
In network intrusion detection systems, autoencoders have been applied to learn the
features from the byte frequency extracted from network traffic [293]. The procedure then
produces a pattern of legitimate or normal network traffic. Another application is to use
autoencoder for feature learning [294] for intrusion detection. There are two training steps,
specifically pre-training and fine-tuning steps. The pre-training is for getting the best
initialization weights for the fine-tuning step. Moreover, the latter step is applied to learn
the features of the input data.
Finally, the autoencoders are also deployed for cyber threat intelligence in the online
hacker community [295]. Samtani [295] proposed new variants of the autoencoders, namely
GCAE. GCAE is a combination of graph convolutional networks (GCN) and the autoen-
coders. In this context, GCN is designed for embedding representations of hacker’s social
networks. In this network, a vertex represents post content and an edge shows the con-
nection with other hackers. This embedding is then fed to the autoencoders to detect a
particular exploit that is shared among the hacker’s online communities.
7.2.3 Anomaly detection in event log data
There are three types of anomalies: point, collective, and contextual [285]. Point anomaly
is an anomalous individual instance compared to the rest of the data. Collective anomaly is
when many data are gathered together and tend to be anomalous, although it may not be
an anomaly for its individual point. The last category is the contextual anomaly when the
information appears in a particular context that has been identified for each specific cases.
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In freely accessible logs, He et al. [190] evaluated supervised and unsupervised mech-
anisms for detecting anomalies. Isolation forest [296] and principal component analysis
(PCA) [297] are the two unsupervised methods explored. Supervised techniques involve the
decision tree [298], logistic regression [299], and support vector machines (SVM) [300]. He et
al. [190] stated that the supervised approaches achieved superior recall and precision scores
compared to the unsupervised ones because the former type was trained on the supplied
data sets.
Recent log anomaly detection analysis has managed to implement advanced machine
learning approaches as they show significant detection improvements. DeepLog [181], for
example, constructs log records as an event series and trains the regular series with the long
short-term memory (LSTM) architecture. The input data are characterized as deviations
when they do not correspond to the base model.
Another deep learning system based on LSTM is applied to discover anomalies in the
cloud deployment log entries [301]. Recurrent neural networks (RNN) were used to locate
the context differences between words in log entries using attention-based deep learning
[302]. Different from DeepLog [181], both normal and anomalous log files were used to train
the latter method.
7.2.4 Anomaly detection in a forensic investigation
Marrington et al. [107, 108] reconstruct Windows event logs relying on the time relationship
of the Lamport method to identify a temporal anomaly. This strategy can distinguish
events that are out-of-sequence or missing. The benefit of this approach is that it can
operate automatically to support the forensic examination. However, it recognizes anomalies
without fixing them or suggesting the missed events.
In a virtual machine environment [109], an anomaly detection approach was developed
that mainly used the timestamp as the primary entity. The researchers use the Lamport
method to find abnormal events from virtual operating system logs, comparable to previous
work [107, 108]. Another paper suggested cross-referencing of the timestamp throughout
the file system and file metadata [303].
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Figure 7.2: The proposed method for anomaly detection in a forensic timeline.
7.3 Threat model
In this research, the main sources used for the forensic timeline are Linux log files, such as
authentication, system, daemon, debug, and kernel logs. These files are commonly found
in /var/log/ directory. The log files save various activities on an OS. The interactions
between the users and the system are recorded as well. For example, the system records
error messages or warnings when an unauthorized user attempts to access a computer server,
as illustrated in Figure 7.1. The proposed method is not associated with a specific threat
or attack to an OS. As long as the events extracted from log messages indicate abnormality
with respect to five features defined in Section 7.4.3, we define these log entries as anomalies.
The proposed anomaly detection method deals with point anomaly type, where each
event in the log entries is checked for its reconstruction errors from the trained baseline
model. Therefore, the proposed method does not take into consideration the correlation
of various individual events. The baseline model can be deployed in real-time or after
a security incident has occurred. However, we do not provide real-time data training to
update the model file. Another assumption we used in this work is that the timestamp and
log entries are not modified by the attacker.
140
7.4 The proposed method
The block diagram of the proposed method is depicted in Figure 7.2. There are two phases:
the training phase and the investigation phase. In the training phase, we preprocess the
log files to parse log entries. Subsequently, we generate events from each log message. For
each event, we extract five features to be fed to the autoencoders. Note that we input to
the autoencoders only the features of normal or non-malicious events. Finally, this phase
outputs a baseline vector that represents normal activities.
In the investigation phase, the extracted log files from a forensic disk image need to be
preprocessed. Furthermore, we have to extract events and features similar to the training
phase. We then calculate reconstruction errors based on the baseline model from training.
A threshold is set to identify log entries that are anomalous and those that are normal.
Finally, we plot anomaly detection results in a timeline to assist the forensic investigator to
find for more detailed information about the anomalous events.
7.4.1 Preprocessing of log files
In the preprocessing step, we have to extract each field in all log entries. Each entry
contains a number of fields, including timestamp, hostname, service name, and the event
message. This extraction is given in Figure 7.3 inside box number 2, where the timestamp
and message are highlighted in grey, and the hostname and service are underlined. In this
work, we focus on the message of a log entry because this field has an event description that
will be analyzed. In the next step, we also use another field, especially the timestamp, for
feature extraction.
The nerlogparser tool [17] is applied to extract all fields from log files. The tool is based
on a natural language processing approach known as “named entity recognition” (NER),
a mechanism used to obtain named entities from text data. The nerlogparser describes
named objects in log files as words or phrases that include specific fields such as timestamp,
hostname, or application name in a log entry. Obtaining named objects is equivalent to
identifying each entity in a log entry.
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Bidirectional long-term memory networks are employed by the nerlogparser to imple-
ment NER [17]. The main advantage of the nerlogparser is that it offers automatic parsing
because a pre-trained model is provided. Therefore, no parsing rules or regular expressions
have to be specified. It can parse different log files because the nerlogparser has been trained
in numerous log types.
At this stage, we define the parsed log messages as M = {M1,M2, . . . ,M|M|} and
Mi = {wi1, wi2, . . . , wi|Mi|} where wi is a single word in a message Mi, |M| is the total
length of log messages, and |Mi| is the length of a particular log message Mi. These
preprocessing results are used for extracting events from the log files.
7.4.2 Generating events
The generation of events from raw log files is illustrated in Figure 7.3. Before feeding the
log files to the autoencoders, we split all log entries to obtain the main message using the
nerlogparser tool [17] as discussed in Section 7.4.1. After that, we extract events using the
Drain method [4]. In general, the Drain works by first building a fixed-depth parse tree to
model log files. The event is generated by traversing the tree with several restrictions from
the input parameter, namely tree depth, maximum child, and similarity threshold. Note
that an event generated by this step represents one or more log entries.
The first step in generating events is to build a parse tree as illustrated in Figure 7.4.
This tree has several main layers. Layer one is for message length, layer two is for the first
word of each log message, and layer three is a list of log events. After building the parse
tree, we need to split each field in the log entries. Unlike the original implementation of
Drain, we use the nerlogparser tool described in the previous section.
The next step is to search by message length. The length of the log messages is already
grouped in the parse tree, so it is trivial to get the correct message length. Note that the
message length comprises the number of words in a particular log entry. The subsequent
step is to search by the preceding word from layer two to the last layer containing leaf nodes.
Leaf nodes contain a list of log events. The number of layers is defined by parameter tree
depth. The Drain method needs a parameter maximum child for limiting the maximum
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Raw log entries from 
an operating system
Extracting events 
with the Drain method
..
DHCPACK from *
Switching to runlevel: *
Failed * for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port * ssh2
..
Preprocessing: Get the log messages and 
keep timestamps for feature extraction
..
Jan 18 09:31:32 victoria dhclient: DHCPREQUEST on eth0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67
Jan 18 09:31:32 victoria dhclient: DHCPACK from 10.0.2.2
Jan 18 09:31:32 victoria dhclient: bound to 10.0.2.15 -- renewal in 34568 seconds.
…
Jan 18 09:32:04 victoria kernel: [   57.636952] eth0: no IPv6 routers present
Jan 18 09:33:03 victoria shutdown[2256]: shutting down for system halt
Jan 18 09:33:03 victoria init: Switching to runlevel: 0
…
Feb  6 15:17:08 victoria sshd[2099]: Failed none for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port 34445 ssh2
Feb  6 15:17:12 victoria sshd[2099]: Failed password for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port 34445 ssh2
…
Feb  6 15:21:10 victoria sshd[2157]: Failed password for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port 44616 ssh2
..
..
Jan 18 09:31:32 victoria dhclient: DHCPACK from 10.0.2.2
..
Jan 18 09:33:03 victoria init: Switching to runlevel: 0
…





Figure 7.3: An illustration showing event extraction from raw log files.
number of children of a node. If a node already has maximum children defined by this
parameter, any unmatch words will be set to the special internal node “*”.
The next step is to find the most similar log event from the group of log events in the






where ham is the standard Hamming similarity measure, evt is the log event in the parse
tree, and msg is the processed log message. n is total number of words in the calculated
event and message. evt(i) is the i-th word of log event, while msg(i) is the i-th word from
the log message M from Section 7.4.1.
After obtaining the log event with the largest similarity value sim, the Drain compares
it with a similarity threshold st defined by the user. If sim ≥ st, the procedure returns the








Event: DHCPACK from *
Line id: [3, 11, 17]
Log group
List of log groups
Figure 7.4: An example of parse tree from the Drain method [4].
tree when the procedures are unable to find a suitable log event in the leaf nodes. The
update proceeds by creating a new log group based on the currently processed log message.
7.4.3 Extracting features
For each event, we extract features that characterize the activity occurring in an operat-
ing system. There are five features including frequency, duration, inter-arrival event rate,
number of bad words, and message length. We discuss each feature as follows.
Frequency of an event. The frequency of an event shows that each event has a normal
or anomalous occurrence. For example, attack attempts of brute-forcing the username and
password will have many records in the log files. This indicates that the event has a very high
frequency. On the other hand, there is a rare event that occurs only in shallow frequency,
but it still needs to be analyzed by the forensic investigator. For instance, there is a file
transfer protocol service that stopped unexpectedly. The system records this activity in log
files, but the frequency is very low. Both high and low frequencies of events are considered
as part of the anomaly detection method. Formally, frequency f is defined as:
f = count(e) (7.2)
where e is an event generated from previous step in Section 7.4.2.
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Duration of an event. The duration d is how long of an event takes place in the recorded
activities. It is simply the end of event substracted with the start of an event as denoted
below:
d = end(e)− start(e) (7.3)
We can extract the start and end time of an event from the timestamp field of log entries.
For example, the event “Initializing USB Mass Storage driver” occurred for the first time at
12:28:48 and last time at 12:43:19. We then calculate the difference between 12:28:48 and
12:43:19. So, the duration of this event is 871 seconds. If the duration of an event is too
long or too short compared to other events, it is highly likely that the event is an anomaly.
The unit of duration is in seconds.
Inter-arrival rate of event. Inter-arrival rate of an event is simply the ratio of event





where r is the inter-arrival rate, while f and d is calculated from Equation 7.2 and 7.3,
respectively. Similar to other features, very high or very low inter-arrival rate will highly
contribute to the calculation of anomaly detection results.
Number of bad words. In the recorded log messages, there are several bad words found
when the system records anomalies or suspicious activities. For example, the brute force
attempt on the system will show “Invalid password for invalid user admin”. This message
means that there is an invalid user named admin trying to login with an invalid password
as well. The two bad words found in this example are “invalid”. We use a list of bad words
defined in [304] and check for these in each log message of an event. This dictionary of bad
words was previously used as dictionary-based sentiment analysis, but we can use it in any
other text data including log files. Finally, we define this feature, b, as the total of words
from log messages of an event that found in the bad words dictionary.
Log message length. In several cases, the log message of an error or anomalous activity
is highly likely to have a greater word length compared to normal activity. This is because
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the system needs to record the description of such events as completely as possible. For
example, we found a suspicious log entry with an event message having 57 words: could not
lookup ssh component setting: Failed to contact configuration server; some possible causes
are that you need to enable TCP/IP networking for ORBit, or you have stale NFS locks due
to a system crash. See http://www.gnome.org/projects/gconf/ for information. (Details -
1: Failed to get connection to session: dbus-launch failed to autolaunch D-Bus session: No
protocol specified
As an event is constructed from many log messages, we consider the maximum word
length of the log messages of an event as a feature and this is defined as:
l = max(count(split(m))) (7.5)
where l is the maximum word length of all log messages m constructing a particular event.
split(m is a function to split the word based on the space character.
Note that we scale all features value to be in range of [0, 1] using minimum and maximum
scaler. This scaling gives all features the same weight in the autoencoders. The formula for





where s is the original value, s′ is the new scaled value, and s is a particular feature for all
events. The final feature vectors are x = {f ,d, r,b, l}, where each variable is the vector of
the value from five features described in this section.
7.4.4 Building baseline with autoencoders
The autoencoders is a neural network architecture that learns input vectors to obtain the
output vectors where the number of neurons is the same as for the inputs. The autoencoders
have two parts, namely encoder and decoder. In the training step, the encoder learns a
function h(x) = σ(Wx + b) where σ is the activation function and we use a hyperbolic
tangent tanh. W is the weight matrix that will be learned, x is the input vector, and b
is the bias value. On the other hand, the decoder reconstructs the input with a function
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x′ = σ(W′h(x) + b), where W′ is the weight matrix learned in the encoder and h(x) is the
function from the encoder, and b is the bias value. The training of the autoencoders aims to
minimize a reconstruction error L, which is the mean squared distance between the input
vector x and the output vector x′ as defined below:
L(x,x′) = |x− x′|2 (7.7)
Figure 7.5 illustrates the proposed autoencoders. We use more than two hidden layers
so that we can categorize the proposed architecture as deep autoencoders. The sizes of the
input and output layers are the same with five neurons, where each represents a feature
generated as described in Section 7.4.3. The hidden layer size is 8 - 4 - 2 - 4 - 8. We
use the hyperbolic tangent tanh as the activation function for each neuron. We use Adam
[212] as the learning optimizer in the proposed architecture. Adam is suitable for general
cases because it is efficient, needs only a small amount of RAM, and is invariant to gradient
scaling.
Unlike other typical architectures of autoencoders, we use a larger number of neurons in
the first hidden layer because we want to capture the sparse representation of the features
and we can discover the interesting structures of the features [305]. The sparsity can be
achieved by adding a constraint to the neurons in the hidden layer to be inactive. We add
regularization in the hidden layer and we use L1 regularizer to obtain this sparsity. In other
words, the sparsity means that not all neurons are active at the same time.
In sparse autoencoders, we add an additional constraint, namely sparsity penalty Ω in
the layer h to the reconstruction error:
L(x,x′) = |x− x′|2 + Ω(h) (7.8)
Because we use the L1 regularization, the Ω(h) become λΣi|hi| where λ is the parameter
for the regularization factor [306]. We split the datasets into the training and testing set.
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Figure 7.5: The proposed architecture of the deep autoencoders for building baseline of
normal events.
data have very high deviation features value. If we include the anomalous data, the output
baseline vector from the autoencoders will not offer a good baseline value.
7.4.5 Detect anomalies from reconstruction errors
In the investigation step of the proposed method (Figure 7.2), the input log data or testing
dataset is processed to generate a vector of features. We then calculate the reconstruction
errors of these vectors based on the baseline value generated from the training step. After
we obtain the reconstruction errors for the input data, we need to define a threshold for
these errors, which decides whether an event is normal or an anomaly.
If a reconstruction error value is below the threshold, then the input event is not an
anomaly, and vice versa. We denote the threshold t as:
t = µ+ cσ (7.9)
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where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of reconstruction errors from training
datasets. The user needs to define a constant value of c. Based on our intensive experiments,
we recommend a value of c is between 0 and 2 as described in Section 7.5.3. Each event
represents one or more log entries. If one event is defined as an anomaly, then log entries
under the definition of this event are also identified as anomalies.
7.4.6 Building a forensic timeline
In this work, we merge various log files from an operating system and then sort them
according to their timestamp. This enables the investigator to obtain the chronology of the
events as a timeline. Since we focus on the operating system logs, we filter out other logs
when constructing the timeline.
We use the Timesketch tool [289] to visualize this forensic timeline. Timesketch works
by providing a sketch, which is a project representing a particular forensic case. A sketch
can contain more than one timeline. The merged and sorted log files need to be formatted
in CSV (comma-separated value). Using the nerlogparser tool, we can obtain all fields and
then format them in a CSV file. We chose to use a tabular-based timeframe provided by
Timesketch. The anomalous events detected by the proposed model are marked in red to
assist the investigator when examining these suspicious activities.
Note that the CSV format contains the sorted forensic timeline based on the timestamp
found in the log files. The mandatory fields for CSV files for the Timesketch are message,
datetime, and timestamp desc. We then add two more fields, namely hostname, and service
name. We can import this CSV file into Timesketch by issuing this command: tsctl import
--sketch id 10 --file timeline.csv --timeline name honeynet7 --username admin, where tsctl
is the command-line tool for managing Timesketch, sketcth id is the identifier of the specific
sketch, while timeline name and username are self explanatory.
7.5 Experimental results and analysis
In this section, we explain the digital forensic datasets and the settings used in the experi-
ments. We then describe how we choose the best threshold for reconstruction errors. Then,
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we compare the proposed method with other log anomaly detection approaches. Subse-
quently, we discuss the anomaly detection results in a forensic timeline. Finally, we analyze
the undetected anomalous log entries.
7.5.1 Digital forensic datasets
We use four public forensic datasets related to log file analysis as summarized in Table 7.1.
These datasets contain various cyberattack scenarios, which lead to many anomalous events
recorded in the log files. We manually label all of the log entries from the datasets to obtain
the ground truth for normal and anomalous events.
The first and second datasets come from The Digital Forensic Research Workshop
(DFRWS) Conference. The conference offered a challenge associated with forensic anal-
ysis of log files in an operating system. In the DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2009 [6], the
forensic investigators had to examine various log files to identify an attacker who illegally
sent secret data including the drug recipes and illicit images. Two hosts were involved in
this case, namely “jhuisi” and “nssal”. These two hosts were Sony PlayStation 3 (PS3)
devices that run on a Linux OS. The security incident also involved unauthorized access
and the use of backdoor software. “nssal” is the biggest dataset with 91,349 normal events
and 15,732 anomalous ones.
The third dataset is obtained from Honeynet Forensic Challenge 7 2011 [2]. This dataset
provides a forensic disk image from a compromised Linux computer where an attacker suc-
cessfully gains access. There are 8,162 and 550 for normal and anomalous entries, respec-
tively, from 12 log files in total. The last dataset is extracted from a disk image, namely
nps-2009-casper-rw from Digital Corpora [167]. It is an ext3 file system dump from a
bootable USB. This dataset also provides operating system logs from a Linux machine. In
this last dataset, no specific incidents found. However, there are several anomalous log
entries, such as failure authentication by the root user. In these datasets, we extracted the
directory /var/log/ from the forensic disk images. We then acquired several Linux typical
log files. List of log types extracted to construct the timeline are authentication, system,
daemon, debug, and kernel logs.
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Table 7.1: A list of public forensic datasets used for the experiments
Identifier Description # log file # lines # normal # anomaly
Jhuisi jhuisi host from DFRWS Challenge 2009 [6] 25 11,737 9,063 2,674
Nssal nssal host from DFRWS Challenge 2009 [6] 40 107,093 91,349 15,732
Honey7 Linux image from Honeynet Challenge 7 [2] 12 8,712 8,162 550
Casper ext3 disk image from Digital Corpora [167] 15 11,086 9,874 1,212
We collected a set of anomalous words or phrases found in log entries to build the
ground truth. We also obtained references for these suspicious log messages from Sigma
[307]. Sigma is a collection of rules for anomalous or suspicious log entries. It is commonly
used in security information and event management (SIEM) applications. However, we
further improved the list to make it more comprehensive as shown in Appendix A.
7.5.2 Experiment settings
To implement the proposed method, we use Python 3.5, Keras [308] with TensorFlow 1.8
[208] as the backend, and scikit-learn [210] for various utilities for machine learning. To
run the experiments for the proposed and other log anomaly methods, we use a computer
with 12 cores of CPU, 64GB of RAM, and NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti 12GB GPU.
The output of the training step is a baseline vector for normal events and this is used for
the testing step or in the investigation step to detect anomalous events in the log files.
The hyperparameters used in the proposed method are explained as follows. The number
of epoch for training is 100 with the batch size of 50. We set the L1 regularization parameter
to 10e-5. We split all datasets according to these proportions: 70% for training, 10% for
validation, and 20% for testing.
For evaluation metrics, we use precision, recall, F1, and accuracy. Precision is the ratio
of the number of true positives and the sum of true and false positives. Recall focuses on
measuring the ability of the methods to detect normal events. We can calculate F1 from






























Figure 7.6: Precision and recall for various c value on all datasets.
where TP is true positives, FP is false positives, and FN is false negatives. Furthermore,





For each dataset, we calculate the metrics in the sorted and merged log files.
Finally, accuracy provides a proportion of true results for both normal and anomalous
events among the total number of log entries in the experiment. Therefore, these four
metrics can capture the performances of all methods in various aspects. For each dataset,
we calculate all evaluation metrics and then obtain the mean for all datasets. Precision,
recall, and F1 are implemented with the scikit-learn library with the “macro average”
option, which means averaging the unweighted mean per label.
7.5.3 Choosing the best threshold
To obtain the best constant value c for an anomaly threshold t in Equation (7.9), we run
an experiment and tested for various values of c from 0 to 2 with step value of 0.05. For
each value, we recorded precision and recall and display them to a scatter plot as shown in
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Table 7.2: Performance comparison (%) on the Casper dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 83.347 77.372 79.728 95.034
Logistic regression 66.959 60.863 59.700 90.993
SVM 58.614 60.757 59.482 90.967
Isolation forest 52.407 50.650 49.926 88.149
PCA 45.401 49.778 47.322 89.420
Proposed method 96.733 84.906 89.422 94.323
Figure 7.6. The best thresholds are shown in a red cross point with their respective c and
t value.
As seen in Figure 7.6, the best value of c was achieved when it produced the proportional
value between precision and recall. We can capture this proportionality by using an F1 score
because it considers both precision and recall. In four datasets, the value of c to produce
the best threshold is between 0 and 2. Specifically, we set c = {0.95, 0.95, 0.10, 1.25} for the
dataset Honey7, Jhuisi, Nssal, and Casper, respectively. We use these values for the rest of
the experiments.
7.5.4 Comparison with other log anomaly detection methods
We compared the proposed method with five other log anomaly detection approaches from
the loglizer tool1 [190]. There are three supervised detection techniques, specifically decision
tree [298], logistic regression [299], and support vector machines (SVM) [300]. We also run
a comparison with two unsupervised detection methods, namely isolation forest [296] and
principal component analysis (PCA) [297]. There are other methods in the loglizer tool,
such as log clustering and invariants mining. However, we chose these methods because
they provided better performance than did the others.
Before feeding the log files to the loglizer, we split all log entries to obtained the main
message using the nerlogparser tool [17]. After that, we extracted event sequences using
the Drain method [4]. The loglizer then processed these event sequences. The performance
of the proposed method in comparison to the other five anomaly detectors are reported in
Table 7.2 to Table 7.5. Note that the bold values in all tables indicate the best performance.
1https://github.com/logpai/loglizer
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Table 7.3: Performance comparison (%) on the Jhuisi dataset.
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 91.735 89.964 90.747 93.454
Logistic regression 67.210 65.629 64.781 79.900
SVM 62.354 64.046 62.132 79.673
Isolation forest 57.519 52.774 51.700 74.707
PCA 38.953 49.942 43.682 77.837
Proposed method 98.609 97.089 97.796 98.081
Amongst these three supervised methods from the loglizer, the decision tree shows the
best performance. For instance, it achieved an F1 score and accuracy of 90.747% and
93.454%, respectively, on the Jhuisi dataset (Table 7.3). Unlike logistic regression that only
works best in linear classification, the performance of the decision tree is not affected by
the linearity. The decision tree is a straightforward approach for binary classification, such
as sentiment analysis. Therefore, the decision tree provides the best performance compared
to other methods from the loglizer toolbox.
The performance of logistic regression on all datasets is similar to the SVM. For ex-
ample, they provide similar accuracy of 97.596% and 97.541%, respectively, on the Nssal
dataset (Table 7.4). SVM has difficulty in reaching optimal performance because we have
to carefully tune the hyperparameters used in the training step. In these experiments, we
follow the default parameter recommended in the loglizer tool.
The isolation forest and PCA algorithm broadly failed to identify anomalous events in
repeated log messages because they have a very similar pattern. This is indicated by the low
precision and recall values for all datasets. For example, in Table 7.5, the isolation forest
achieved only 47.509% precision, while the PCA showed 60.871% precision. In general,
these unsupervised methods show lower performances compare to supervised ones. The
results are clear because the unsupervised techniques do not learn the OS logs data and
rely heavily on the anomaly threshold established by the user.
The overall performances of all methods from the loglizer tool are lower than the pro-
posed method because they use a count matrix as the features. These features then inputted
into various machine learning in the loglizer.
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Table 7.4: Performance comparison (%) on the Nssal dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 94.702 87.887 89.583 98.064
Logistic regression 84.783 74.956 76.598 97.596
SVM 80.085 74.747 76.320 97.541
Isolation forest 65.504 57.352 56.101 80.967
PCA 52.893 50.894 45.769 83.191
Proposed method 96.449 96.105 96.214 96.234
Table 7.5: Performance comparison (%) on the Honey7 dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 85.538 78.928 80.863 96.611
Logistic regression 68.143 70.000 69.042 96.286
SVM 68.143 70.000 69.042 96.286
Isolation forest 47.509 50.948 48.064 85.966
PCA 60.871 58.898 55.943 88.279
Proposed method 99.069 88.000 92.712 98.243
The count matrix has several disadvantages. First, it considers only the frequency of
events as features. One can add more features such as the inter-arrival rate of events
to provide more information to the classifier about anomalous events. Second, the count
matrix is grouped based on sequence windows. In the case of OS logs, the anomalies do
not always appear in each window. This situation also influences the training process by
machine learning methods in the loglizer tool. This windowing mechanism also does not
fit well with the point anomaly type. This technique would be appropriate for collective
anomalies.
In line with the results from He et al. [190], the three supervised methods provide
better performance compared to the unsupervised ones. However, the proposed method
still demonstrates a superior performance with overall mean F1 and accuracy of 94.036%
and 96.720%, respectively. The reason is that the proposed method uses various features
extracted from the log data, while other methods only use the frequency. In addition, we
also employed the sparse autoencoders that can capture better representation of features
for normal events.
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Figure 7.7: A visualization of the forensic timeline of the Honey7 dataset in the Timesketch.
7.5.5 Anomaly analysis in a forensic timeline
In the investigation phase, we first extracted the log files from the forensic disk image.
We then preprocessed them using the nerlogparser and saved to CSV formatted file. The
procedure then detected anomalies in these log entries and then plotted the detection results
to the Timesketch. This visualization enables the forensic investigator to navigate and
examine the chronology of all events.
Figure 7.7 provides an example of the visualization of the findings of anomaly detection
in the Timesketch. This is a case study from the Honey7 dataset [2], where an attacker
tried to compromise a Linux server. The user “ulysses” attempted to gain an unauthorized
access to the server. The view displayed in Figure 7.7 provides a general overview of the
timeframe to a forensic investigator who is investigating a more specific period.
Figure 7.7 shows a section of a forensic timeline and with a red-highlighted view, the
forensic investigator can easily distinguish the anomalous activities from all others. The
relevant cases are “authentication failure” and “failed password” for the user “ulysses”. In
order to determine potential accidents triggered by an attacker, the investigator can then
examine those events and their surrounding activities.
In the experiments, several anomalous events were not detected by the proposed method.
After we delved deeper into the datasets, we found that the features of several anomalous
156
Table 7.6: Performance of the proposed method (%) on untrained datasets
Dataset Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Windows event logs 91.109 97.508 93.843 95.949
Linux logs 85.945 91.570 88.047 90.262
events were very similar to the normal one. Therefore, we need better features to represent
anomalous events so that the autoencoders can determine whether they are normal or
anomalous. In addition, a correlation of events can improve detection by capturing the
relationship between events. It can assist in anomaly detection when a particular event
triggers or initiates other anomalous events.
7.5.6 Anomaly detection on untrained datasets
To demonstrate that the learned baseline model from training can be applied to other
unseen datasets, we test the proposed method on two different datasets. The first dataset is
Windows event logs collected from a Windows 7 machine at CUHK laboratory [309]. The
Windows had a CBS (Component Based Servicing) configured for secure and controlled
software installation. The suspicious activities include an unrecognized package attribute,
no package parent found, and a null object when creating a transaction. Another additional
dataset is Linux logs from a honeypot server [234]. As a honeypot, the log files contained
various attempts to gain access to the server. For example, failure authentication, failed
login, bad username, unknown user, and timeout authentication error.
Our proposed method shows a good performance, although the two datasets are unseen
in the training phase. The results are shown in Table 7.6. For example, it obtained 91.109%
precision and 97.508% recall on the Windows event logs dataset. In addition, it achieved
88.047% F1 and 90.262% accuracy on the Honeypot logs. The proposed method can work
well because it considers not only the frequency of an event, but also other features, such
as arrival rate and duration of an event as discussed in Section 7.4.3.
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7.6 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a deep learning technique to detect the anomalous events in a
forensic timeline. The investigated system logs are first preprocessed using the nerlogparser
tool. The deep and sparse autoencoders are applied to log files as one of the primary sources
to build a forensic timeline. We finally plot the anomaly detection results to the Timesketch
as a forensic timeline tool. This plot is easy to navigate as it uses a web-based interface. In
the experiments with four public forensic datasets, the proposed method achieves 94.036%
and 96.720% for F1 score and accuracy, respectively. It also provides 97.715% of precision
and 91.525% of recall.
Detecting anomalous activities in a forensic timeline with deep autoencoders is the
second main approach in this thesis. The third approach is to identify anomalies using
sentiment analysis of log messages. This approach is described in the next two following
chapters (Chapter 8 and Chapter 9).
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Chapter 8
Sentiment analysis in a forensic
timeline with deep learning
A forensic investigator creates a timeline from a forensic disk image after an occurrence
of a security incident. This procedure aims to acquire the time for all events identified
from the investigated artifacts. An investigator usually looks for events of interest by
manually searching the timeline. One of the sources from which to build a timeline is
log files, and these events are often found in log messages. In this work, we propose a
sentiment analysis technique to automatically extract events of interest from log messages
in the forensic timeline. We use a deep learning technique with a context and content
attention model to identify aspect terms and the corresponding sentiments in the forensic
timeline. Terms with negative sentiments indicate events of interest and are highlighted in
the timeline. Therefore, the investigator can quickly examine the events and other activities
recorded within the surrounding time frame. Experimental results on four public forensic
case studies show that the proposed method achieves 98.43% and 99.64% for the F1 score
and accuracy, respectively.
This chapter has been published in the IEEE Access (Special Issue on Deep Learning: Secu-




Constructing a timeline of events is one of the most important steps in analyzing a piece
of digital evidence [7]. For example, an investigator needs to build a forensic timeline from
a forensic disk image right after a cyber security attack. The timestamps can be extracted
from file systems and various log files. It is very critical for an investigator to understand
when a suspicious event occurred and the activities surrounding that event [8].
The forensic timeline provides a general overview of the activities that occurred before,
during, and after a particular security incident [9]. In addition, timeline construction is a
part of event reconstruction. Event reconstruction is defined as processing a set of events
and constructing a timeline of the events related to a forensic case [9].
An event of interest can be viewed as an anomaly in a forensic timeline. For instance,
the investigator can analyze outlier files in a directory from digital evidence [283]. A new
file created by an attacker is defined as an outlier in an investigated computer directory.
The iterative z algorithm [284] has been used to detect this type of outlier. Marrington et
al. [108] investigated temporal inconsistency in event log data from the Windows operating
system. The timeline was constructed based on the Lamport relation, and the method
determines out-of-sequence and missing events.
The investigator needs to check the forensic timeline for suspicious events. Existing
methods need a manual search [8] or require inputting keywords that have a high likelihood
of occurring [7]. The use of predefined rules does not provide flexibility because previously
unseen messages may be recorded in log files. For an automatic process, there are several
methods for generating a forensic timeline [10, 11] but not for finding events of interest in
a timeline.
Furthermore, to support statistics-based anomaly detection for forensic purposes, nat-
ural language processing approaches, such as sentiment analysis, are needed [19]. On the
other hand, an investigator can manually identify the events of interest in a forensic timeline.
However, this is time-consuming; therefore, automatic detection of the events of interest is
needed [16].
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Invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1
Sentiment term Aspect term
pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure
Failed password for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port 34431 ssh2
Figure 8.1: An illustration of aspect-based sentiment analysis in a forensic timeline. The
log messages are extracted from an authentication log file [2].
As one of the primary sources used to build a forensic timeline, the messages in event logs
offer useful information about events and contain both positive and negative sentiments.
The basic idea of this work is that the investigator can spot any event of interest from
negative log messages because log files contain huge entries to analyze. We do not intend to
remove the positive messages from the investigation context. After the investigator spots
log messages with negative sentiments, the investigator can further examine the surrounding
events described in the log messages.
As an illustration, there are log messages containing negative sentiments such as “failed
password” or “authentication failure”, as shown in Figure 8.1. The aspect term is shown in
blue, while the sentiment term is indicated in red. The aspect term is the entity or subject
being discussed in a log message. This type of timeline can be generated from a forensic
disk image using the log2timeline tool [286].
Therefore, it is advantageous to examine the log files using aspect-based sentiment anal-
ysis. Unlike document-level or sentence-level sentiment analysis, aspect-based sentiment
analysis aims to detect polarity in each aspect being examined [310]. This level of granu-
larity enables us to extract more detailed information from log messages in the investigated
forensic disk. From Figure 8.1, we can see that the investigator is better able to analyze
a forensic timeline where the events of interest are highlighted through sentiment analysis
results, especially the negative sentiments.
Aspect-level sentiment analysis involves two main steps: extracting the aspect from text
data and then identifying the sentiment for each aspect, specifically positive or negative
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[310]. The most common data to be examined for its sentiment are social media data [311]
and customer product reviews [312]. By analyzing sentiment, we can determine the users’
and customers’ preferences. In our case, the event logs can contain suspicious activities such
as attempts to gain unauthorized access to computers, as illustrated in Figure 8.1. On the
other hand, a normal system or normal user activities are viewed as positive sentiments.
The use of deep learning for forensic purposes was suggested in [16]. On the other hand,
deep-learning-based techniques have been used to detect aspect-based sentiment [313, 310].
They also provide better performance compared to traditional machine learning methods.
Specifically, we employ attention-based deep learning for sentiment detection [314]. We use
two types of attention, namely, context attention and content attention, to achieve high
accuracy.
Overall, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
1. This work proposes using aspect-based sentiment analysis in a forensic timeline. The
events of interest are modeled as negative sentiments.
2. We use attention-based deep learning to detect sentiment from log messages, which
are then displayed in a forensic timeline. This assists the forensic investigator in
examining a timeline containing various messages.
3. Once the sentiment model is trained, it can be used to detect the events of interest in
a forensic timeline automatically, and no further input is required.
4. The proposed method achieves very high performance, indicated by 98.43% and
99.64% for the F1 score and accuracy, respectively.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 8.2 covers the related research
on forensic timeline analysis, sentiment analysis of event logs, and anomaly detection in
a forensic timeline. Section 8.3 describes the main pipeline of the proposed method. The
experimental results and analysis are given in Section 8.4. In Section 8.5, we give the
conclusions and future work of this paper.
162
8.2 Related work
This section reviews the work related to forensic timeline analysis and sentiment analysis in
event logs. Subsequently, we explain anomaly detection in a forensic timeline. We discuss
anomaly detection because the negative sentiment found in log messages can be considered
an anomaly or an event of interest as described in this chapter.
8.2.1 Forensic timeline analysis
One popular tool used to generate a forensic timeline is log2timeline [8, 286]. It creates a
comprehensive timeline from various log sources, such as browser logs and operating system
logs. log2timeline produces a CSV file, which can be examined or visualized further by
other forensic tools.
A recent tool to analyze a CSV file from log2timeline is Timeline2GUI [7]. It offers a
graphical user interface (GUI) to investigate the timeline. Timeline2GUI is equipped with
a search box enabling an investigator to look for important events based on a particular
keyword. It can filter the events inside the CSV file generated from log2timeline with
Timeline2GUI or with log2timeline itself.
Moreover, Timeline2GUI has two views, namely, a reduced view to obtain a general
overview of all events and a detailed view for more detailed records of activity. It also
uses a color highlighting to inform the investigator about events, such as red for program
execution.
To build a forensic timeline, one can use other commercial tools such as EnCase and
FTK, as demonstrated in [287]. As highlighted in [288], the creation of an event timeline
from various artifacts in an operating system is a critical task for forensic investigation.
Esposito and Peterson [288] showed the analysis of a CSV output file from log2timeline
with an SQL query. First, the CSV file is imported to a Microsoft Access database.
Then, there are several queries for examining important events, namely, application ac-
tivity, browsing history, access to recent documents, and executed programs [288]. A foren-
sic timeline is also needed after events are modeled with semantic-based correlation [9]
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or ontology-based techniques [11] to investigate the association between events and their
timeline.
There are several other tools to build a forensic timeline and its visualization, such
as Zeitline [121] and CyberForensic TimeLab [119]. However, these tools are no longer
updated, and more recent tools for visualization, such as Timeline2GUI [7], are available to
practitioners and the digital forensic community.
8.2.2 Sentiment analysis in event logs
Since sentiment analysis is popularly applied to social media or product review data, we
can apply it to log messages from an event log file. In software engineering, we can identify
developer emotions from commit logs on the GitHub repository by using sentiment analysis
[315]. This work uses the SentiStrength method, which is built based on a dictionary of
sentiment words and a machine learning technique [316]. Guzman et al. [315] concluded
that a software project with a larger number of developers tends to have more positive
emotion polarity.
Other work on software commit logs indicated that a large number of changes in source
code files resulted in negative sentiment in the commit messages [317]. The SentiStrength
method is also used in this work [317]. In addition, these works [315, 317] concluded that
the time to commit the source code to the repository would have negative sentiments when
executed at the beginning of the week, specifically on Mondays or Tuesdays.
These aforementioned works attempted to use sentiment analysis in event log data.
However, none of them have been applied to operating system logs for forensic purposes.
To build a forensic timeline, we propose applying deep-learning-based sentiment analysis to
system logs, which are extracted from a forensic disk image. Negative sentiments indicate
an anomaly or an event of interest, which has to be investigated further.
8.2.3 Anomaly detection in a forensic timeline
In terms of a temporal anomaly, Marrington et al. [107, 108] modeled Windows event
logs based on the Lamport time relation. This technique can identify out-of-sequence and
missing events. The advantage of this method is that it can run automatically to assist an
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Figure 8.2: Proposed method for detecting aspect-based sentiment in a forensic timeline
with deep learning.
investigation. However, it recognizes anomalies without correcting or giving a recommen-
dation about the missing events.
The timestamp-based anomaly detection has also been developed in a virtual machine
[109]. Similar to [107, 108], the authors used the Lamport model to detect anomalous events
from virtual operating system logs. Another work proposed a temporal cross-reference in
the file system and file metadata [303]. Different from existing methods, we propose a novel
approach that involves using sentiment analysis to detect an anomaly or point of interest
from system logs and then plotting them in a forensic timeline.
8.3 The proposed method
A block diagram of the proposed method is shown in Figure 8.2. There are two main steps,
specifically, a training step and an investigation step. In the training step, we first preprocess
the log files to extract messages containing negative or positive sentiments. Second, we build
word embeddings to represent text messages as a vector of numbers. Furthermore, there are
two attention-based techniques in the main deep learning architecture, namely, a context
attention layer and a content attention layer. We then use a softmax layer to determine
whether a message sentiment is positive or negative. In the last step of the training phase,
we save the sentiment model.
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Feb  6 15:16:20 victoria sshd[2085]: Invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1
timestamp hostname service message containing sentiment
Figure 8.3: An illustration of parsing of a log entry.
In the investigation step, we first build a forensic timeline from the forensic disk image.
We then detect the sentiments using the model from the training step. Finally, the nega-
tive messages are displayed in a timeline to assist the forensic investigation. Each step is
described in detail in the following subsections.
8.3.1 Event log preprocessing
To obtain the sentiment of log messages, each log entry is split into separate entities. Several
entities that are commonly found in a log entry include the timestamp, hostname, process
name, and a message containing a short description about a particular event. An illustration
of the entity parsing process for a log entry is depicted in Figure 8.3. At this stage, we
extract all log messages from a log file to be analyzed for their sentiments.
Unlike the existing approaches, which generally use regular expressions to parse log files,
we employ the nerlogparser tool [17]. It can automatically split each entity in a log entry
using a pretrained deep learning model, namely, bidirectional long short-term memory.
The output of the nerlogparser is a JSON file containing the entity names and values for
all records in a log file or a dictionary data structure. We use the latter because it will be
fed to the word embedding as the next layer of the proposed method.
Finally, in this stage, we define the preprocessed log messages, which contain sentiments
such that P = {p1,p2, . . . ,p|P|} and pi = {wi1, wi2, . . . , wi|pi|}, where wi is a single word
in a message pi, |P| is the total length of log messages, and |pi| is the length of a particular
log message pi.
8.3.2 Word embedding layer
Since deep learning architectures can process only numbers, we convert each word in prepro-
cessed log messages to a vector of numbers. This conversion technique is commonly known
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as word embedding. The embedding is the first layer in our proposed attention-based deep
learning method.
We use a pretrained word embedding, namely, GloVe version glove.42B.300 [200]. GloVe
produces the embedding value for each word based on statistical properties such as word
occurrence in a certain context or a particular sentence. The name of this version indicates
that it has been trained with a total of 42 billion words of web text data from Common
Crawl [318], and 300 is the dimension of the embedding.
The advantage of using a pretrained embedding model is that it can include a relation-
ship between the words and the context in a sentence. Since it has been trained on 42 billion
words of web text data and the log files also contain readable texts, GloVe is a reasonable
representation for text messages from event log data. In other words, the embedding vector
values from the training results can be applied to the log files. In this embedding layer,
we look up each word from log messages in the GloVe embedding. If an unknown word is
found in the preprocessed log messages, we replace it with a random floating value in the
range [-0.1, 0.1].
The word length of messages in log entries can vary. Therefore, we apply the padding
and truncating technique to ensure that the length of messages is the same. We pad
a message if it is shorter than the embedding size, and we truncate it if otherwise. If
the messages are the same size, the model training can be conducted in batches, thereby
making it faster. Formally, we define a preprocessed log message p as a sentence s =
{w1, w2, . . . , wi, . . . , wi+L, . . . , w|s|}, where |s| is the length of the sentence and wi to wi+L
are the aspect terms, where L is the length of the aspect words. The deep learning model
aims to identify the sentiment of these aspect terms.
The word embedding matrix, E = {e1, e2, . . . , e|P|}, is extracted from GloVe, where
E ∈ Rd×|V |, V is the vocabulary, and d is the word vector dimension. The word embedding
of wi is denoted as ei ∈ Rd×1. In other words, it is a column from the embedding matrix E.
Therefore, we obtain an embedding vector e = {e1, e2, . . . , e|s|} to represent a sentence s.
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Figure 8.4: An illustration of the context attention procedure.
8.3.3 Context attention layer
An attention model is intended to obtain valuable information on an aspect sentiment from
a sentence. The first attention layer is the context attention. This layer considers three
factors, namely, the word order, the aspect information, and the correlation between the
word and the aspect [314].
To address the context attention, we use gated recurrent unit (GRU) networks [319]
as the deep learning technique. Figure 8.4 depicts an illustration of the context attention
procedure. The GRU learns the long-term dependencies in a sequence of words in a log
message and the positional relationship between words in the whole log message. The GRU
has two gates in its cell, namely, the reset gate and the update gate. The reset gate r is
defined as:
r = σ(Wrxt + Urht−1), (8.1)
where σ is the logistic sigmoid function, x is the input vector and ht−1 is the previous hidden
state. Moreover, Wr and Ur are weight matrices to be optimized in the training step. The
vector input x is the vector E from the word embedding layer. The reset gate manages the
computation when the hidden state neglects the previous state and then adjusts with the
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current input. Moreover, the update gate z is denoted as:
z = σ(Wzxt + Uzht−1), (8.2)
where the notations are similar to the reset gate r. The update gate manages information
from the previous state to the current one [319].
Furthermore, the activation unit ht is defined by:
ht = z  ht−1 + (1− z) h̃t, (8.3)
where h̃t is computed by:
h̃t = tanh(Wh̃txt + Uh̃t(r  ht−1)), (8.4)
where  is the element-wise product.
To capture the context between the aspect term and its surrounding words in a log
message, we employ two GRU networks, namely, GRUl for the left context and GRUr
for the right context. GRUl processes the log messages from left to right or in a forward
direction to learn the aspect term and its sentiment. On the other hand, GRUr moves from
right to left or in a backward direction. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 8.4, where
the context of word embedding from Section III B are learned for the left and the right
context. Finally, GRUl provides hidden state vectors Hl = {hi+Ll , . . . ,hil ,hi−1, . . . ,h1},
while GRUr generates Hr = {hir , . . . ,hi+Lr ,hi+L+1, . . . ,hN}, where N is the number of
processed words.
Moreover, we use a multilayer perceptron (MLP) to compute the left context attention
weight βl of hl, which is denoted as:
βl = σ(Whl) + bl, (8.5)
where W is the weight matrix to be optimized and bl is a basic attention weight. We run
the same calculation for the right context attention weight βr. To obtain the attention
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weights for all aspects βa, we calculate the mean of the left attention weight βl and right
attention weight βr.
To produce the weighted memory, which contains the context attention, we define
the memory M, which is built from a stack of embedding vectors E. It is defined as
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,m|M|}, where M ∈ Rd×N . Finally, the weighted memory M′ =
(mw1,mw2, . . . ,mwN ) is denoted as:
mwi = β mi, (8.6)
where β is the concatenation of βl,βr, and βa. The weighted memory M
′ contains infor-
mation about contexts in input log messages and is fed to the content attention layer.
8.3.4 Content attention layer
To more accurately detect the aspect sentiment, we use a second attention layer called the
content attention layer that is used specifically for sentence representation. This represen-
tation improves the importance of a word for aspect sentiment within the whole content
and enables us to capture the important sentiment features [314].
An illustrative example of content attention is shown in Figure 8.5 and explained in detail
as follows. Note that in the bottom part of Figure 5, the weighted memory M′ is generated
from the previous procedure for the context attention. We define ci as the attention weight
of the memory slice mi. To calculate ci, we use feedforward neural networks (FNNs) such
that:
ci = W tanh(Wmi + Wva + Wvs), (8.7)
where mi is from M
′, va is the aspect representation, and vs is the sentence representation.
This ci score shows the importance of word wi to a sentiment aspect. After we calculate all
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Figure 8.5: An illustration of the content attention procedure.
At this stage, the attention weights produce an attention weight vector α =
{α1, α2, . . . , αN} of the memory M′. Note that the memory M′ used in this layer is
the weighted memory from the previous context attention layer. Furthermore, we can
compute the aspects for sentence representation vsr:
vsr = M
′α, (8.9)
where vsr ∈ Rd. To improve the sentence representation to handle more complex log
messages, we add the sentence representation from the embedding layer vs and the sentence
representation from the content attention layer vsr, resulting in vf . Finally, vf is the final
representation of the aspect, considering the context and sentiment information of the log
messages from the previous context attention layer [314].
8.3.5 Softmax layer
To build the deep learning model, we stack the embedding layer, content layer, and context
attention layer. We use softmax as an output layer to identify the sentiment of each aspect
found in the log messages. The softmax layer estimates a normalized distribution over two
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where xi = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} is the vector output from the attention layer. In the model
training step, we minimize the cross-entropy loss H, which is calculated by:




where g is the ground-truth distribution and s is the estimated distribution from the softmax
function.
8.3.6 Building a forensic timeline
We use the log2timeline tool [286] to build a forensic timeline. Since we focus on sen-
timent analysis for operating system logs, we filter out other logs when constructing the
timeline. The command for extracting the timeline including the log files is log2timeline.py
forensic-image.plaso forensic-image.dd, where .plaso file is the plaso storage file format from
log2timeline containing the extraction results from the forensic disk image. After that, we
sort the timeline chronologically by accessing the plaso storage format with the command
psort: psort.py -w forensic-sorted.csv forensic-image.plaso. Note that the CSV format con-
tains the sorted forensic timeline based on the timestamp found in the log files. The psort
tool is also included in the log2timeline toolsets.
We cannot access the plaso storage format directly; therefore, we have to use the psort
tool to extract the timeline. In our case, we filter the messages extracted by the log2timeline
tool to obtain only the operating system logs because the messages inside these logs contain
sentiments that can assist in the investigation process.
The CSV file generated by the log2timeline tool provides 17 predefined and fixed fields,
including the date, time, source, type, and description. For sentiment analysis, we focus
on the description field containing the main message and description of a particular event
from the systems. The sentiment model produced by the proposed deep learning method is
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Table 8.1: A list of public system logs datasets used in this chapter
Identifier Description # files # lines # positive # negative
Casper ext3 disk image from Digital Corpora [167] 15 11,086 9,874 1,212
Jhuisi jhuisi host of DFRWS Challenge 2009 [6] 25 11,737 9,063 2,674
Nssal nssal host of DFRWS Challenge 2009 [6] 40 107,093 91,349 15,732
DFRWS-16 DFRWS Challenge 2016 [207] 1 3,304 3,069 235
applied to this description field. Therefore, when building a forensic timeline, we do not use
the nerlogparser tool to parse the log entries. The nerlogparser is used only for building the
deep learning model in the training step. For timeline visualization, we use the Timesketch
tool [289], which is described in the experiment section.
8.4 Experimental results and analysis
In this section, we describe the four public forensic datasets used to test the proposed
method and five other methods. We then discuss how we built the ground truth for sen-
timent analysis in the event log data as the primary source of a forensic timeline. Subse-
quently, we explain the software and settings used when conducting the experiments. We
also compare the proposed method with five other deep learning techniques. Finally, we
demonstrate the sentiment analysis results when displayed in a forensic timeline.
8.4.1 Public forensic datasets
We use four public forensic datasets to evaluate the proposed method and compare the
results with those of five other techniques. These datasets are displayed in Table 8.1.
These datasets are chosen because they contain various security incidents. Therefore, the
operating system records several events, which are associated with these incidents. We
extract these log messages and analyze their sentiments with the proposed method. The
negative sentiments refer to negative events in the log messages. Note that system log files
are one of the main sources used for building a forensic timeline.
The first dataset is nps-2009-casper-rw, a forensic image from a bootable USB device
and provided by Digital Corpora [167]. The disk file system is ext3 from a Linux Ubuntu
distribution. The main event in this disk is that the user browsed through several US
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government websites. It provides 15 system log files with 11,086 lines in total, 9,874 positive
events, and 1,212 negative events.
The second and third datasets are from The Digital Forensic Research Workshop
(DFRWS) Challenge 2009 [6]. This conference is one of the most respected venues in the
digital forensics research area. The 2009 Challenge was related to a case study about an
attacker who illegally transferred secret data. There were two Linux hosts involved in this
case, namely, “jhuisi” and “nssal”. These two hosts were Sony PlayStation 3 (PS3) devices.
“jhuisi” has 25 system log files with 11,737 log entries, while “nssal” is the largest dataset,
with 91,349 and 15,732 positive and negative entries, respectively.
The last datasets are extracted from Honeynet Forensic Challenge 7 2011 [2]. This
dataset also provides a disk image of a compromised Linux server. From 12 files, there
are 8,162 and 550 positive and negative activities, respectively. We recovered the directory
/var/log/ from these forensic disk images for all datasets. From this directory, we extract
several standard log files found in a Linux distribution, such as authentication logs, kernel
logs, and syslog. These files are the artifacts commonly analyzed for investigation.
8.4.2 Building ground truth for sentiment analysis
We build a list of negative sentiment terms and a list of aspect terms from the datasets.
We have an initial dictionary containing several negative words from the log messages,
such as “invalid”, “failed”, “disconnect”, “error” and “failure”. Examples of aspect terms
include “password”, “user”, “port”, “authentication”, and “session”. We iterate through
each entry in the log files in the datasets. After that, we extract the aspect term from a
message. Subsequently, we determine whether a message contains negative terms from the
predefined list. If so, the message and its respective aspect term are flagged as a negative
sentiment. Otherwise, the message is defined as a positive sentiment.
When a negative log message does not contain any predefined keywords, we add the
keyword in that message manually to the dictionary. All labeled datasets, the complete list







<text>Invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1</text>
<aspectTerms>





Figure 8.6: XML format for log datasets based on SemEval-2014 format [5].
datasets, the total number of negative sentiment terms is 90, while that of the aspect terms
is 74.
The ground truth is formatted in XML, as this is the common data format used in
aspect-based sentiment datasets. An example of the XML format we use in the log datasets
is shown in Figure 8.6. The XML format of the log entry depicted in Figure 8.3 is shown
in Figure 8.6. The XML tags are based on SemEval-2014 Task 4 [5] as the most popular
datasets for aspect-based sentiment analysis. In Figure 8.6, the aspect term is “user’,’ and
the sentiment identified is negative, as term the “Invalid” exists in the predefined list of
negative sentiments. This format also records the start and end indices of the aspect term
in the log message.
8.4.3 Experiment settings
For this experiment, we use Python 3.6 to implement the proposed method. In addition, we
use Keras 2.2.4 [308] for the deep learning library and TensorFlow 1.7.0 [208] as its backend
engine. We also use scikit-learn 0.21.2 [210] to calculate the evaluation metrics and split
the training and testing data. For the hardware, we use a computer with a 12-core CPU, 64
GB of RAM, and a GeForce GTX 1080 Ti 12 GB GPU. The output of the training phase
is a model file that can be used directly by a forensic investigator to analyze sentiments in
a forensic timeline. We split all datasets with the following proportions: 60% for training,
20% for development, and 20% for testing. Note that these proportions are applied to the
proposed and all compared methods.
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Furthermore, we use the following hyperparameters for the proposed method. The
dimension of the word embedding is 300, with GloVe as the pretrained embedding. The
dropout value is 0.1, with a batch size of 32. Furthermore, we run the training with 50
epochs, with a learning rate of 0.001. We use Adam [212] as the learning optimizer in the
proposed architecture. Adam is suitable for general cases because it is efficient, needs only
a small amount of RAM, and is invariant to gradient scaling. The training is stopped early
if there is no improvement in the model accuracy after five iterations to prevent model
overfitting.
For evaluation metrics, we use the precision, recall, F1, and accuracy. The precision
measures the method’s ability to identify negative sentiments and not label them as positive,
while recall shows the performance when detecting positive sentiments. Moreover, F1 is a
weighted average of the precision and recall. Finally, the accuracy score provides an overall
measurement of the detection results for all positive and negative sentiments. These four
evaluation metrics are discussed in the next section.
8.4.4 Comparison with other methods
To demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed method, we compare the pro-
posed method with nine other deep learning techniques: BRNN (bidirectional recurrent
neural network) [320], BGRU (bidirectional gated recurrent unit) [321], BLSTM + CRF
(bidirectional long short-term memory and conditional random field) [3], TD-LSTM (target-
dependent long short-term memory) [322], and MemNet (deep memory network) [323]. Note
that TD-LSTM and MemNet are attention-based deep learning but use only one attention
model.
In addition, we compare the proposed method with other aspect-based sentiment detec-
tion methods, namely, the attention network (AN), word-aspect attention network (WAAN),
lexicon-aware word-aspect attention network (LWAAN), and interactive lexicon-aware word-
aspect attention network (ILWAAN) [324]. These methods are based on the attention neural
networks and incorporate sentiment lexicon information.
The metric values in the experimental results were from the testing dataset. The exper-
imental results for each dataset when analyzed with the aforementioned methods and the
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Table 8.2: Comparison with other methods on the Casper dataset (%)
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
BRNN [320] 91.827 89.531 90.665 97.466
BGRU [321] 91.918 90.625 91.267 97.570
BLSTM + CRF [3] 86.474 88.906 87.673 97.027
TD-LSTM [322] 96.124 94.714 95.406 98.684
MemNet [323] 97.297 66.667 73.611 94.737
AN [324] 94.365 94.000 92.094 94.000
WAAN [324] 94.809 94.500 92.987 94.500
LWAAN [324] 95.256 94.500 93.224 94.500
ILWAAN [324] 99.202 90.000 94.042 98.500
Proposed method 99.575 95.000 97.155 99.211
Table 8.3: Comparison with other methods on the Jhuisi dataset (%)
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
BRNN [320] 96.203 94.508 95.348 97.875
BGRU [321] 95.698 94.508 95.099 97.738
BLSTM + CRF [3] 94.861 95.648 95.253 97.578
TD-LSTM [322] 98.966 93.023 95.727 98.165
MemNet [323] 98.797 91.860 94.961 97.859
AN [324] 96.769 96.750 96.570 96.750
WAAN [324] 97.211 97.250 97.158 97.250
LWAAN [324] 91.428 90.500 87.736 90.500
ILWAAN [324] 99.160 93.878 96.315 98.500
Proposed method 99.825 98.837 99.324 99.694
proposed method are shown in Table 8.2 for the Casper dataset, Table 8.3 for the Jhuisi
dataset, Table 8.4 for the Nsaal dataset, and Table 8.5 for the Honey dataset. These meth-
ods have been used to detect sentiment in other datasets, such as social media or product
reviews. However, in these experiments, we evaluate these methods using the system log
data. Note that the system log data are one of the main sources of data when constructing
a forensic timeline.
When applied to the four datasets, the proposed method achieved the best performance
in detecting sentiments, as indicated by the best mean F1 and accuracy values, with 98.430%
and 99.635%, respectively. This superior performance is mostly due to the use of two
attention layers in the deep learning model. The difference in the performance between the
BRNN and BGRU is not significant because the GRU represents an improvement over the
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RNN. For example, it achieved 97.466% and 97.570% accuracy for the BRNN and BGRU
on the Casper dataset, as depicted in Table 8.2. The bidirectional approach captures only
the left and right context of each word in a log message. These two directions provide
information about the sequence of words in a log message. In addition, the bidirectional
architecture represents each word and captures the context from the surrounding words in
a log entry.
BLSTM + CRF is slightly better than the BRNN and BGRU because it uses a CRF
as the last layer. LSTM is also an improved version of the RNN. The CRF considers the
most optimal path in the neural networks through all possible label sequences. It assumes
that each aspect is dependent on each other. Therefore, it provides an increase in accuracy
compared to the BRNN and BGRU. In Table 8.4 and Table 8.5, BLSTM + CRF produces
the highest F1 score compared to that of the BRNN and BGRU, with 99.424% and 95.075%,
respectively. However, the BRNN, BGRU, and BLSTM+CRF take into account only the
left and right context. In the proposed method, we use two types of attention that consider
both content and context to achieve better accuracy.
TD-LSTM performs quite well on the Casper dataset, as indicated by the second-best
F1 score of 95.406% (Table 8.2); it also achieves the third-best score on the Nssal dataset,
with 99.570% (Table 8.4). TD-LSTM models the left and right contexts with the targets.
In other words, TD-LSTM models the previous and following contexts as aspect-dependent
features and can capture the interactions between aspects and contexts in the log message
data. However, the recall and F1 score on the Honey dataset are lower than those of the
other methods, with 85.000% and 90.912%, respectively. The reason is that the majority
of sentiments in this dataset are negative. TD-LSTM is unable to identify them because
targets are represented twice and are focused specifically on the second representation.
For the Casper and Honey datasets, MemNet demonstrated the poorest performance
compared to the other methods. For instance, it shows an F1 score of 73.611% (Table 8.2)
and 86.964% (Table 8.5). This is because it does not use a recurrent neural network model;
thus, it is unable to capture the context between words. It uses multi-hop attention, which
is not really applicable to log message data. In addition, MemNet builds the knowledge
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Table 8.4: Comparison with other methods on the Nssal dataset (%)
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
BRNN [320] 98.765 98.007 98.384 99.315
BGRU [321] 99.335 99.269 99.302 99.710
BLSTM + CRF [3] 99.431 99.417 99.424 99.733
TD-LSTM [322] 99.703 99.439 99.570 99.770
MemNet [323] 98.128 99.317 98.711 99.298
AN [324] 98.684 98.688 98.672 98.688
WAAN [324] 98.996 99.000 98.993 99.000
LWAAN [324] 99.041 99.042 99.033 99.042
ILWAAN [324] 99.874 99.484 99.677 99.833
Proposed method 99.988 99.935 99.961 99.979
Table 8.5: Comparison with other methods on the Honey dataset (%)
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
BRNN [320] 92.657 91.471 92.060 98.302
BGRU [321] 94.577 92.964 93.763 98.475
BLSTM + CRF [3] 95.484 94.670 95.075 98.961
TD-LSTM [322] 99.474 85.000 90.912 98.973
MemNet [323] 81.963 94.113 86.964 97.945
AN [324] 99.048 84.333 91.081 84.333
WAAN [324] 93.356 94.000 93.677 94.000
LWAAN [324] 94.994 94.667 94.830 94.667
ILWAAN [324] 90.736 94.655 92.598 99.000
Proposed method 99.823 95.000 97.280 99.658
directory based on the embedding vectors of individual words [323]. Therefore, it is harder
to learn the aspect terms provided in more complicated contexts.
The AN, WAAN, and LWAAN are simpler variants of the ILWAAN; thus, they are
similar in terms of their deep learning architectures [324]. Therefore, they show similar
performances on all datasets. The AN is the baseline model; it builds an aspect and its
context separately using LSTM networks. The WAAN does not incorporate sentiment
lexicon information. The LWAAN is different when calculating aggregation-level attention.
Finally, the ILWAAN is a complete model that includes multiple attention mechanisms and
sentiment lexicon information. Note that all of the evaluation results are very high, as
shown in Table 8.2 to Table 8.5. This is because the log datasets are not as complex and
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complicated as regular text data. Log messages tend to only be short and consist only of
several words or phrases.
On all evaluation metrics, the proposed method achieves the best value. The proposed
method performs well, with overall F1 and accuracy scores of 98.43% and 99.64%, respec-
tively. The reason is that we use two attention techniques to model aspect-based sentiment
analysis. The context attention can capture the word position and information on the con-
text and aspect. In addition, this attention also considers the correlations between each
aspect in a sentence. The second attention, which addresses content, is able to represent
the sentence well. Based on the conducted experiments, it has been proven that these two
attention models can increase the performance of the aspect-based sentiment analysis in
terms of model accuracy.
8.4.5 Displaying negative sentiments on a forensic timeline
After extracting system logs from a forensic disk image using the log2timeline tool, we
run the proposed method for sentiment analysis. In this investigation step, we detect the
sentiments using the model from the training step. Finally, the negative messages are
displayed in a timeline to assist the forensic investigation. We use the Timesketch tool [289]
to plot negative sentiments on a forensic timeline. We use Timesketch because it is the
latest and most improved application for displaying the activity timeline. It is a forensic
tool that allows the investigative examination of a timeline. As shown in Figure 8.7, we use
tabular-based views to display the negative sentiments of log messages. Blue denotes the
aspect word, while red indicates its sentiment.
An example visualization of the forensic timeline is shown in Figure 8.7 with a portion
of the case of DFRWS 2009. In the DFRWS 2009 case, a user is suspected of transferring an
illegal file, which is a drug recipe in this case. Based on the scenario solution provided in [6],
the user “goatboy” is responsible for this recipe file of illegal drug recipes in exchange for a
subscription to Mardi Gras images and a video library. This type of view shown in Figure
8.7 gives a forensic investigator a general indication of the timeline before they examine













Figure 8.7: A plot of the sentiment analysis results to a Timesketch forensic timeline from
an auth.log [6]. The investigator can easily spot the events of interest.
A portion of the forensic timeline for the auth.log file from the DFRWS 2009 jhuisi host
[6] is shown in Figure 8.7. The forensic investigator can easily distinguish the events of
interest from among all events, as they are highlighted. In Figure 8.7, the events of inter-
est are “authentication failure” and “failed password” for the user “goatboy”, which have
negative sentiments. The investigator can then examine these events and their surrounding
events to identify possible incidents caused by an attacker.
8.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we propose an aspect-based sentiment analysis to identify the events of in-
terest in a forensic timeline. The sentiment analysis is applied to log messages as one of
the primary sources to construct a forensic timeline. We apply the attention-based deep
learning method, an architecture with two types of attention, namely, context and content
attention. We finally plot the sentiment analysis results to a forensic timeline using the
Timesketch tool. This plot is easy to navigate, as it is based on a web-based interface. The
proposed method achieves 98.43% and 99.64% for the F1 score and accuracy, respectively,
when evaluated on four public forensic datasets.
The next chapter presents another sentiment analysis approach for anomaly detection,
namely pylogsentiment. The method does not consider aspect term of log messages. How-
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ever, pylogsentiment takes class imbalance issue into account in the case of system logs.
The method provides similar performance in terms of the accuracy of the detection.
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Chapter 9
Anomaly detection in operating
system logs with deep
learning-based sentiment analysis
The purpose of sentiment analysis is to detect an opinion or polarity in text data. We can
apply such an analysis to detect negative sentiment, which represents the anomalous activ-
ities in operating system (OS) logs. Existing methods involve manual searching, predefined
rules, or traditional machine learning techniques to detect such suspicious events. In this
work, we propose a novel deep learning-based sentiment analysis technique to check whether
there are anomalous activities in OS logs. Log messages are modeled as sentences and we
identify the sentiments using the gated recurrent unit (GRU) networks. OS log datasets in-
herently have a class imbalance in the sense that the number of negative sentiment is much
lower than that of the number of positive ones. In order to address the class imbalance,
we build a GRU layer on top of a class imbalance solver using the Tomek link method.
Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can detect anomalous events
in OS logs with an overall F1 and accuracy of 99.84% and 99.93%, respectively.
This chapter has been published in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (Special
Issue on AI/ML for Secure Computing), 2020. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2020.3037903.
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9.1 Introduction
Sentiment analysis is commonly applied to social media or product review data. It enables
us to analyze user preferences in various contexts. The purpose of sentiment analysis is to
detect the opinion or polarity in text data [325]. In this case, the sentiment can be positive,
neutral, or negative. The most popular data to be analyzed in terms of sentiment are social
media data [326, 327] and customers’ product reviews [328]. We are able to identify what
people like or dislike by analyzing the sentiments. The results can be used for evaluating
the products.
Because sentiment analysis can be applied to text data, we can use it to analyze operating
system (OS) logs. An OS records its activities in log files. The recorded messages are not
only activities conducted by the system itself but also show interactions with users. The OS
also logs various activities including attempts to obtain unauthorized access to a server. The
messages in OS logs have rich content and contain both positive and negative sentiments.
Therefore, it is important to examine the OS logs using sentiment analysis. In addition,
sentiment-based detection can support the security analysis or forensic investigation of OS
logs, especially using deep learning as suggested in [16].
The system administrator who has responsibility for the computer security needs to
inspect the log files to check for anomalous messages or irregularities. The checking process
can take a significant amount of time if launched by a manual command in the terminal
[12]. The use of predefined rules for anomalous activities does not provide flexibility as the
various messages continue to be saved in log files. The existing log management tool, such
as Splunk [13], requires input threshold from the users to detect anomalies with common
statistics-based methods, namely the Z-score and the interquartile range (IQR). The static
threshold cannot adapt with dynamically changing log entries in various cases [14]. Another
technique is to use traditional machine learning methods [15]. However, the accuracy of
this method is not very high.
To detect the log anomalies in a production OS, we propose to use sentiment analysis
in the OS log files. We consider this problem as two classes sentiment analysis, specifically
positive and negative sentiments. We argue that the detection of negative sentiments is
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Feb  6 15:04:39 victoria login[1990]: pam_unix(login:session): session opened for user root by LOGIN(uid=0)
Feb  6 15:04:39 victoria login[2042]: ROOT LOGIN  on 'tty1'
Feb  6 15:16:20 victoria sshd[2085]: Invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1
Feb  6 15:16:20 victoria sshd[2085]: Failed none for invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1 port 34431 ssh2
Feb  6 15:16:24 victoria sshd[2085]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): check pass; user unknown
…
Green: positive sentiment
Red: negative sentiment = anomalous activites in log messages
Figure 9.1: An illustration of a section of an OS authentication logs with negative and
positive sentiments
equivalent to identifying anomalous activities from OS log messages. On the other hand,
the positive sentiment is the normal or other regular messages recorded in an OS log file.
An illustration to support this argument is provided in Figure 9.1. We highlight the
positive sentiment of log messages in green and the negative in red. The negative sentiments
that emerged in this example are “invalid user” and “user unknown”. These types of entries
need to be investigated further. Furthermore, sentiment analysis mainly uses machine
learning to detect positive or negative content. On the other hand, deep learning has been
applied and has gained popularity as a means of analyzing sentiment and it has been shown
to produce better accuracy than traditional machine learning methods [329].
We use a deep learning technique that provides both high accuracy and flexibility in
regard to previously unseen data. Specifically, we use a gated recurrent unit (GRU) networks
[319] to detect the sentiment in OS log messages. In real-life OS logs, the number of negative
messages is much smaller than the positive ones, which leads to class imbalance. We consider
this issue to achieve a balance between the two sentiment classes by using the Tomek link
method [330]. The balancing will produce a better deep learning model; therefore, more
accurately detect anomalous activities as the minority class.
Contributions. In general, the contributions of this work are as follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work to use sentiment analysis
for identifying anomalous activities in OS logs. Detecting negative sentiments can be
considered as a new way of detecting irregularities in OS logs.
2. We consider class imbalance in OS log data by applying the Tomek link method.
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3. We build a GRU layer to detect sentiment analysis of log messages. This layer is built
on top of the Tomek link method and a word embedding layer.
4. To enable reproducibility of this research, we provide the source code implementa-
tion of the proposed method, the preprocessed and labeled system log datasets, and
the trained model on a GitHub repository.1 The model can be readily used to de-
tect anomalous activities in an OS log file. Finally, we name the proposed method
pylogsentiment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 9.2 describes the related work on log anomaly
detection, broad sentiment analysis using deep learning, the use of sentiment analysis in
event logs, and the class imbalance problem in sentiment analysis. Threat model and
assumptions used in this paper are provided in Section 9.3. Section 9.4 explains the proposed
method named pylogsentiment. Experiment results and analysis are reported in Section 9.5.
In Section 9.6, we give the conclusion of this work.
9.2 Related work
This section reviews the related work on anomaly detection in log files. Moreover, we
briefly describe the deep learning for sentiment analysis and its application in event log
data. Subsequently, we discuss related work on class imbalance in the context of sentiment
analysis.
9.2.1 Anomaly detection in event log data
An anomaly is the data pattern that are not similar to the normal data behavior [285]. In
the case of log data, anomalies are entries that repeatedly appear (e.g., brute force attacks)
or rarely occur (e.g., a particular service stopped unexpectedly). The system administrator
has to be aware of these types of suspicious events.
Broadly there are three types of anomalies, namely point, collective, and contextual
anomalies [285]. Point anomaly is an individual instance that is anomalous to the rest of
the data. Collective anomaly is when several data occur together as a collection and appear
1https://github.com/studiawan/pylogsentiment
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to be anomalous, while its individual instance may not be an anomaly. The last type is
the contextual anomaly when the data appear in a specific context, which has been defined
regarding each particular problem.
He et al. [190] reviewed several supervised and unsupervised methods for anomaly
detection in publicly available logs. The unsupervised approaches discussed are isolation
forest [296] and principal component analysis (PCA) [297]. The supervised methods include
the decision tree [298], logistic regression [299], and support vector machines (SVM) [300].
The paper [190] reported that the supervised methods provide higher recall and precision
values than the unsupervised ones because the former category has been trained on the
provided datasets.
At an OS level, one can detect anomalies using statistical predictors and a safety margin
[14]. They [14] analyze various features, such as the system call errors, OS signals, and
various device timeouts. A lower and an upper anomaly thresholds have to be calculated
and trained based on the mean and standard deviation of the log data.
Bitton and Shabtai [331] provided another work for OS level anomaly detection. They
focused on a remote desktop protocol installed in electronic flight bag servers. Anomaly
detection acts as a network-based intrusion detection system. This approach is considered
as a fine-grained model because it comprises multiple anomaly detection models such as
k-means clustering and the cluster-based local outliers factor (CBLOF).
Recent research in log anomaly detection has started to adopt deep machine learning
techniques because they show a significant improvement in the performance. For instance,
DeepLog [181] models log entries as a sequence and then trains the normal sequence with
the long short-term memory (LSTM) networks. When there are data that do not conform
with the normal model, they are defined as anomalies. Note that DeepLog is designed for
collective anomaly and it is another type of anomaly detection. It requires a sequence of
entries as the input.
Another LSTM-based deep learning model is used to detect anomalies in cloud operation
log files [301]. Recurrent neural networks (RNN) have been applied along with attention-
based deep learning to capture the context between words in log entries [302]. Unlike
DeepLog [181], the latter method was trained using both normal and anomalous datasets.
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The aforementioned works look into the statistical properties of log data or modeling
log entries as sequences. Unlike the existing approaches, we propose to detect anomalies
based on the sentiment of the log messages. We detect a log entry as an anomaly when the
message in the entry shows a negative sentiment.
9.2.2 Deep learning for sentiment analysis
Many popular deep learning methods have been used to address sentiment analysis, such
as convolutional neural networks (CNN) [332], long short-term memory (LSTM) [333], and
gated recurrent unit (GRU) [334]. Note that the last two architectures are extensions
of recurrent neural networks (RNN) [335]. The advantage of deep learning compared to
traditional machine learning is that deep learning does not need feature definition of the
text data. Another benefit of deep learning is that it provides an easier model development
as the developer needs to give only the input data and basic initial parameters for training.
In the testing phase, the users only input the data and they will be processed based on the
models generated in the learning phase.
dos Santos and Gatti [336] examined short text, especially Tweet data, at both character-
level and sentence-level and then process them with CNN. Severyn and Moschitti [337] used
CNN to train the sentiment model. The difference is that they first initialized the parameter
weights of the convolutional neural network to increase the accuracy. Socher et al. [338]
introduced a sentiment treebank and trained them on the recursive neural tensor network.
Moreover, Araque et al. [327] used ensemble learning techniques for sentiment analysis with
deep learning.
Kim [332] proposed CNN along with pre-trained word embedding to detect sentiment
polarity. It shows good accuracy against various benchmarks. Furthermore, Radford et
al. [339] used LSTM in the byte-level representation of text. Another work employed
hierarchical LSTM to detect sentiment and then considered user and product attention
[328]. For a comprehensive review of sentiment analysis by means of deep learning, the


























Figure 9.2: The proposed method for sentiment analysis to detect anomalous log messages
9.2.3 Sentiment analysis in event log data
Sentiment analysis in log data is not so popular if we compare it to social media or product
reviews. In [340], sentiment analysis was applied to web query logs to detect political
sentiment, specifically right or left wing. A sentiment polarity can be employed to identify
developer emotion in commit logs on public GitHub software repositories [315]. The method
used in that research is the SentiStrength, which is based on a dictionary of sentiment terms
and machine learning [316]. Using the SentiStrength, the authors concluded that a project
with a greater number of team members tends to have more positive sentiment.
Similar research [317] showed that the large number of files changed in a software project
tends to produce negative sentiment in commit logs. The method used was also Sen-
tiStrength. These researches [315, 317] reveal that the commit at the beginning of the
week, specifically Monday and Tuesday, tend to have negative polarity.
However, none of the aforementioned works in event log data applied deep learning to
sentiment analysis. In addition, none of these research addresses the problem in event logs
for computer security purposes. We conduct research on the impact of sentiment analysis
on the system logs in order to detect anomalous activities in them.
9.2.4 Class imbalance in sentiment analysis
The imbalance between the positive and negative classes in sentiment analysis has been
considered in several works. Three main techniques are used to address the class imbal-
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ance, namely under-sampling, over-sampling, and a combination of these two. Mountassir
et al. [341, 342] compared under-sampling methods, specifically random under-sampling,
remove similar, remove furthest, and remove by clustering. Subsequently, the authors used
traditional machine learning such as näıve Bayes, support vector machines, and k-nearest
neighbors. The experimental results show that the random removal technique produces
good performance [341].
Gokulakrishnan et al. [343] applied an over-sampling method called Synthetic Minority
Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) to tackle class imbalance in the case of sentiment anal-
ysis for Twitter data. Then, various methods were used including näıve Bayes, sequential
mining optimization, random forest, and support vector machines. Gokulakrishnan et al.
[343] showed that SMOTE was able to increase the accuracy for all methods. In [326],
the authors used SMOTE, Borderline-SMOTE, and adaptive synthetic (ADASYN) to solve
class imbalance and then used logistic regression and decision trees as sentiment classifi-
cation methods. Similar to [343], Ah-Pine and Soriano-Morales [326] also reported that
SMOTE produces better performance than other methods such as ADASYN.
Another technique used to redress class imbalance is ensemble learning. The ensemble
framework applied a bootstrapping technique and used the same sample for both positive
and negative classes [344]. To choose the best bootstrap model, the authors propose a
step-wise iterative model selection. Similar to other research, Hassan et al. [344] employed
traditional machine learning such as näıve Bayes, support vector machines, and logistic
regression. Furthermore, Li et al. [345] proposed an active learning-based method called
co-selecting to deal with class imbalance for sentiment analysis in product review datasets.
This approach uses two feature subspace classifiers to identify the most informative samples
minority-class.
Krawczyk et al. [346] proposed to address class imbalance by using a one-vs-one binary
decomposition in a Twitter dataset. Then for each pairwise class, the dimensionality of
feature space is reduced using multiple correspondence analysis. In these reduced dimen-
sions, the procedure then applies three methods to fix the class imbalance, namely random
undersampling, random oversampling, and SMOTE. The method then train a combination
of binary and a weighted multi-class classifier. This combination gives more weight to the
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minority class. However, none of these works uses the class imbalance technique followed
by deep learning techniques.
9.3 Threat model and assumptions
The log files save various activities on an OS. The interactions between the users and the
system are recorded as well. For example, the system records error messages or warnings
when an unauthorized user attempts to access a computer server, as illustrated in Figure
9.1. The proposed pylogsentiment is not associated with a specific threat or attack to an
OS. We identify a log entry as an anomaly when the message in the entry shows a negative
sentiment.
The proposed anomaly detection method deals with point anomaly type, where each
log entry is checked for its sentiment. The sentiment model for anomaly detection can
be deployed in real-time or after a security incident has occurred. However, we do not
provide real-time data training to update the model file. Moreover, if log entries do not
provide human-readable message description, such as [<c010ce54>] mtrr wrmsr+0xf/0x2e
in a kernel log, we set them as a positive sentiment in the training phase.
9.4 The proposed method: pylogsentiment
An overall block diagram of pylogsentiment is shown in Figure 9.2. There are two phases
in our anomaly detection technique, namely training phase and production phase. In the
training phase, we first preprocess the OS log files to extract log messages, which contain
the sentiment. Second, we construct word embedding of log messages. Then we address
the class imbalance issue with the Tomek link method before feeding the embedded vectors
of log messages into the GRU layer. The last step in the training phase contains a softmax
layer to decide whether a log message has either a negative or positive sentiment. Note that
the negative polarity is related to anomalous activities, which may have occurred. We save
the trained model in order to be deployed in the production server.
In the production phase, we also preprocess the raw OS logs before checking for anoma-
lies. Detection is conducted based on the sentiment model that is constructed in the training
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Feb  6 15:16:20 victoria sshd[2085]: Invalid user ulysses from 192.168.56.1
timestamp hostname service message (contains sentiment)
Figure 9.3: The preprocessing step to extract a log message containing sentiment
phase. The system administrator then can check the anomaly results for further examina-
tion.
9.4.1 Preprocessing of operating system logs
A log entry has several entities such as timestamp, hostname, service name, and the main
message. The entity which has sentiment is the message, so we need to extract it from the
log entry. This extraction is illustrated in Figure 9.3. Note that we focus on the message
of a log entry as this part contains sentiment, which will be analyzed. Therefore, in the
analysis, we do not consider other entities such as timestamp and hostname.
We use the nerlogparser [17] to parse system log files and extract the main message in
each log entry. The nerlogparser tool is based on named entity recognition (NER), which is
a process used to extract named entities from text. In log files, nerlogparser defines named
entities as words or phrases containing common fields in a log entry such as timestamp, host
name, or service name. The extraction of named entities is the equivalent of identifying
each field in a log entry.
The nerlogparser utilizes bidirectional long short-term memory networks to perform
NER [17]. The main benefit of the nerlogparser is that it provides automatic parsing
because it is completed with a pre-trained model. Therefore, we do not need to define
any rules or regular expressions. It can parse various log files as the nerlogparser has been
trained in diverse types of logs. We define the parsed log messages, which contain sentiment
as M = {M1,M2, . . . ,M|M|} and Mi = {wi1, wi2, . . . , wi|Mi|} where wi is a single word in a
message Mi, |M| is the total length of log messages, and |Mi| is the length of a particular
log message Mi.
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9.4.2 Word embedding as input layer
Before constructing the embedding layer, each word is converted into lowercase. Further-
more, the length of each log message is different. We make the size of the messages equal
to the embedding size. If the log message is shorter than the embedding size, we pad it
with zeros. On the other hand, if it is longer than the embedding size, we truncate it to
the designated size. The padding and truncating is done to enable the data training to be
run efficiently in batches because each batch has to be in the same size.
Before feeding into the neural networks, the first step in building a deep learning ar-
chitecture is to convert raw data into vectors of numbers. First, we build a dictionary
containing a conversion of each word in all log messages to a unique integer. Let us denote
the vocabulary size as v The embedding layer will lookup each log message into a proper
vector of integer. The procedure retrieves a sequence of integers for an input log message
from a dictionary, which has been built previously. The dictionary is defined as D ∈ Zv.
As discussed in the previous section, a log message Mi is defined as:
Mi = {wi1, wi2, . . . , wi|Mi|}, w ∈ D, i ∈ [0, |M|]. (9.1)
Let k be the embedding size. To get embedded representation M ′i for each log message Mi,
we define
ei = D(wi), ei ∈ Zv (9.2)
M ′i = [e1, e2, . . . , el], M
′
i ∈ Z|M|×k (9.3)
where ei is the word embedding of the i-th word in the log message Mi and D is a dictionary
of vocabulary that has already been built. For each integer value, we look up its vector
representation from a pre-trained embedding, namely GloVe which provides a embedding
vector of each word based on statistical properties, such as the occurrence in a context or
a sentence [200]. Note that M ′i includes zero padding when |Mi| < k. The final embedding
vector E ∈ Z|M|×k is then passed to the Tomek link method to fix the class imbalance
problem.
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9.4.3 Solving class imbalance with the Tomek link
We need to address the class imbalance problem to obtain better deep learning model
outputs. If we consider only imbalanced data, the model will tend to learn for the majority
class only. For example, if positive data has 1000 data and negative has 100 data, the
model can achieve 90% accuracy only by detecting the positive sentiment. On the other
hand, in many applications especially in OS logs, the detection of negative sentiment is even
more critical. It is important to address class imbalance because most real-life OS logs are
unbalanced with negative log messages being in the minority.
We use the under-sampling method for class balancing. With balanced data, the model
will be able to detect positive and negative sentiment proportionally. We use the Tomek
link [330] to create a new representation of the majority class by under-sampling. We chose
this method because it removes the samples from the majority class based on the minimum
distance. In OS log data, the majority class is often repetitive and can be considered as a
noise. Therefore, we can remove several log data from the majority class without affecting
the performance.
We can view the Tomek link as a pair of nearest neighbors from different classes [347].
This means that this pair has the most minimum distance compared to other possible pairs.
Let us define Smaj as the majority class and Smin as the minority class. Note that there
are only two classes considered in this paper, specifically positive majority and negative
minority. We then denote a pair of vectors (xi,xj) from embedding vectors of log messages
E, where xi ∈ Smin,xj ∈ Smaj , and d(xi,xj) is the Euclidean distance between xi and xj .
(xi,xj) is a Tomek link if there is no xk, such that:
d(xi,xk) < d(xi,xj) or (9.4)
d(xj ,xk) < d(xi,xj). (9.5)
If a pair of vectors (xi,xj) form a Tomek link, then this pair is near to a class boundary.
The procedure then removes the vector xj , which is a member of majority class Smaj . All
Tomek links are removed until all nearest neighbor vector pairs are in the same class. The
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checking of whether or not a vector pair is in the same class uses the nearest neighbor
method, where the number of neighbors is two.
In the Tomek link, the procedure only removes the links that are a pair of nearest
neighbors between the majority and minority classes. Other undersampling methods delete
many data from the majority class until the number of data between both classes is the
same. In contrast, the Tomek link only removes the links. Consequently, the Tomek link
does not remove many data instances from the majority class. By following this procedure,
we obtain balanced data for training and validation. Subsequently, the GRU layer receives
relatively balanced input data for sentiment classification, which is the balanced embedding
vectors E′.
9.4.4 Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) layer
GRU [319] can learn the long-term dependencies in a sequence and the positional relation
of the whole log messages. GRU is an improvement of LSTM as it has only two gates in its
cell, namely the reset gate and the update gate. The reset gate r is calculated as:
r = σ(Wrxt + Urht−1), (9.6)
where σ denotes the logistic sigmoid function, x is the input vector and ht−1 is the previous
hidden state. Furthermore, Wr and Ur are weight matrices, which are processed to be
optimized. Note that input x is the balanced embedding vectors E′ in this case. The reset
gate manages when the hidden state neglects the previous state and then adjusts with the
current input. Moreover, the update gate z is defined as:
z = σ(Wzxt + Uzht−1), (9.7)
where the notation is similar with the reset gate r. The update gate manages information
from the previous state to the current one [319].
The activation unit ht is denoted by:
ht = z  ht−1 + (1− z) h̃t, (9.8)
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where h̃t is calculated by:
h̃t = tanh(Wh̃txt + Uh̃t(r  ht−1)), (9.9)
where  is the element-wise product.
9.4.5 Softmax as output layer
To estimate the type of sentiment for each log message, pylogsentiment uses a softmax
output layer. This layer predicts a normalized distribution over two possible labels for






where xi = (x1, x2, . . . xn) is the output from the GRU layer. Furthermore, the objective
of the proposed method as a supervised learning is to minimize the cross-entropy loss H,
which is calculated by:




where g is the ground truth distribution and s is the estimated distribution from the softmax
function.
9.5 Experimental results and analysis
In this experiments, we first describe the OS log datasets and experiment settings. After
that, we compare pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection methods and evaluate the
Tomek link with other class balancing techniques. Subsequently, we compare pylogsentiment
to other major deep learning techniques, such as convolutional neural networks (CNN), re-
current neural networks (RNN), long short-term memory (LSTM), and gated recurrent unit
(GRU). These deep learning techniques have been used to address the sentiment analysis
problem in other areas, such as social media or product review data. However, in our ex-
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periments, we test these architectures on OS log data. Finally, we discuss the limitations
of the proposed method.
9.5.1 Operating system log datasets
To test the performance of the proposed method, we use four public datasets of OS logs and
other system logs as shown in Table 9.1. These datasets include various attack scenarios,
which lead to many anomalous or suspicious activities in log messages. This means that
there are many log entries containing negative sentiments. We manually label all of the
log messages from the datasets to obtain the ground truth. Table 9.1 also shows that
there are class imbalances between positive and negative events in all OS log datasets. The
first system logs are extracted from a disk image, namely nps-2009-casper-rw from Digital
Corpora [167]. It is an ext3 file system dump from a bootable USB. This dataset provides
OS logs from a Linux machine.
The second and third OS logs come from an annual security conference, namely The
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS). In 2009, they provided a challenge associ-
ated with OS log forensics. In the DFRWS Forensic Challenge 2009 [6], various log files had
to be investigated in order to trace an attacker who illegally transferred secret data. There
were two hosts involved in this case, namely “jhuisi” and “nssal”. These two hosts were
Sony PlayStation 3 (PS3) devices that run on a Linux OS. “nssal” is the biggest dataset
with 91,349 positive and 15,732 negative entries.
Another OS logs are retrieved from Honeynet Forensic Challenge 7 2011 [2]. This dataset
also provides a disk image of a compromised Linux server. From 12 files, there are 8,162
and 550 for positive and negative activities, respectively. For all datasets, we extracted the
directory /var/log/ from the cloned disk images. We then acquired some common log files
such as authentication logs, kernel logs, and system logs.
To test pylogsentiment against different types of domains, we also use other public
system logs. Zookeeper is a management system for distributed systems. The logs were
acquired from 32 hosts at the CUHK (Chinese University of Hong Kong) laboratory for 26
days [309]. Hadoop is a big data tool that can distribute jobs across machines. The logs
were generated in a Hadoop cluster with 46 cores across five machines [218]. The anomalous
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Table 9.1: A list of public OS logs datasets used in this work
Identifier Description # files # lines # positive # negative
Casper An ext3 disk image from Digital Corpora [167] 15 11,086 9,874 1,212
Jhuisi The jhuisi host from DFRWS Challenge 2009 [6] 25 11,737 9,063 2,674
Nssal The nssal host from DFRWS Challenge 2009 [6] 40 107,093 91,349 15,732
Honey7 A Linux image from Honeynet Challenge 7 2011 [2] 12 8,712 8,162 550
Zookeeper Logs from a distributed system deployed at CUHK [309] 1 74,380 25,873 48,507
Hadoop Hadoop logs for big data processing [218] 978 394,308 382,870 11,438
BlueGene/L Logs from a BlueGene/L super computer at LLNL [206] 1 4,747,963 4,399,486 348,477
Spark* Spark logs for big data processing at CUHK [309] 3852 33,236,604 31,513,147 1,723,457
Honey5* A Linux system from Honeynet Challenge 5 [173] 7 124,386 67,798 56,588
Windows* Windows 7 logs from a CUHK laboratory [309] 1 25,000 18599 6401
*Not included in the training phase. These datasets are for testing unknown anomalies in Section 9.5.6.
events are machine down network disconnections. BlueGene/L is an open dataset from a
BlueGene/L supercomputer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) with
131,072 processors and 32,768 GB memory. The log entries include alert and non-alert logs.
The alert messages indicate anomalous activities.
The last three datasets are not included in the training phase. These datasets are for
testing unknown anomalies, as discussed in Section 9.5.6. Spark is a management tool for
big data processing. The logs were collected from 32 hosts where include both normal and
anomalous activities from the Spark system [309]. Honey5 is from The Forensic Challenge 5
2010, The Honeynet Project [173]. This dataset is a compromised Linux operating system.
The directory /var/log/ has been imaged and the system analyst needs to analyze the
brute-force attack recorded in the log files. Finally, Windows logs were collected from a
Windows 7 machine at CUHK laboratory [309]. The Windows had a CBS (Component
Based Servicing) configured for a secure and controlled software installation.
9.5.2 Experiment settings
We implement pylogsentiment using Python 3.5 and Keras 2.1.5 [308] with TensorFlow
1.8 [208] as the backend. We use imbalanced-learn library [348] to implement the Tomek
link and compare it with various class balancing methods. To run the experiments for the
proposed and baseline methods, we use a computer with 12 cores of CPU, 64GB of RAM,
and NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti 12GB GPU. The output of training and validation step
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is a model file, which is used for the testing step and in production to detect sentiment in
log entries.
Hyperparameters used in the proposed method are explained as follows. The maximum
epoch for training is 50 with a dropout rate of 0.4. We use the batch size of 128 and early
stopping of five times. This means that the training will stop if there is no more improvement
after five epochs. We use Adam [212] as the learning method in GRU architecture. Adam is
good for general cases because it is efficient, it needs only a small amount of RAM, and it is
invariant to gradient scaling. We set the learning rate to 0.001. We set the batch size to 64
and GRU hidden states are set to 64. We split all datasets according to these proportions:
60% for training, 20% for development, and 20% for testing. We merge datasets for training
and validation, respectively. Therefore, there is only one deep learning model that can be
tested to each testing dataset.
For evaluation metrics, we use precision, recall, F1, and accuracy. Precision is the ratio
of the number of true positives and the sum of true and false positives. Recall focuses on
measuring the ability of the methods to detect positive log messages. We can calculate F1









where TP is true positives, FP is false positives, and FN is false negatives. Furthermore,





For each dataset, we calculate the F1 for each file and then obtain the mean F1 for all log
files.
Finally, accuracy provides a proportion of true results for both positive and negative
sentiments among the total number of log messages in the experiment. Therefore, these four
metrics can capture the performances of all methods in various aspects. For each dataset,
we calculate all evaluation metrics and then obtain the mean for all datasets. Precision,
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recall, and F1 are implemented with the scikit-learn library [210] with the “macro average”
option, which means averaging the unweighted mean per label.
9.5.3 Comparison with other log anomaly detection methods
We compared pylogsentiment with five other log anomaly detection techniques from the
loglizer toolbox2 [190]. They are three supervised detection methods, namely decision tree
[298], logistic regression [299], and support vector machines (SVM) [300]. In addition, we
perform a comparison with two unsupervised detection methods, namely isolation forest
[296] and principal component analysis (PCA) [297]. There are other methods provided
in the loglizer tool, such as log clustering and invariants mining. However, we chose these
methods because they provided better performance than others.
Before feeding the log files to the loglizer, we split all log entries to obtain the main
message using the nerlogparser tool [17]. After that, we extract event sequences using the
Drain method [4]. These event sequences are then processed by the loglizer. For large-
scale log files, one can use a parallel log parser, namely POP [349] to extract events before
running the loglizer tool. The performance comparison of pylogsentiment and the five other
anomaly detectors are reported in Table 9.2 to Table 9.5. Note that the bold values in all
tables indicate the best performance.
Among three supervised methods from the loglizer, the decision tree shows the best
performance. For instance, it achieved an F1 score of 90.550%, 89.470%, and 86.359%,
respectively, on the Jhuisi (Table 9.3), the Nssal (Table 9.4), and the Honey7 dataset (Table
9.5). Unlike logistic regression that only works best in linear classification, the performance
of the decision tree is not affected by the linearity. The decision tree is a straightforward
approach for binary classification, such as sentiment analysis. Therefore, the decision tree
provides the best performance compared to other methods from loglizer toolbox.
The performance of logistic regression on all datasets are similar to the SVM. For exam-
ple, they provide similar accuracy of 98.562% and 98.078%, respectively, on the Zookeper
dataset (Table 9.6). A difficulty of SVM to reach optimal performance is that we have to
tune the hyperparameters used in the training step carefully. In these experiments, we tune
2https://github.com/logpai/loglizer
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Table 9.2: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection
techniques on the Casper dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 83.466 77.037 79.488 94.998
Logistic regression 66.959 60.863 59.700 90.993
SVM 58.614 60.757 59.482 90.967
Isolation forest 52.407 50.650 49.926 88.149
PCA 51.205 50.282 49.362 87.480
pylogsentiment 99.487 99.413 99.449 99.459
Table 9.3: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection
techniques on the Jhuisi dataset.
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 91.534 89.769 90.550 93.313
Logistic regression 68.373 66.127 64.886 79.182
SVM 63.643 66.506 64.051 80.914
Isolation forest 57.519 52.774 51.700 74.707
PCA 44.828 49.299 45.014 75.448
pylogsentiment 98.867 98.761 98.813 98.850
the parameter of the traditional machine learning methods using the grid search technique.
It is an exhaustive search over predefined parameter values for the classifiers. Most of the
methods in the loglizer are from scikit-learn library. Therefore, we also implement the grid
search techniques in scikit-learn.
The isolation forest and PCA algorithm broadly failed to identify anomalous events in
repeated log messages because they have a very similar pattern. It is indicated by low
precision and recall values on all datasets. For example in Table 9.7, the isolation forest
achieved only 47.702% precision, while the PCA showed 49.995% precision. In general,
these unsupervised methods show lower performances compare to supervised ones. The
results are clear because the unsupervised techniques do not learn the OS logs data and
heavily rely on the anomaly threshold given by the user.
The overall performances of all methods from the loglizer tool are lower than pylogsen-
timent because they use count matrix as the features. These features then inputted into
various machine learning in the loglizer.
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Table 9.4: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection
techniques on the Nssal dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 94.791 87.700 89.470 98.063
Logistic regression 85.133 74.728 76.476 97.604
SVM 80.206 74.935 76.474 97.655
Isolation forest 65.504 57.352 56.101 80.967
PCA 52.642 53.827 49.505 80.614
pylogsentiment 97.170 96.050 96.602 99.020
Table 9.5: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection
techniques on the Honey7 dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 93.260 83.307 86.359 97.471
Logistic regression 68.143 70.000 69.042 96.286
SVM 68.143 70.000 69.042 96.286
Isolation forest 47.509 50.948 48.064 85.966
PCA 60.871 58.898 55.943 88.279
pylogsentiment 99.970 99.107 99.535 99.943
The count matrix has several disadvantages. First, it only considers the frequency of
events as features. One can add more features such as the inter-arrival rate of events
to provide more information to the classifier about anomalous events. Second, the count
matrix is grouped based on sequence windows. In the case of OS logs, the anomalies do
not always appear in each window. This situation also influences the training process by
machine learning methods in the loglizer tool. This windowing mechanism also does not fit
well with the point anomaly type. Such technique will be a good fit for collective anomalies.
In line with the results from He et al. [190], the three supervised methods provide bet-
ter performance compared to the unsupervised ones. However, pylogsentiment still demon-
strates a superior performance with overall mean F1 and accuracy of 99.135% and 99.590%,
respectively. The reason is that pylogsentiment checks for each content of log messages
rather than extracting only the frequency information from the OS logs.
The overall performance of pylogsentiment and other anomaly detection methods. We
present all evaluation metrics and the value is calculated by obtaining the mean value
for all datasets. Based on Table 9.2 to Table 9.8, we can see that the proposed method
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Table 9.6: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection
techniques on the Zookeeper dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 98.599 98.880 98.737 98.851
Logistic regression 98.369 98.464 98.416 98.562
SVM 97.987 97.769 97.877 98.078
Isolation forest 32.607 50.000 39.473 65.215
PCA 79.011 51.209 42.121 66.021
pylogsentiment 99.722 99.898 99.810 99.973
Table 9.7: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection
techniques on the Hadoop dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 48.523 50.000 49.250 97.046
Logistic regression 48.523 50.000 49.250 97.046
SVM 48.523 50.000 49.250 97.046
Isolation forest 47.702 50.000 48.824 54.034
PCA 49.995 49.996 49.996 58.214
pylogsentiment 99.886 99.732 99.809 99.905
Table 9.8: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other anomaly detection
techniques on the BlueGene/L dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Decision tree 60.576 50.998 50.303 92.348
Logistic regression 54.028 51.852 52.092 90.368
SVM 46.314 50.000 48.087 92.628
Isolation forest 53.081 50.047 51.519 47.389
PCA 51.168 54.260 38.970 48.487
pylogsentiment 99.892 99.963 99.928 99.980
delivers superior performance on average than the other methods. This improvement is
very important because the detection of negative sentiment in OS logs needs to be accurate
so that the administrator can effectively utilize this sentiment-based approach.
9.5.4 Comparison of the Tomek link with other class balancing methods
We apply the class balancing to all datasets using the Tomek link method. Figure 9.4 depicts
the performance of the Tomek link in comparison with other class balancing methods,
namely ADASYN [350], SMOTE [351], random under sampler, instance hardness threshold
203





















Figure 9.4: Comparison of various data balancing methods when combined with the GRU
[352], and neighborhood cleaning rule [353]. Note that these class balancing methods are
positioned before the GRU layer and we save all metrics values after we run them on all
datasets. In addition, we test weighted cross-entropy loss and focal loss [354] that are
commonly used in deep learning to address class imbalance problem. The loss function is
calculated in each epoch of training phase.
Besides the accuracy, we also consider other metrics specifically precision, recall, and
F1 to check model performance against both classes. The reason is that the accuracy value
may be misleading to provide a performance metric as discussed in Section 9.4.3.
As shown in Figure 9.4, the Tomek link showed the best overall value for precision, recall,
F1, and accuracy with 99.836%, 99.839%, 99.837%, and 99.931%, respectively. The recall
value of the Tomek link with 99.839% is slightly better than the weighted cross-entropy
loss with 98.863%. However, the Tomek link is superior in other three metrics. On the
other hand, SMOTE has same performance with the instance hardness threshold in our
case. In the four datasets used in the experiment, the majority class is positive. As we use
the under-sampling method, the size of positive class as the majority is reduced. Note that
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this sampling still produces good performance because many positive log entries are very
similar to each other.
9.5.5 Comparison with other deep learning-based sentiment analysis
The proposed method, pylogsentiment, uses the GRU technique on top of the Tomek link
method for class balancing. To show that the proposed method can achieve the best per-
formance, we compare the proposed method with five baseline methods as listed below.
1. CNN. CNN has been implemented for sentence classification including sentiment
analysis [332].
2. RNN, LSTM, and GRU. Three major deep learning architectures, specifically RNN,
LSTM, and GRU are also applied to all datasets.
3. BRNN. Bidirectional RNN from [320]. Bidirectional technique considers information
from forward and backward direction in the word sequences of the log text data.
We compare all baseline methods and pylogsentiment on seven datasets as shown in
Table 9.9 to Table 9.15. The results of the comparison for the Casper dataset are shown
in Table 9.9 where the bold value indicates the best performance. pylogsentiment gives the
best performance with sophisticated values for all metrics as follows: 99.975% precision,
99.794% recall, 99.884% F1 score, and 99.955% accuracy.
The experimental results on the Jhuisi dataset for all baseline methods and pylogsenti-
ment are shown in Table 9.10. The proposed method which uses GRU and the Tomek link
outperforms other methods. With fewer gates than LSTM, pylogsentiment still generalizes
well on Jhuisi dataset. The performance is also better than its closest competitor, specifi-
cally GRU, on this dataset with 99.637% and 99.745% for F1 and accuracy, respectively.
In all datasets, the performance of regular GRU is comparable to the proposed method
as indicated in Table 9.11. Furthermore, adding the class balance method to GRU improves
the sentiment detection performance. On the Honey7 dataset, pylogsentiment still offers
superior performance than other methods as shown in Table 9.12 with F1 score of 99.535%.
In addition, it shows that the sequence model such as LSTM and GRU are more effective
than using CNN for detecting sentiment in several cases of system logs.
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Table 9.9: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other deep learning tech-
niques on the Casper dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN 98.959 91.358 94.744 98.107
RNN 86.587 54.014 54.769 89.770
BRNN 90.687 70.839 76.723 93.060
LSTM 92.728 90.238 91.433 96.755
GRU 93.614 90.751 92.117 97.026
pylogsentiment 99.975 99.794 99.884 99.955
Table 9.10: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other deep learning tech-
niques on the Jhuisi dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN 94.838 90.290 92.309 94.851
RNN 90.319 87.508 88.801 92.383
BRNN 94.832 92.402 93.544 95.574
LSTM 91.660 90.773 91.206 93.872
GRU 97.976 98.039 98.007 98.596
pylogsentiment 99.769 99.506 99.637 99.745
Table 9.11: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other deep learning tech-
niques on the Nssal dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN 98.144 97.802 97.972 98.987
RNN 93.582 96.334 94.892 97.357
BRNN 97.797 97.847 97.822 98.907
LSTM 92.900 97.005 94.804 97.269
GRU 98.700 99.326 99.010 99.500
pylogsentiment 99.835 99.848 99.842 99.921
The use of Tomek link as an under-sampling method also provides a better model as
it learns from balanced data, while other methods are applied to imbalanced data. RNN
as the base method for LSTM and GRU showed poor results for all datasets. This is why
LSTM and GRU come to improve the RNN. On the Zookeeper and Hadoop datasets, GRU
is better than LSTM with accuracy of 99.140% (Table 9.13) and 99.930% (Table 9.14),
respectively. It is broadly expected because GRU is an improvement of LSTM with fewer
gates inside its architecture.
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Table 9.12: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other deep learning tech-
niques on the Honey7 dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN 94.063 88.785 91.229 98.049
RNN 80.029 70.113 73.913 94.836
BRNN 89.833 88.479 89.142 97.476
LSTM 96.245 97.028 96.632 99.197
GRU 99.410 98.151 98.771 99.713
pylogsentiment 99.550 99.969 99.758 99.943
In non-OS log datasets (Table 9.13 to Table 9.15), pylogsentiment still offers the best
performance because it is a domain-agnostic method, which means it can be applied to
any human-readable and text-based system logs. For example, it achieved 99.993% and
99.980% accuracy on the Zookeeper and Hadoop dataset as displayed in Table 9.13 and
Table 9.14, respectively. Based on the experimental results on non-OS log datasets, regular
GRU provide slightly weaker of overall performance compared to pylogsentiment.
On the other hand, the worst performance is demonstrated by regular RNN on OS log
datasets (Table 9.9 to Table 9.12). The reason is that RNN cannot remember the long-term
dependencies between words in log messages. BRNN provides performance improvement
to RNN as the bidirectional technique train the word vector sequences in both forward and
backward directions.
We have demonstrated that the use of GRU in pylogsentiment produces better results
than LSTM in the case of anomaly detection in system logs. As shown in Table 9.9 to Table
9.15, the performance of pylogsentiment, which uses Tomek link and GRU outperforms its
LSTM based counterpart. The main reason is that log data comprises of short and simple
text. Therefore, it does not need any strong and long dependency features provided by
LSTM. GRU with a fewer gates is more suitable with the characteristics of the log message
data.
Furthermore, while a bulk of the improvement in anomaly detection performance has
been achieved by the deep learning architecture (i.e. GRU), the Tomek link as a class
balancing technique, further improves the performance. To demonstrate the importance
of the Tomek link, an ablative analysis is shown in Table 9.16. As shown in Table 9.16,
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Table 9.13: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other deep learning tech-
niques on the Zookeeper dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN 98.691 99.124 98.901 98.999
RNN 98.741 99.225 98.976 99.066
BRNN 98.623 98.853 98.736 98.851
LSTM 98.776 99.232 98.997 99.086
GRU 98.839 99.286 99.056 99.140
pylogsentiment 99.990 99.995 99.993 99.993
Table 9.14: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other deep learning tech-
niques on the Hadoop dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN 99.608 98.788 99.195 99.910
RNN 96.332 98.684 97.477 99.708
BRNN 99.675 98.790 99.228 99.914
LSTM 98.684 98.869 98.776 99.861
GRU 99.770 98.989 99.376 99.930
pylogsentiment 99.841 99.799 99.820 99.980
for example, for Casper dataset, GRU alone can detect 201 anomalies from the total of
243 anomalies in the test dataset. Our proposed pylogsentiment, which is a combination of
GRU and Tomek link, was able to detect 242 anomalies. It means, pylogsentiment detected
41 additional anomalies out of the remaining 42. A similar trend can be seen for other
datasets. This additional improvement is significant because anomalous log entries are rare
and important.
In summary, we can state that the proposed method outperforms all other methods
in terms of overall precision, recall, F1, and accuracy with 99.836%, 99.839%, 99.837%,
and 99.931%, respectively. The reason is that the GRU which provides better composition
capability than other sequence models, such as RNN or its variants. As GRU has fewer
gates than LSTM, it also can generalize better than LSTM in the case of OS log data.
Moreover, the class balancing achieved with the Tomek link method also offers a better
representation of raw log messages.
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Table 9.15: Performance comparison (%) of pylogsentiment with other deep learning tech-
niques on the BlueGene/L dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN 99.878 99.477 99.676 99.904
RNN 99.394 99.318 99.356 99.825
BRNN 98.789 99.058 98.923 99.714
LSTM 99.281 99.800 99.539 99.879
GRU 98.704 99.460 99.078 99.726
pylogsentiment 99.892 99.963 99.928 99.980
Table 9.16: Comparison of detected anomalies by GRU and pylogsentiment
Dataset
Total anomalies Detected anomalies
on testing dataset GRU only pylogsentiment
Casper 243 201 242
Jhuisi 536 520 531
Nssal 3147 3118 3139
Zookeeper 110 106 110
Hadoop 9702 9586 9701
9.5.6 Detecting anomalies on unseen datasets
We discuss the robustness or generalizability of pylogsentiment in detecting unknown
anomalies on datasets that have not been trained before. These datasets include Spark
logs [309], Honey5 (a compromised Linux host) logs [173], and Windows logs [309]. Note
that pylogsentiment has never seen these datasets before. Nevertheless, pylogsentiment still
provides a good performance to detect unknown anomalies as provided in Table 9.17. For
instance, it achieved 95.651% and 99.467% F1 scores on the Spark and Honey5 datasets,
respectively.
pylogsentiment has been trained on a number of training datasets (Table 3.1) and is able
to deal with unknown anomalies as shown in Table 9.17. It is also applicable in a production
environment as shown in Honey5 logs from a different Linux host. It also works well even
on a significantly different type of unseen logs, specifically on Windows logs dataset, and it
achieved a recall rate of 91.119%. The main reasons are two fold. First, we use the GloVe
word embeddings [200] to represent log messages. GloVe is able to capture the relationship
and meaning between words. Second, we use a supervised deep learning model combined
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Table 9.17: Performance of pylogsentiment (%) on unseen datasets
Dataset Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Spark 99.451 92.447 95.651 99.205
Honey5 99.448 99.487 99.467 99.471
Windows 83.884 91.119 85.992 88.028
with an under-sampling technique that achieved high performances on both previously seen
and unseen datasets.
The example of the applicability of GloVe in contributing to detect unknown anomalies
is as follows. Let us take one word “failed” that has close meaning to “error”. In this
example, let us assume “failed” is never seen in the training dataset, but “error” appears
in training. We can still recognize a log entry containing the word “failed” as anomalous
because they have close meaning based on GloVe word vectors and very high similarity of
meaning with the vocabularies of log messages that have been trained.
In a production environment, we can easily deploy pylogsentiment by invoking this
command after installation process as explained on the GitHub page3: pylogsentiment
-i log file, where log file is an arbitrary log file to be checked for its anomalies. Note
that there is only one final model file of pylogsentiment that can be applied to arbitrary log
files. For the aforementioned reasons and an ease of deployment, the proposed method is
applicable in detecting unknown anomalies and can be implemented on a production server.
9.5.7 Limitations
Despite its high accuracy to detect anomalous OS log messages, pylogsentiment has several
limitations as discussed below.
Training for more OS log datasets. Deep learning models are highly dependent on the
datasets to be learned from in the training phase. Public log datasets, such as Loghub,4 can
be used to make the sentiment model to generalize well across various events in OS logs or




two other untrained datasets to test pylogsentiment. However, there are still more datasets
to be included in the training phase.
Mechanism for model update. At the moment, pylogsentiment does not have a mech-
anism to update the sentiment model. This update is useful because the OS events or
activities recorded in the log files will continue to change dynamically. The main source
of the update procedure is the anomalous log inputs from the system administrators. The
model update will improve the detection performance of the proposed method.
Nonhuman-readable OS log entries. pylogsentiment only deals with human-readable log
messages because it detects anomalies by identifying their sentiments. However, in several
cases, there are log entries that are not human-readable. In this work, pylogsentiment still
recognizes them as positive sentiments. A possible solution for this issue is to build an
advanced deep learning method to recognize special entities such as kernel-related activity
(e.g., [<c010ce54>] mtrr wrmsr+0xf/0x2e, memory address (e.g., lowmem : 0xc0000000 -
0xcfff0000 (255 MB)), or another hardware-related log entry (e.g., ACPI: RSDP 000E0000,
0024 (r2 VBOX)). Subsequently, the deep learning model will determine these entities as
anomalous or not.
9.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to apply sentiment analysis to detect anomalous activities in
OS logs. We use a deep learning technique, namely gated recurrent unit (GRU) on top
of the Tomek link as a class imbalance method. We consider class imbalance because, in
real-life OS logs, the number of negative sentiments is smaller than the positive ones. To
produce a better deep learning model, we first address this class imbalance issue. Based on
the experimental results, the proposed method achieved the best performance compared to
other baseline methods with F1 of 99.84% and accuracy of 99.93%. pylogsentiment is also
applicable to other types of system logs.
The method presented in this chapter is the third main method for anomaly detection
that can be applied in a forensic timeline. In the next chapter, we explain the fusion
method for the previous three major techniques that have been discussed in the previous
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chapters. The fusion considers three methods, specifically cluster-based detection, deep
autoencoders-based detection, and sentiment analysis-based detection. Note that we use
aspect-based sentiment (Chapter 8) and sentiment analysis with class balancing method
(Chapter 9) in the fusion method.
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Chapter 10
Fusion method for anomaly
detection in a forensic timeline
To investigate a cyber attack, an investigator usually needs to construct a forensic timeline
and find any anomalous events. Current anomaly detection techniques in a forensic timeline
only uses one particular method. This chapter proposes a classifier fusion for anomaly
detection based on multiple methods, specifically normal baseline-based detection, aspect-
based sentiment analysis, and data balancing combined with sentiment analysis. The results
of experiments conducted on two datasets show that the fusion method can improve anomaly
detection performance in system logs.
10.1 Introduction
A forensic timeline shows an orderly sequence of events after a cybersecurity attack. It
is extracted from a disk image acquired after the incident. One of the primary sources of
this timeline is log files from the operating system. The investigators analyze all activities
before, during, and after the attack [9]. They mainly search for anomalous events in the
timeline that may be related to the attack [8].
Existing techniques require investigators to use a manual search [8] or type a possible
keyword in the timeline for searching suspicious activities [7]. Marrington et al. [108]
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discuss time inconsistency from Windows event logs using the Lamport theory to identify
any abnormal sequence and possible missing activities.
In this work, we propose to use a fusion method to identify anomalies in a forensic
timeline. The fusion method aims to improve the performance of detection by combining
the output from each classifier. We use weighted voting for classifier fusion. We combine
three approaches in the fusion. First, it is anomaly detection using deep autoencoders based
on normal activities baseline (Chapter 7). Second, anomaly detection with aspect-based
sentiment analysis (Chapter 8). Finally, we use data balancing, combined with sentiment
analysis of log messages as an anomaly detector (Chapter 9).
We use a weighted voting strategy on these three methods to decide whether a log entry is
anomalous or not. The final results of anomaly detection are displayed in a forensic timeline
to help the investigators analyze a security incident. It should be noted that the focus of
this chapter is to investigate whether our previously developed methods can complement
in a multi-classifier fusion pipeline. As such we use off-the-shelf simple weighted voting
mechanism for the fusion.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 reviews work related to fusion meth-
ods and anomaly detection in forensic investigation. Section 10.3 describes the proposed
method. Section 10.4 presents the experimental results and analyses. Finally, Section 10.5
concludes this chapter.
10.2 Related work
In this section, we summarize related work on fusion for anomaly detection in the area of
computer security. Moreover, anomaly detection in forensic investigation is presented in
the subsequent section.
10.2.1 Fusion methods for anomaly detection
Classifier fusion is a technique whereby several classifiers are combined to provide a decision
or classification results. However, each method is prone to producing misclassification or
other errors. With the fusion technique, different methods are applied to the same data and
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should generate different errors. Therefore, a combination of these methods is intended to
decrease overall classification errors [355]. Fusion can be performed at various level, e.g.,
data, feature, sensor, rank, or classifier level [356].
Mi et al. [357] use a fusion of multiple decision templates with different weights to
detect anomalies in various datasets. Data fusion can also be applied to boost the accuracy
of detection. For instance, data is processed using the Damster-Shafer theory and principal
component analysis [358].
Cai et al. [359] propose a fusion of the Ball vector machine and the extreme learning
machine to identify anomalies in features extracted from network traffic datasets. The
fusion function used is weighted majority voting, where the weights are learned using a
neural network technique. Eldardiry et al. [360] detect anomalous activities from a threat
by applying multi-source data as information to recognize anomalies. For each user, the
procedure calculates the weighted score for each data source, then aggregates the weighted
scores, and calculates the final anomaly score.
10.2.2 Anomaly detection in a forensic investigation
Schindler [15] uses two Support Vector Machines to detect an anomaly in log data. The first
SVM is used to separate multiple predefined classes from each other. The feature vectors
are based on Windows logon, logoff, and firewall logs. The second SVM is a one-class SVM
used to classify previously discovered classes under normal and anomaly events. Hu et al.
[112] propose anomaly detection based on user activity. First, the various formats of multi-
source logs, including OS logs, are normalized by means of metadata extraction. Then,
user-specific models are constructed to issue alerts for users whose event patterns are not
similar to those of their training phase patterns.
Event logs are first preprocessed to prepare them for analysis. A rule mining method,
such as association rules [106] or attribute-oriented induction [111], is used to obtain a base
user profile. Additionally, a machine learning approach such as SVM [15], is applied in this
step to generate base profiles for existing users. The investigation includes filtering profiles,
intra-profile analysis, and comparison with input log entries to the discovered base profiles.
This process will generate a report containing anomalies within a specific time frame.
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Marrington et al. [107, 108] reconstruct Windows event logs using the Lamport time
relationship method to identify a temporal anomaly. This strategy can distinguish events
that are out-of-sequence or missing. The benefit of this approach is that it can operate
automatically to support the forensic examination. Nevertheless, it recognizes anomalies
without fixing them or identifying the missed events.
In a virtual machine environment [109], an anomaly detection approach was developed
that used the timestamp as the primary entity. The researchers used the Lamport method to
find abnormal events from virtual operating system logs, similar to previous work [107, 108].
Another paper suggested cross-referencing the timestamps throughout the file system and
file metadata [303].
10.3 The proposed fusion method
Our proposed fusion anomaly detection method is shown in Figure 10.1. We combine three
main methods: detection based on a normal activity baseline, the aspect-based sentiment
analysis, and the data balancing combined with the sentiment of log messages. The results
of anomaly detection is a fusion decision obtained from these three novel methods presented
in Chapter 7, Chapter 8, and Chapter 9, respectively. We do not use graph clustering for
anomaly detection (Chapter 5) in the proposed fusion method because it is an unsupervised
learning technique and quite hard to generalize well in certain log data types.
10.3.1 Anomaly detection based on normal baseline
First, we preprocess the log files to parse log entries. Similar to the other methods, we use
the nerlogparser [17] to obtain messages from raw log entries. Subsequently, we generate
events from each log message. Here, an event is an abstraction from a group of log entries.
We have described details about log abstraction in Chapter 6. For each event, we extract five
features to be fed to deep autoencoders. These features include event frequency, duration,
inter-arrival rate, the number of bad words, and log message length.
Autoencoders are a neural network architecture that learn input vectors to obtain the
output vector where its number of neurons is the same as the inputs. The autoencoders have
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Figure 10.1: Proposed fusion method for automatic anomaly detection in a forensic timeline
two parts, namely an encoder and an decoder. Note that we input to the autoencoders only
the features of normal events. Finally, this phase outputs a baseline vector that represents
normal activities. Reconstruction errors are calculated from the baseline model, and then
a threshold is established to distinguish anomalous log entries. This method has been
described in Chapter 7. We name this method log-autoencoders.
10.3.2 Aspect-based sentiment analysis for anomaly detection
With this method, we first preprocesses the log files to extract messages containing negative
or positive sentiments. We employ the nerlogparser [17] which can automatically split each
entity in a log entry and obtain the event messages. Second, this method builds word
embeddings to represent text messages as a vector of numbers. We use a pre-trained word
embedding, namely, GloVe version glove.42B.300 [200]. GloVe produces the embedding
value for each word based on its statistical properties, such as word occurrence in a certain
context or a particular sentence.
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Furthermore, there are two attention-based techniques in the main deep learning archi-
tecture: a context attention layer and a content attention layer. To address the context
attention, we use gated recurrent unit (GRU) networks [319] as the deep learning technique.
To more accurately detect the aspect sentiment, we use the content attention layer which is
used specifically for sentence representation. This representation improves the significance
of a word in terms of aspect sentiment within the entire content and enables us to capture
the important sentiment features [314].
We then use a softmax layer to determine whether a message sentiment is positive or
negative. In the last step of the training phase, we save the sentiment model. One can
detect the sentiments using the model from this training step. This aspect-based sentiment
analysis for anomaly detection has been explained in Chapter 8. For the sake of simplicity,
we call this approach log-aspects.
10.3.3 Anomaly detection with data balancing and sentiment analysis
We extract log messages from raw log files using the nerlogparser. These messages contain
either positive or negative sentiments. We then construct word embedding of log messages
using GloVe [200]. This involves addressing the class imbalance issue in system logs with
the Tomek link method [330] before feeding the embedded vectors of log messages into the
GRU layer [319].
The last step in the training phase contains a softmax layer to decide whether a log
message has a negative or positive sentiment. Note that the negative polarity is related to
anomalous activities, which might have occurred. We save the trained model so that it can
be deployed in the testing or production phase to detect anomalies. This method has been
discussed this method in Chapter 9, and henceforth is referred to as pylogsentiment in the
rest of this chapter.
10.3.4 Classifier fusion for anomaly detection
The fusion method is based on the notion that each classifier applied to the same log data
can produce different classification errors. When combined, the fusion can obtain the best-
predicted class for the data. A particular classifier provides each class label. In this work,
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we use weighted majority voting [355] as the fusion technique. Each classifier provides a
class label and has a classifier weight.
The procedure calculates the multiplication between each class decision and its weight.
The fusion determines class j as the final predicted class for a log entry where it produces








where k is the number of classes, n is the number of classifier methods, w is the weight of
classifier, and d is the decision of the classifier. The weight w for each classifier is 0.3, 0.3,
and 0.4, for the log-autoencoders, log-aspect, and pylogsentiment, respectively. Each classifier
does not provide the same performance. Therefore, we give the better classifier a higher
weight for the final decision. The pylogsentiment is assigned a greater weight because it
achieves a very good performance as discussed in Chapter 9 and can improve the voting
results. The decision d is defined as follows.
dt,j =

1, if Ct gives correct label in the class j
0, otherwise
(10.2)
where Ct is the classifier t. If the classifier Ct outputs class j, then the decision d is 1, and
vice versa.
10.3.5 Constructing a forensic timeline
In this study, the primary source of the forensic timeline is log files. We parse the log files
using the nerlogparser, merge them to only one file, and then sort them chronologically
based on their timestamps. They are then saved in a CSV (comma-separated value) file.
Then, we import the CSV file to the Timesketch [289]. It is a tool used to depict a forensic
timeline where one of the sources is a CSV file.
The mandatory fields for CSV files for the Timesketch are message, datetime, and
timestamp desc. We then add two more fields, namely hostname, and service name. We can
import this CSV file into Timesketch by issuing this command: tsctl import --sketch id 10
--file timeline.csv --timeline name windows --username admin, where tsctl is the command-
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Table 10.1: Attributes of the two public log datasets used in the experiments
Identifier Description # lines # normal # anomaly
Windows Windows 7 logs from a CUHK laboratory [309] 149,835 28,064 121,771
Linux Linux logs from a honeypot server [234] 37,925 9,504 28,421
line tool for managing Timesketch, sketch id is the identifier of the specific sketch, while
the timeline name and username are self-explanatory.
10.4 Experimental results and analyses
In this section, we present the results of experiments conducted on two public log datasets.
First, we describe the datasets and then the experiment settings. Subsequently, we explain
the results and the detailed analyses of the experiments.
10.4.1 Datasets
We acquired two operating system logs from a public repository. These datasets were from
two different operating systems, specifically Windows and Linux. These logs are displayed
chronologically in a forensic timeline. A list of system logs used for the experiments is given
in Table 10.1.
The Windows logs were collected from a Windows 7 machine at CUHK laboratory [309]
and are available on GitHub1. The Windows has a CBS (Component Based Servicing)
configured for secure and controlled software installation. The Linux logs were from a
honeypot server on a RedHat distribution [234]. The log files in the honeypot contained
various attempts to gain access to the server. For example, failure authentication, failed
login, wrong username, unknown user, and timeout authentication error.
10.4.2 Experiments and analyses
To implement the deep learning technique, such as deep autoencoders, GRU, and LSTM
used in the proposed method, we used TensorFlow [208] with Keras [308] as the frontend.
We used standard metrics, including precision, recall, F1, and accuracy, to evaluate the
1https://github.com/logpai/loghub
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Table 10.2: Performance evaluation on the Windows logs dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
log-autoencoders 91.110 97.508 93.843 95.950
log-aspects 95.620 95.688 95.654 97.352
pylogsentiment 86.551 93.132 89.267 92.853
Fusion 95.216 96.478 95.831 97.426
Table 10.3: Performance evaluation on the Linux logs dataset
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
log-autoencoders 85.895 91.059 87.886 90.199
log-aspects 95.118 94.227 94.661 96.029
pylogsentiment 96.211 94.015 95.047 96.367
Fusion 95.741 95.436 95.587 96.696
performance of all methods being investigated. We used the scikit-learn library [210] with
the “macro average” parameter, which means averaging the unweighted mean per label.
We used a machine with 12 cores of CPU, 64GB of RAM, and NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080
Ti 12GB GPU as the hardware.
The experimental results of the fusion method applied to the Windows dataset are
shown in Table 10.2. As evident, when the fusion method is applied, the performance
is generally better than that of a single method. The fusion shows 95.831% of F1 and
97.426% of accuracy. Table 10.3 reports the results of the fusion method compared with
the other three methods applied to the Linux dataset. The fusion is able to obtain the best
performance with recall, F1, and accuracy. The best metric values are shown in bold.
The increase of the performance can be achieved because the fusion combines the three
methods. For example, if one method is unable to identify an anomaly correctly, another
method may detect it correctly. The results obtained from experiments demonstrate that
the assigned weights for each classifier increase the F1 and accuracy. The weight of the
sentiment analysis is higher than those of the other two methods. The reason is that based
on our previous work (Chapter 8 and Chapter 9), the sentiment-based technique gives high
accuracy compared to other approaches. Finally, the fusion method can be deployed in a
real production environment, when the model of the supervised methods are available.
We can apply a particular method separately, and it does provide high accuracy. How-













Figure 10.2: A plot of the sentiment analysis results on a Timesketch forensic timeline from
an auth.log [6]. The investigator can easily spot the events of interest.
rics, the log-autoencoder does not perform better than the sentiment approaches because it
depends on the five features to learn. However, in the log-aspect and pylogsentiment, the
input is the pre-trained word embedding using GloVe with vector values to represent each
word in a log message. Therefore, deep learning architectures can learn more about the
data.
10.4.3 Displaying anomalous events in a forensic timeline
The forensic timeline is constructed using the log2timeline tool as discussed in Section
10.3.5. We then apply the fusion to identify anomalous events and the results are displayed
in a timeline to assist the forensic investigator. We use the Timesketch tool [289] to plot
anomalous events on a forensic timeline. We use Timesketch because it is the latest and
most improved application for displaying the activity timeline. It is a forensic tool that
allows the investigative examination of a timeline. As shown in Figure 10.2, we use tabular-
based views to display the anomalous log messages. Blue denotes the aspect word, while
red indicates the suspicious word.
A sample visualization of the forensic timeline is shown in Figure 8.7 with a portion
of the case of DFRWS 2009 [6] that was using a Linux host. In the DFRWS 2009 case, a
user is suspected of transferring an illegal file, a drug recipe. Based on the scenario solution
provided in [6], the user “goatboy” is responsible for this recipe file of illegal drug recipes
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in exchange for a subscription to Mardi Gras images and a video library. The depiction of
this event, as shown in Figure 10.2, gives a forensic investigator a general indication of the
timeline before they examine specific surrounding events.
A section of the forensic timeline for the auth.log file from the DFRWS 2009 jhuisi host
is shown in Figure 10.2. Because they are highlighted, the forensic investigator can easily
discern the anomalous events. In Figure 10.2, the events of interest are “authentication
failure” and “failed password” for the user “goatboy”. The investigator can then exam-
ine these events and their surrounding events to identify possible incidents caused by an
attacker.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a classifier fusion for the detection of anomalies in a forensic
timeline. We use three supervised methods, namely the log-autoencoders (Chapter 7), log-
aspects (Chapter 8), and pylogsentiment (Chapter 9) for the fusion method. The results of
experimentals show that the fusion technique can provide better performance compared to
the already high performances by the classifiers individually. After the detection step, the
anomalous events are highlighted in the forensic timeline to assist the investigator.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we conclude the research with a summary of the five main contributions
made by this thesis. Each contribution is intended to achieve a specific research aim.
Subsequently, we discuss the future work of the research.
11.1 Summary of contributions
The parsing of event logs is the first step in the process of anomaly detection. We model log
parsing as a named entity recognition problem. For this first major contribution, we use a
deep machine learning technique to train the entity recognizer on various log files. We chose
the bidirectional long short-term memory approach because this architecture is originally
designed to detect sequences. In the case of a log entry, these sequence refers to the fields
such as timestamp, hostname, service name, and the main message. The bidirectional model
is used to increase the detection performance as the procedure runs in both forward and
backward context in the sequence. The proposed method is an automatic tool for event log
parsing that does not require forensic investigators to define any parsing rules. In addition,
it provides genericity as only one model file is required to parse various types of log files.
The second contribution is the automatic graph-based clustering for the detection of
anomalies. Two automatic clustering techniques are proposed. The first automatic cluster-
ing involves a novel graph-theoretic approach for security log clustering based on maximal
clique percolation. We model the logs as a maximal clique graph and relax it to a weighted
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graph. This is because the proposed graph model considers the string similarity between
two log entries as an edge weight. With the graph data structure, the logs are grouped
naturally because the log entries are connected by their similarity. Afterwards, we add
an intensity threshold to the obtained maximal clique to consider the edge weight before
proceeds to the percolations. Subsequently, we use the simulated annealing algorithm to
optimize the number of percolations and intensity threshold for maximal clique percolation.
The entire process is automatic and does not need any user input. Therefore, the proposed
method makes the investigation of the security logs significantly easier because no input
parameters are needed.
Another proposed automatic clustering technique is completed with anomaly detection.
We propose a novel method to automatically detect an anomaly in the system logs. The logs
are first pre-processed and then clustered using an improved MajorClust algorithm to obtain
a better clustering. This technique provides parameter-free clustering so it automatically
can produce an analysis report for the forensic investigators. The clustering results are
checked for anomalies based on a score that considers several factors. These factors include
the total number of members in a cluster, the frequency of the events in the log file, and
the inter-arrival time of a specific activity. An estimated threshold for anomalousness is
provided to detect this behavior automatically.
The third contribution involves the detection of anomalies based on normal baseline
activities. First, we extract events from system logs using automatic abstraction. We
propose an automatic method to facilitate event log abstraction avoiding the need for the
user to manually identify suitable parameters. We model event logs as a graph and propose
a new graph clustering approach to group log entries. The abstraction is then extracted
from each cluster. We propose a novel graph model for logs with a new edge weight,
namely weighted Hamming similarity. We propose automatic graph clustering based on
Girvan-Newman community detection and a modularity value to obtain the best cluster
configurations. The final step is to extract log abstractions from each cluster automatically
without the need for user intervention.
We then propose a method for identifying anomalies in a forensic timeline. We use a
machine learning technique, namely deep autoencoders, to establish a baseline for normal
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activities in log files. Furthermore, we set an anomaly threshold for reconstruction value
based on the constructed baseline. We then plot these anomalous events on a forensic
timeline. The proposed model is a novel application of the deep autoencoders for detecting
anomalies in operating system log files as the main source of a forensic timeline. We use a
sparse variant of deep autoencoders to detect anomalous events, which can be visualized in
a forensic timeline. This approach assists the forensic examination in analyzing the timeline
containing numerous activities. We present various features from log files extracted from
each abstraction in the previous step. Once the model has been trained, it can be used to
detect the anomalous events in a forensic timeline with a recommended anomaly threshold
value.
The fourth major contribution is the sentiment-based anomaly detection in a forensic
timeline. We propose two approaches in this area. First, we propose a sentiment analysis
technique to automatically identify anomalies from log messages in the forensic timeline.
We use a deep learning technique with a context and content attention techniques to iden-
tify aspect terms and the corresponding sentiments in the forensic timeline. The anomalies
are modelled as negative sentiments. Therefore, the investigator can conduct a timely ex-
amination of the events and other activities recorded in the time frame. Once the sentiment
model is trained, it can be used to automatically detect the events of interest in a forensic
timeline, and no further input is required.
In another sentiment-based approach, we propose a deep learning technique to check
whether there are anomalous activities in system logs. Log messages are modelled as sen-
tences and we identify the sentiments therein using the gated recurrent unit networks.
System log datasets inherently have a class imbalance in the sense that the number of neg-
ative sentiment is much lower than the number of positive ones. In order to address the
class imbalance, we build a GRU layer on top of a class imbalance solver using the Tomek
link method. The extraction of negative sentiments can be considered as a novel approach
to the detection of anomalies in system logs.
Finally, we propose a fusion method for anomaly detection in a forensic timeline based
on the three major methods explained earlier. The fusion considers normal baseline activ-
ities, aspect-based sentiment, and data balancing combined with sentiment analysis of log
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messages as the main source of a forensic timeline. The fusion method takes advantage of
these novel approaches and provides more accurate identification results.
11.2 Future work
Several parts of the proposed framework use deep learning techniques and they need the
training to produce a model. Deep learning techniques can be trained on various event
types and a large volume of log data. This can capture a wide variety of environments
and event situations, thereby making the system well generalized. For instance, there are
16 datasets in the Loghub public repository [361]. In addition, the proposed framework
can be deployed and tested on other types of event logs such as particular application logs,
supercomputer logs, web server logs, web proxy logs, to name a few.
It is also worth noting that the runtime of the authentication log forensic analysis can still
be improved. Some research in the digital investigation area has considered this problem
[362]. We plan to implement the parallel version of the proposed method to decrease
the processing time so that the authorities will receive the result promptly and report
it immediately. This is one of our priorities since we believe that the evidence not only
originates from a single host but can also be obtained from a cluster environment.
At this stage, we do not have a mechanism for updating the proposed model in real-time.
This update is useful because the events recorded in the log files will continue to change
dynamically. The primary source of the update procedure is the anomalous log inputs
from the forensic investigator or system administrators. The model update procedure will
improve the detection performance of the proposed framework.
The proposed sentiment-based anomaly detection deals only with human-readable log
messages because it detects anomalies by identifying their sentiments. However, in sev-
eral cases, there are log entries that are not human-readable. In this work, the proposed
method recognizes them as positive sentiments. A possible solution for this issue is to
construct a more advanced deep learning model to recognize special entities such as kernel-
related activity (e.g., [<c010ce54>] mtrr wrmsr+0xf/0x2e, memory address (e.g., lowmem
: 0xc0000000 - 0xcfff0000 (255 MB)), or another hardware-related log entry (e.g., ACPI:
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RSDP 000E0000, 0024 (r2 VBOX)). Subsequently, the model will determine whether or
not these entities as anomalous.
For the fusion method, we plan to apply a learnable weight or confidence-based weighting
scheme. This approach will improve the detection performance because it will determine
the weight in the fusion dynamically. The proposed fusion weighting is still based on a
static weight in this thesis.
This research is primarily focused on anomaly detection in a forensic timeline. We also
plan to extend the detection on top of forensic event reconstruction. The reason is that
the event log is one of the main sources for forensic reconstruction. This integration will
complete the reconstruction process and provide a comprehensive insight into the whole
logs. Therefore, the investigator is able to more easily identify any malicious activities in
the event log files.
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Appendix A
Sample list of anomalous log
entries
This appendix provides a sample list of anomalous log entries in Linux log files discussed in
this paper. Note that log files are the primary source of the forensic timeline in this work.
The full list can be found at https://bit.ly/loganomaly.
1. Invalid user. The attacker attempts to access the system with an incorrect user. This
event is usually triggered when the attacker launches a brute-force technique and uses
usernames from a dictionary.
2. Did not receive identification string. The attacker may try to access the system but
does not finish the authentication process. A port scanning activity can also cause
this event.
3. Reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo. The connected client has a bad or no reverse
DNS. This message may be unauthorized attempt access to the server.
4. Failed password. A user may mistype the SSH password. If the message occurs
repeatedly, an attacker tried to guess the password using an automatic tool.
5. Failed none. The attacker attempts to log in with an empty password.
6. Cannot determine username. The Linux authentication process cannot find the user-
name given. An attacker may try to type a random username to login to the system.
7. Cannot execute. Linux systems cannot recognize the executed file or script.
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8. Incorrect password attempt. A user has a valid username but an incorrect password.
9. Killed by TERM signal. The kernel kills the specified process because of memory or
swap exhaustion.
10. Deactivating device. The network manager deactivates a device.
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Appendix B
List of datasets used in this thesis
This appendix shows a list of datasets used in this thesis. All of them are publicly available
and can be downloaded for free.
1. BlueGene/L super computer logs [206]
2. Digital Corpora casper-rw host [167]
3. DFRWS 2009 jhuisi and nssal host [6]
4. DFRWS 2016 [207]
5. Honeynet Challenge 5 [173]
6. Honeynet Challenge 7 [2]
7. Kippo honeypot [19]
8. Proxifier logs [190]
9. SecRepo access logs [174]
10. Zookeeper logs [190]
11. Authentication logs I [232]
12. Authentication logs II [174]
13. Snort IDS logs [177]
14. MACCDC Snort IDS logs [233]
15. Honeypot syslog [234]
16. Hadoop logs [218]
17. Spark logs [309]
18. Windows 7 logs [309]
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